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Abstract 
 
 
 
Rural economies in developing countries are often characterised by high levels of 
inequality, particularly so in their distribution of land. This can lead to the 
establishment of patron-client relationships between peasants and their landlords 
with far-reaching social, political, and economic implications for both parties. 
This thesis investigates whether, and how, clientelist networks change, when 
connecting isolated villages become connected to the outside economy. It does so 
from three different perspectives. Firstly, it highlights the ability of resource rich 
landlords to interlink different markets in the rural economy in an effort to 
maximise surplus extraction. Yet, when peasants are provided credible exit 
options, the change in relative bargaining powers alters the character of such 
interlinkages in favour of the peasants. Secondly, it explores how clientelism 
enables landlords to use peasant votes as bargaining chips with politicians to 
appropriate public resources for their own private benefit. Yet, when peasants are 
given outside options, the landlord has to provide them with public goods in order 
to maintain his economic and social standing in the village. Lastly, it analyses 
peasants’ difficulty in engaging in community driven projects when residing under 
a strong patron. Yet, when landlords have to compete with markets outside the 
village, they no longer have the incentive or ability to block peasant collective 
action for self provision. In all three areas, it is argued that the patrons’ ability to 
control peasant activities stems from the interaction of inequality with isolation, 
which provides them with monopoly/monopsony powers. Hence while policy 
solutions to exploitative forms of clientelism have typically focused on land 
redistribution, I argue that similar results are attainable by increasing peasants’ 
outside options. In order to test the validity of this hypothesis I make use of a 
natural experiment found in the construction of a motorway in rural Punjab, 
Pakistan. The research design compares connected villages dominated by large 
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landlords to isolated ones and uses villages with relatively egalitarian distribution 
of land as a control group. Making use of field interviews and quantitative survey 
data the thesis finds that connectivity results in converging outcomes between 
connected villages dominated by large landlords and those with more egalitarian 
distribution of land. The results suggest that connecting villages previously 
isolated from the outside economy can go a long way to help the rural poor.   
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1. Introduction 
 
 
Developing countries the world over are plagued by high levels of inequality, 
particularly in their distribution of land. While this has implications for the 
economy at large, the effects of land inequality are particularly detrimental in 
rural areas where the majority of the population relies on agriculture, either 
directly or indirectly, to generate an income. Given that the World Bank (2008) 
estimates that three out of four people in developing countries live in rural areas, 
the effects of land inequality are therefore felt by the vast majority of the 
population in these countries. Lipton (2009), while pushing for more active land 
reform policies, argued that land must be treated as a special asset as, unlike other 
financial assets, it can be used in combination with the poor’s main, and maybe 
even only, endowment which is labour to help generate a livelihood that could 
pull them out of poverty. Moreover, ownership of this asset enables the holders to 
use it as collateral for accessing formal credit and insurance markets, thus further 
increasing their ability to pull themselves out of poverty. Also, land in agrarian 
economies entails high social value and is instrumental in determining the 
households’ social status within rural society (Deininger and Binswanger 1999). 
As a result, the poverty faced by landless households is not only economic in 
nature but also has a social dimension which can at times result in exclusion.  
 
Therefore, the concentration of this asset in a few hands, places the vast majority 
in a position of economic and social dependency vis-à-vis the resource rich. 
Dependency of this form can result in the resource holder enjoying considerable 
leverage over the resource poor, as the goods and services that he provides are 
vital to the survival of poor households and thus have an inelastic demand. In 
exchange, the poor provide services such as their labour, their political support by 
agreeing to vote in accordance with the landlord’s political preferences, and their 
social following by providing loyalty and deference to the service provider (see 
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for example Powell 1970 for a detailed description). These services, while 
important to the land owner, are available in abundance and are easily 
dispensable. As a result, the landlord has been argued to have significantly higher 
bargaining power in the exchange relationship, which can be used to charge a 
relatively high price for allowing access to his resources. This is particularly true 
when dealing with landless households who possess no skills and exist close to 
subsistence level. Mason (1986) argues that such households would be willing to 
work for extremely low wages on the agreement that, in times of bad harvests, 
they would be ensured a subsistence salary by the landlord.  
 
Of course not all peasants are vulnerable to exploitation at the hands of the 
landlord. Peasants who are better endowed in terms of skills, assets and social 
status, are likely to receive much better terms from the interaction, as not only are 
they less dependent on the landlord, but also because their skill sets make them 
less easily replaceable (Scott 1972, Scott and Kerkvliet 1977). Moreover, not all 
environments are conducive for the landlord to extract high surpluses off the rural 
poor. The peasants’ dependency on the patron is determined not only by resource 
distribution but also by the availability of outside options. So while landless 
peasants, residing in isolated villages dominated by large landlords, have no 
choice but to accept the high demands of the resource holder, those who reside in 
areas which give access to outside options have a higher opportunity cost, and 
thus, a higher threshold below which they would cease interaction with the 
landlord. These exit options could be in the form of either additional landowners 
willing to take peasants into their network, or access to alternative options found 
outside the rural economy. Hence, as will be argued throughout this thesis, for the 
landlord to enjoy monopolistic control, not only must he own most of the village 
resources, but also the village economy needs to be fairly isolated so that peasants 
have limited options aside from the landlord. Put another way, a monopolistic 
landlord is only able to charge extractive prices off the peasants when inequality 
is interacted with isolation so as to leave peasants no option but to approach the 
landlord. The absence of either of these two conditions should considerably 
weaken the control of the patron over his clients.  
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The patterns of these exchange relationships and the resultant exploitation due to 
peasants’ high dependence on the landlord, have been addressed quite extensively 
in the literature. Interestingly, this has been analyzed through two separate, yet 
possibly overlapping frameworks; interlinked markets – used mostly by 
economists – and patron client networks – favoured by anthropologists, 
sociologists and political scientists. The literature on market interlinkages 
discusses how the owner of resources has control over multiple markets (such as 
employment, credit and insurance) and is thus able to bundle transactions so that 
outcomes are no longer independent, thus causing equilibria to be jointly 
determined (See Bardhan 1980 for an overview. Also see Basu 1986, Bell 1988, 
Sarap 1991, Srinivasan 1991, Braverman and Srinivasan 1981). The patron-client 
literature, on the other hand, talks about an exchange relationship established 
between actors of unequal economic and social status born out of necessity and 
mutual benefit (Powell 1970, Scott 1972, Mason 1986, Eisenstadt and Roniger 
1980, Foster 1963, Wolf 1966). They too discuss how a range of goods and 
services are exchanged between the patron and his clients, often at a rate 
advantageous to the landlord.  
 
The literature dealing with both these analytical frameworks is extremely varied 
and rich and explores, in considerable detail, the nature and structure of exchange 
relationships established between the resource rich and poor. Moreover, both 
emphasise the exploitative powers the landlord can enjoy due to his (almost 
monopolistic) control over an asset whose demand is fairly inelastic. However, 
despite them both being focused on unequal relationships, most authors talk in 
terms of one concept or the other to the extent that these theories sit parallel to one 
another but seldom ever come into dialogue. This chapter aims to bring the two 
frameworks together by highlighting the similarities between them and thus the 
benefits of relying on both frameworks for getting a better understanding of 
interaction in rural societies. The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. 
Section 1 gives an overview of the literature on market interlinkages, emphasising 
the wide range of explanations cited for why this market structure arises and the 
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detrimental effect it can have on peasants’ welfare. Section 2 then goes on to 
review the literature on patron-client networks and once again looks at why these 
networks arise and how they impact poor clients. Section 3 puts the two literatures 
together, highlighting the similarities between the two. It is argued that, if the 
definition of markets is broadened to include all types of exchanges, and not just 
those which are monetized or formal,1 then we find that the patron-client 
framework is also dealing with interlinkages as interaction in the network is over 
a range of goods and services and the rate at which they are exchanged is 
determined based on the value of the bundle that each party is bringing to the 
table. Of course, as will be discussed, not all interlinked markets result in patron-
client relationships but it can be stated that all patron-client exchanges take place 
in an interlinked market setting.  
  
While there is intellectual value in placing the two literatures in dialogue, as it 
enables us to draw on both frameworks for getting a better understanding of the 
socio-economic effects of inequality, there is also a policy value to this exercise as 
it allows the formulation of more nuanced policy recommendations which should 
enable us to better attack the problems created by inequality. In this vein, Section 
4 briefly synthesises the policy options popularly used in the past to help mitigate 
the harmful effects of poverty. These are policies such as land reforms, micro-
credit schemes, cash transfers and rural works programs. However, given the 
persistence of inequality in many developing countries, even in those that have 
tried to implement the abovementioned policies, the concluding section extends 
an alternative, less advocated, policy option of increasing connectivity so as to 
provide peasants with an alternative to the local landlord for satisfying their 
needs. The basis for this policy prescription comes from the argument that the 
landlord’s monopoly is dependent not only on inequality, but also on the level of 
seclusion of the rural economy. Thus this section argues that reducing isolation 
can go a long way towards altering the power dynamics within the rural economy. 
This policy prescription then forms the basis for the rest of the thesis, which 
                                                 
1 This is the definition of markets Bardhan (1980) uses in his review of the literature on interlinked 
markets. 
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evaluates the success of infrastructural development for restructuring incentives in 
rural exchange relationships.  
 
1. Inequality and the Establishment of Interlinked Markets 
 
Asset inequality has meant that a considerable majority of the population in 
developing countries has very little, other than their labour services, to rely on for 
satisfying their basic consumption needs. While this creates problems for the 
resource poor population at large, its adverse effects are particularly pronounced 
in the rural economy where the population mostly depends on agriculture to 
employ their labour services (World Bank 2008). The problem faced by these 
poor households, aside from having to rely on others for gaining access to land, is 
that their employment and resultant income vary seasonally, thus causing them to 
rely on their savings and/or credit during slack seasons (Mahajan and Ramola 
1996, Hulme and Mosley 1996, Marcus et al 1999). Also agricultural workers, 
whose income is tied to the output they produce, face considerable uncertainty 
due to random shocks that are outside their control – such as bad weather. 
Therefore, in years of bad harvests, poor households find it particularly hard to 
meet their consumption requirements solely from their own assets and have to 
seek alternative avenues for satisfying their needs. Often this takes the form of 
loans meant to sustain consumption (Hussain et al 2004). However, since the only 
asset that they can offer as collateral is their labour, the result is the interlinking of 
markets.  
 
The problem, as formulated in the literature, is that households who do not own 
tangible and/or marketable assets are barred from formal credit agencies and 
possibly also from village moneylenders.2 The only recourse left to them then is to 
approach the local landlord for credit in exchange for a guarantee to work on his 
fields during peak seasons. While this loan helps households get through lean 
                                                 
2 An noted by Ray and Sengupta (1991)while models on interlinkages have focused on credit 
markets their findings can just as easily be applied to other market interlinkages. 
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seasons, the benefits of this relationship for them have been questioned as not 
only is the implicit interest paid for this loan often very high (Aleem 1990), but 
also, once established, poor households may find themselves tied into an 
interlinked relationship indefinitely (Bhaduri 1973). Therefore, as argued by 
Sarap (1991), in the long run the gains from such interlinkages for the borrowing 
households may be perceived rather than actually realised, as households tend to 
get caught into a debt-trap that forces them to trade their labour at below market 
rates.  
 
The non-desirability of interlinked markets, from the poor villagers’ perspective, 
has also been illustrated by Srinivasan (1991), who questions the circumstances 
under which a household would opt for an interlinked relationship.3 The model he 
builds is one in which sharecropping households have the option of approaching 
either formal lending institutions or the local landlord for credit. The decision is 
assumed to be voluntary but, once made, cannot be changed – i.e. a household 
cannot oscillate between the two creditors, particularly after it has defaulted with 
one creditor. Sharecroppers, in this model, are assumed to be identical in all 
respects except for their non-agricultural incomes. The decision of the 
sharecropper needs to take into account, among other things, the difference in the 
reaction between the two creditors. A formal credit agency would consider a lapse 
in payment as a default and would penalise the borrower by confiscating his 
current income and denying him further access to credit. On the other hand, while 
an inability to repay the landlord would also result in his current income being 
confiscated, the shortfall would be met through amortised labour services at a rate 
determined by the landlord. Moreover, contrary to the formal lending agency, 
once the sharecropper has repaid his debt to the landlord, he can continue to enjoy 
credit facilities. However, despite the flexibility regarding repayment when 
dealing with the landlord, the model reveals that households with high non-
                                                 
3 The term Srinivasan (1991) uses in his model is bonded labour. He defines a bonded labour 
contract as one in which the landlord gives consumption credit to the sharecropper, on the 
understanding that the latter will make up repayment, not met by output, through his labour 
services which are valued bellow the workers’ opportunity cost. Whether interlinked markets 
result in bonded labour, depends on the relative bargaining power of the two parties. This is 
discussed in more detail at the end of this section. 
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agricultural income would always approach the formal lending agency, thus 
keeping their labour market independent and protecting the value of their labour 
services. On the contrary, households that rely mostly on agricultural income 
approach the local landlord and hence run the risk of having their labour under-
valued. Therefore, his model finds that, similar to the argument made by Sarap 
(1991), even though the decision of where to obtain credit from is voluntary, it is 
resource constraints that effectively make the decision for the sharecropping 
household. 
 
The incentive of the landlord to offer credit to his sharecropper would be based on 
the extent of benefits he receives from the relationship. As stipulated by Ray and 
Sengupta (1991), the landlord will only interlink markets if the surplus from the 
interlinked deal is greater than the sum of the surplus extracted from these 
markets when operating independently. These benefits can take the form of either 
higher profits or lower costs. In this vein, most of the classic models of market 
interlinkages establish, quite conclusively, the benefits that accrue to the resource 
holder from these tied relationships. This is mostly illustrated through one of two 
main models; that of the landlord-cum-moneylender and the trader-cum-
moneylender. Examples dealing with the landlord-cum-moneylender draw 
scenarios much like the one described above. It has been shown that the landlord 
can take advantage of the agricultural workers’ need for credit, when his collateral 
is non-marketable, by charging an interest rate equal to his own opportunity cost 
for capital, but paying wages below the market rate (Bardhan 1984, Bhaduri 1973, 
Braverman and Srinivasan 1981, Braverman and Stiglitz 1982, Mitra 1983). 
Through market interlinkages the landlord then essentially increases his own 
surplus by lowering his wage bill, while still recovering his opportunity cost of 
capital.  
 
The other main example of interlinked markets and their exploitative potential is 
that of a trader-cum-moneylender (Bhaduri 1986, Harriss 1992, Crow and 
Murshid 1994, Ray and Sengupta 1991, Gangopadhyay and Sengupta 1987). The 
farmer’s need for working capital creates an opportunity for the trader who buys 
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the farmer’s output to interlink the output and the credit market. By offering the 
farmer credit at his own opportunity cost of capital, the trader is able to extract a 
guarantee from the farmer to sell him his output at a price below that of the 
market thus enabling him to make a higher profit. The benefits enjoyed by the 
interlocker from this relationship stem largely from his privileged position of 
being active in one market, but also having the ability to engage in another (Ray 
and Sengupta 1991). While the pure moneylender may also be able to charge the 
same interest rate as the trader, it is not possible (or even feasible4) for him to 
include the output market in his contract with the borrower. Similarly, as the pure 
moneylender is not active in the labour market, he has no utility for the 
borrower’s labour services due which he cannot extract a profit from those 
services.  
 
Precisely because of the extractive powers that interlinkages offer, it has been 
argued that the landlord may actually actively try and interlock markets (Bhaduri 
1973). According to Bhaduri, interlinked transactions isolate markets as 
interlocked households may face high costs of switching to another supplier, and 
thus create monopolistic conditions for the landlord to exploit. However, Basu 
(1983) argues against this and instead stipulates that outcomes in an interlinked 
market, when viewed jointly, are in fact competitive and efficient. His basis for 
this argument is that while certain imperfections lead to the interlinkage of 
markets (discussed later), these imperfections do not create a monopoly as the 
landlord does not have the power to increase the price in one market without 
simultaneously reducing the price in another so as to maintain the overall 
equilibrium. If the landlord was to price above the joint equilibria the peasants 
would, according to Basu, cease all interactions with him. What affords the 
landlord monopoly power is peasants not having alternative options, as this 
curtails their ability to walk away from an exploitative interlinked deal. Therefore, 
monopoly power arises not due to interlinkages, but due to high “transfer costs or 
exogenous barriers to entry” (Basu 1983, pg 272).  
                                                 
4 Trying to enter the output market may entail high transaction costs for the pure moneylender. 
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However, given that monopoly power exists due to lack of exit options, the 
question then arises why the landlord needs to interlink markets in order to extract 
higher surpluses in isolated villages. Sarap (1991) argues that this may be done in 
order to overcome customs and traditions which may constrain the landlord’s 
surplus extraction in any single market. Basu (1986), on the other hand, argues 
that interlinking transactions and having multiple dealings in the village economy, 
can allow a monopolistic landlord to coerce peasants to interact in an exploitative 
deal, without having to resort to violence. Interlinkages, Basu argues, may give 
the resource holder enough influence to interfere with peasants’ independent 
relationships and can empower him to use the threat of interrupting those 
independent interactions to induce the peasant to accept his (exploitative) offer. 
Interaction with such a monopolistic landlord, according to Basu, is not voluntary 
as once the agreement has been entered into, the peasant no longer has the ability 
to go back to the scenario that existed before the interaction, i.e. a state where he 
has no dealings with the landlord but still has ties with his other relationships.5  
 
However, interlinkages, even in isolated villages, need not always be established 
to extract high surpluses. While it is agreed that the landlord must be able to draw 
additional benefits from the interlinked deal, these could also come through a 
reduction in the costs associated with interacting with the peasants in the rural 
economy. These costs range from adverse selection to moral hazard problems to 
transaction costs arising due to uncertainty. Basu (1983) argues that the inherent 
risk faced by lenders in the rural economy, due to market imperfections, induces 
them to interlink transactions with other markets so as to minimise their ‘potential 
risk’. This, he argues, is achieved through two mechanisms. Firstly, interlinked 
credit transactions effectively increase the cost of defaulting for the borrower, as 
he not only losses credit facilities but also forsakes any other dealings that he has 
with the lender. Secondly, by restricting loans to households with whom the 
lender has other interactions, he is assured of the borrower’s type and can 
                                                 
5 This model is dealt with in much greater detail in Chapter 3. 
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significantly reduce his chances of lending to a non-credit worthy household. 
Therefore, in a rural economy where the lender faces high risks of default, credit 
would only be offered as part of an interlinked deal so as to minimise the chances 
of loss. The savings that result from the lowered probability of loss means that the 
landlord gains from the transaction even if it is at market rates.  
 
While Basu’s (1983) argument makes analytical sense, the extent of its 
applicability is questionable when we consider the closed-knit nature of village 
societies. Here, not only is the household’s ‘type’ well known due to its reputation 
in the village (Bell 1988), but the social and economic costs of defaulting are also 
extremely high as they tarnish the villager’s reputation and impede him from 
obtaining credit in the future (Rao 1980, Sarap 1990). Therefore, even when loans 
are not secure, the chances of wilful default should be very low in rural society. 
Also, for households that do put up collateral, defaulting would result in their 
losing their pledged asset – possibly even all of it and not just the portion that 
covers the loan (Bhaduri 1973).6 This should considerably reduce the landlord’s 
risk. 
 
Bell (1988), on the other hand, argues that landlords may interlink markets in an 
effort to curtail the moral hazard problem inherent in agriculture. The high costs 
involved in monitoring the agricultural worker create strong incentives for him to 
shirk. One way of reducing these incentives is to interlink markets. The example 
Bell uses is of a landlord who gives workers sowing the field exclusive rights to 
harvest them and a share of the output produced, thus tying their income to the 
effort they put in. Alternatively, the landlord may insist that the agricultural 
worker borrow only from him (Bhaduri 1973, Braverman and Srinivasan 1981, 
Braverman and Stiglitz 1982, Mitra 1983). Transactions are bundled with the 
intention of increasing the worker’s cost of shirking, as his ability to repay the 
loan would depend on the total output he is able to harvest. Once again, the 
savings to the landlord by curtailing peasants’ incentive to shirk means that the 
                                                 
6 Bhaduri (1973) goes as far as to argue that the lender may keep the interest rate high enough to 
actually induce default, as then he is able to take control of the borrower’s collateral.  
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transaction need not be conducted below market rates for him to benefit from the 
interlinkage. The benefits of these deals to the peasants, on the other hand, are 
questionable, particularly with regards to the extent of protection it affords them 
in times of crop failure. While Atchi Reddy (1996) has argued that, in the event of 
a bad harvest, the landlord forgoes some of the contractual claims on the peasant, 
Bhaduri (1973) claim that such an event may place the peasant deeper into the 
debt trap and may even result in him losing his collateral. 
 
Interestingly, Bell (1988) argues that markets may be interlinked even when there 
are no market failures. The advantage he foresees in these interlinkages is their 
ability to minimise transaction costs, which can then be enjoyed as added surplus 
by one or both of the agents. This is illustrated by the example of a landlord who 
offers agricultural workers consumption loans during slack seasons, on the 
guarantee that they will work for him during peak seasons. By tying in workers 
early, the landlord not only reduces the uncertainty of labour availability during 
crunch periods, but also pre-determines the wage rate at which the work would be 
done. Thus, the greater the demand for labour in peak seasons, the higher will be 
the tendency of landlords to tie in labour through such interlinked contracts 
(Bardhan 1978). The wage rate negotiated in the contract may be lower than the 
marginal cost of labour in the spot market, but it need not be so. The benefits to 
the landlord from this deal are the search costs he saves and the lowered 
uncertainty from not having to frequent the spot market during peak seasons (Bell 
1988). These saved costs are transformed into higher profits which would be split 
between the landlord and the worker, based on their relative bargaining position. 
This bargaining position, Bell argues, is determined by the opportunities each 
party has in unbundled transactions. Once again, the saving of transaction costs 
means that the landlord benefits from interlinkages even if he offers the worker 
the spot market wage rate and charges competitive interest rates.  
 
While the various justifications for interlinkages can and are discussed in isolation 
for analytical purposes, in reality it is most likely a variety of reasons that lead to 
the interlinkage of markets (Bell 1988). Moreover, despite the variation in 
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explanations for why interlinkages arise, the one commonality, as explicitly stated 
by Ray and Sengupta (1991), is that interlinkages would only arise if the benefits 
to the landlord from the linked deal out-weigh the benefits from interacting in 
these markets independently. However, as this section has highlighted, while the 
benefits to landlords from linked deals can come through surplus extraction, this 
is not the only avenue available. In the presence of market imperfection, 
interlinkages offer the resource rich a means of lowering their costs by reducing 
uncertainty, and incentivizing peasants to increase their efforts. Which option the 
landlord chooses, depends not only on his preferences but also on the environment 
in which the relationship is cultivated. Thus when inequality is found to exist in 
isolated villages, the landholder can enjoy levels of control high enough to 
facilitate surplus extraction off the peasants, as they have few alternatives to turn 
to (Sarap 1991, Desai 1984). However, in the absence of either inequality or 
isolation, the exploitative nature of interlinked markets breaks down as the 
peasants would then have the option of walking away from the landlord’s offer – 
either to their external options, if the village is not isolated, or to other service 
providers if there are multiple landowners. Thus in such an environment the 
landlord arguably no longer has the option to extract high surpluses and, therefore, 
has to maximise his benefits by lowering his costs of interacting in the rural 
economy.  
 
2. Patron-Client Networks- A Lopsided Friendship 
 
Relationships based on inequality have also been analysed using the theory of 
patron-client networks. The patron-client relationship is described as an exchange 
relationship established between actors of unequal socio-economic status, 
cultivated due to necessity and mutual benefit. While this framework has been 
applied to exchange relationships at various levels of social interaction and in a 
wide variety of settings (see Eisenstadt and Roniger 1980 for an overview), the 
focus here is on rural agrarian societies and how the relationship plays out in the 
presence of inequality. In the rural economy clients consist of those villagers who 
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own few, if any, tangible assets (Hall 1974) and are under considerable threat 
from fluctuations in their environment; both natural (diseases, famines, accidents 
and deaths) and manmade (threats of violence, injustice and exclusion) (Powell 
1970). In order to try and ameliorate these hazards, and to gain access to tangible 
income generating assets, clients approach a figure of authority to act as their 
‘patron’. The patron, on the other hand, is someone who has control of the 
village’s income generating assets and has the resources necessary to provide 
peasants with protection from external threats (Scott and Kerkvliet 1977). 
 
Thus a relationship of exchange is established where the patron provides his 
clients with goods and services pertaining to their material and physical well-
being, and clients reciprocate by providing the patron guaranteed access to their 
labour – the main asset that they have control over – by providing social following 
and by agreeing to vote for the political candidate supported by the patron (Powell 
1970, Scott 1972, Mason 1984, Eisenstadt and Roniger 1980, Foster 1963, Wolf 
1966, Berman 1974). The benefits that the landlord derives from this exchange 
come not only in the economic market – in the form of guaranteed labour during 
cropping seasons – but also in the political sphere as the patron is able to use his 
clients’ political support to negotiate with the local politician. By having control 
over the peasants’ voting decisions, the patron is able to offer the politician a 
cluster of guaranteed votes in exchange for access to public resources, that are to 
be spent at the patron's’ discretion (Cheema and Mohmand 2004). While there are 
variations in the nature of the patron-client network, depending on the 
environment in which they are cultivated and the relative bargaining powers of the 
two parties (discussed later), Powell (1970) argues that there are certain aspects of 
the relationship which are considered necessary for it to be classified as a patron-
client one. First and foremost, the relationship is based on inequality, both of 
wealth and influence. These relationships are often found in rural societies, where 
inequality results in a large number of households being either landless or having 
very small land holdings (Hall 1974). Thus, a major income generating asset in 
the economy is owned by a few individuals. Aside from economic inequality, land 
ownership also affords the holder considerable social authority that results in him 
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wielding considerable influence in the social and political sphere (Deininger and 
Binswanger 1999). Secondly, interaction in the network must be face-to-face as it 
is proximity that allows the relationship to be highly particularistic and 
individualised.  
 
These particularised services provided by the patron are not done so out of the 
goodness of his heart, thus bringing us to the third defining feature of the 
relationship – reciprocity. Of course, given the unequal status of the two parties, 
reciprocity is by no means on a one to one basis. While the goods vary in value, 
Lande (1977) argues that what allows this exchange to be acceptable is the 
relative costs incurred by the provider for delivering these goods and services. He 
stipulates that, even though the patron’s resources are extremely valuable to 
peasants, the costs to the patron for providing them are considerably low. 
Similarly, while the peasants’ labour services are not too valuable, they enable the 
patron to reduce his costs and enhance his status. Moreover, as will be discussed 
in greater detail in Chapter 4, the political support of the clients is a valuable asset 
for the patron in his negotiations with local politicians. Therefore, as stated by 
Scott (1977), the lopsidedness of the relationship is not in question, as that is a 
given, rather, it is the degree of lopsidedness that matters, and it is that which 
determines the legitimacy of the relationship. As long as the relative value that 
each party places on what it provides, is lower than the value of what it receives, 
the exchange would be deemed fair and would perpetuate in the future (Scott and 
Kerkvliet 1977).  
  
The actual rate at which goods and services are reciprocated is determined by the 
relative bargaining powers of the two parties. By definition, of course, the patron 
has the upper hand in this relationship as the needs of the clients tend to be vital, 
while those of the patron are desired, but by no means life threatening (Eisenstadt 
and Roniger 1980, Scott and Kerkvliet 1977). However, this is not to say that the 
patron does not value the services provided by the clients. As a collective, 
peasants are of great value to the patron. But individually the value, and thus the 
bargaining power, of each peasant is considerably low (Mason 1986). It is 
24 
 
dependent, to a large extent, on the needs the peasant aims to fulfil through the 
patron’s resources and the number of other clients with whom he has to compete 
for patronage. Hence, the greater the inequality the stronger will be the patron’s 
control and his ability to make high demands on his clients. Therefore, while 
landless peasants would be in a particularly precarious position vis-à-vis the 
patron – with the terms of the exchange possibly even approaching serfdom 
(Waterbury 1977) – landowning households would be considerably better off.  
 
Moreover, bargaining power is also influenced by the number of alternative 
options available to peasants for satisfying their needs (Scott and Kerkvliet 1977). 
This could take the form of either additional patrons co-existing in the village, or 
peasants having the ability to pursue options outside the rural economy. While 
multiplicity of patrons should result in competition for the clients’ following, thus 
leading to better terms for the peasants, access to outside markets should broaden 
the sphere from which peasants can extract benefits in exchange for their services. 
Thus isolation, like inequality, would also steer the network in a direction 
advantageous to the patron, thereby enabling him to increase his demands 
considerably without jeopardising the legitimacy of the relationship (Mason 
1984). In addition, isolation can insulate the rural economy from government 
approach. This should further widen the scope and need for the patron’s resources, 
as services such as dispute resolution, social security and basic public goods 
would be obtained through the patron rather than the state (Weingrod 1968, Scott 
1969, Cheema, et al. 2007). Moreover, limited government presence may also 
enable the patron to indulge in activities which would otherwise be deemed illegal 
(Chabal and Daloz 1999). Therefore, as maintained by Mason (1984), when 
material exchange fails him, the landlord can resort to the use of force to exert his 
will on the peasants. Lastly, in isolated village economies, where the patron is the 
main conduit of communication with the outside world, Hall (1974) argues that 
social change would be very slow to come, thus resulting in the reproduction of 
these relationships of dependency.  
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According to Scott (1972), the extent of a patron’s level of control could possibly 
be measured by the way the exchange relationship plays out, i.e. whether the 
patron uses the carrot or the stick to extract services from the clients. He argues 
that, when the patron has considerable power over his clients, the exchange would 
be based mostly on the threat of sanctions rather than the payout of rewards. 
These sanctions could be economic – entailing the termination of employment, 
eviction and/or refusal of credit. They could also be social in the form of social 
exclusion, or political with the patron using his alliance with the local politician to 
bar non-complying peasants from access to public resources (see for example 
Scott1972, Mason 1986, Powell 1970). The perpetuity of this network would then 
depend on the patron maintaining his control established due to peasants’ lacking 
other options. In contrast, a weaker patron, who is less confident about the 
resilience of his network, would maintain support through the disbursement of 
rewards or the promise of future rewards. In that case, the continuity of the 
network would depend largely on the patron’s ability to come through on the 
promises made to the clients. Therefore, while the network of a powerful patron 
would be largely based on coercion, a patron whose clients had alternative options 
would have to establish a network which is arguably more beneficial for the 
clients and, at the very least, matches the value of their exit options. However, it is 
worth mentioning that, while the monopolistic patron may have considerable 
discretion regarding the setting of the terms of the exchange, there is a threshold 
below which the patron would stand to lose legitimacy, thus causing the patronage 
network to break down (Scott and Kerkvliet 1977). This threshold must, at least, 
provide peasants with guaranteed subsistence living and physical protection. 
 
The resilience of the patron-client network would also depend on the motivation 
that drives reciprocity within it. Silverman (1977), based on her study in Central 
Italy, stipulates that peasants engage in the patronage network not only to satisfy 
their needs, but also out of a sense of loyalty and deference towards the patron. 
She bases this on her findings that peasants offered their best produce as gifts to 
their patron, or made available a family member to work in his house, or repaid 
his patronage by simply refraining from cheating him. However, whether this 
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displays selfless reciprocity is debatable, as it could be argued that peasants 
engage in these practices to gain better standing with the patron or to obtain more 
privileged access to his resources. Hall (1974), on the other hand, argues that the 
interaction in the patronage network is in fact one based on pure exchange, where 
every good and service provided is recorded and must be repaid. He claims that 
the voluntary nature of patron-client relationships is often overstated, as clients 
would quite willingly accept an offer to earn an income outside the traditional 
network. Scott (1972), taking a middle (and probably more realistic) stance, 
argues that peasants’ motivation for reciprocating with the patron is most likely 
not homogenous across all households. He stipulates that peasants who share 
some extra traits with their patron, e.g. kinship or familial ties, are more likely to 
find their relationship to be based on traditional legitimacy, reinforced by feelings 
of affiliation, rather than feelings of material self-interest. This is contrasted with 
peasants who have no extra link with the patron and are likely to see the 
relationship as one of a pure exchange, where their intention would be to merely 
satisfy the terms of the relationship. The resilience of the network, when faced 
with change, would then depend on the ratio of the two types of clients in the 
relationship. If it consists largely of clients interacting based on material self 
interest, then the network would disintegrate fairly rapidly. On the contrary, if the 
network is composed largely of clients who feel some extra ties to the patron, then 
they are likely to stand loyally by his side when the village economy starts to 
change.  
 
This discussion, regarding peasants’ motivation for reciprocating in the exchange 
relationship, raises the question of whether these networks are merely a way for 
the resource rich to exercise power and extract benefits from the poor who have 
few other alternatives, or whether they do in fact have a functional aspect, 
particularly so for the clients who do not share any extra ties with the patron? 
While a number of authors have stipulated that patronage networks are also 
beneficial for the clients (Eisenstadt and Roniger 1980, Foster 1963, Wolf 1966), 
Stein (1984) argues otherwise by claiming that the functional aspect of the 
network is only present in the short run. A deeper analysis, he maintains, reveals 
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an inherent contradiction in the setup of the network, which is the continuity of 
the relationship being dependent on the existence of the very imbalance and stress 
that it is aiming to mitigate. The patron only benefits as long as the clients are 
dependent on him, due to which he has an incentive to perpetuate this 
dependency. However, the two purposes of the network – the patrons’ desire to 
exercise power and the clients’ need to find survival strategies – need not be 
mutually exclusive. In the presence of scarcity, patron-client networks enable 
peasants to assure their subsistence while simultaneously providing the patron 
with the opportunity to maximise his surplus. Therefore, as argued by Waterbury 
(1977), how this question is answered depends largely on what one’s ideological 
preferences are. For those who believe that egalitarian societies are achievable, 
both in terms of wealth and power, these networks would indeed be deemed 
exploitative and would be perceived as a way for the resource rich to subjugate 
the poor into a perpetual relationship of dependency. However he states that, for 
those who believe that inequality is inherent in society, patron-client networks 
may be seen as a ‘second-best’ solution for the poor to gain access to resources by 
linking themselves to the rich. This is particularly true when the state is largely 
absent in providing citizens with the goods and services necessary for ensuring 
their welfare and protection (Mason 1986). Bari et al (2005), looking at rural 
Pakistan, support this argument by asserting that, in the presence of state failure, 
patronage networks are an alternative means for poor citizens to gain privileged 
access to state resources.  
 
Thus as with the case of interlinked markets, the patron-client network itself need 
not be exploitative or harmful for the peasants’ welfare. The ability of the patron 
to exercise power would depend, to a large extent, on the number of options 
peasants have for satisfying their needs. In villages which are secluded from the 
external economy and where land is mostly concentrated in the hands of a single 
landlord, the patron would have considerable discretion regarding the setting of 
the terms of exchange. Conversely, in villages where peasants have alternative 
options, the control of the patron would be fairly limited. Therefore, for those who 
perceive patronage networks as a second-best option in the presence of inequality, 
28 
 
policy recommendations would need to focus on altering the relative bargaining 
powers in favour of the poor, so as to reduce their vulnerability to exploitation and 
hence enhance the functional value of the network. However, before getting into a 
policy discussion, the next section highlights the relative similarity between the 
two frameworks used for studying inequality in agrarian societies.  
 
3. Patron-Client Relationships and Interlinked Markets – Two Sides of 
the Same Coin? 
 
The two literatures surveyed above set out to understand exchange relationships 
that arise in the presence of inequality. The interlinkage literature frames this in 
terms of the resource holder dealing with the resource poor in multiple 
transactions, resulting in the outcomes of one market having an impact on another 
completely unrelated market. The patron-client framework, on the other hand, 
articulates this problem as the establishment of personalised, face-to-face 
exchanges over a number of transactions, occurring between individuals of 
unequal economic and social status. For both these frameworks, the rate at which 
goods and services are exchanged is determined by the relative bargaining power 
of the two parties which, by definition, is tilted in favour of the resource owner. 
Still, there is considerable variation that can take place regarding the size and 
nature of the bundles exchanged, depending on the setting in which the 
relationship is cultivated. Hence, while extreme power asymmetry resulting from 
the landlord’s monopolistic control over resources allows him to set the equilibria 
price unilaterally (Mason 1986), those who face competition in any form have to 
alter the terms so as to align them with their competitors. However, both 
frameworks argue that the setup itself is not inherently exploitative, rather it is the 
environment in which it is cultivated that determines the impact it will have on 
peasants’ welfare. In fact it is argued that, provided the right environment exists, 
these structures have a functional value that benefits both the resource holder and 
the poor by lowering transaction costs and giving each party access to resources 
they themselves do not have (Basu 1983, Bell 1988, Eisenstadt and Roniger 1980, 
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Foster 1963, Wolf 1966). Therefore, in the presence of inequality and state and 
market failures, these set-ups can be seen as second-best solutions meant to 
minimise costs and uncertainty.  
 
The fact that there are two major frameworks developed to explain interaction in 
rural societies, in the presence of inequality, is by no means surprising. Given that 
they are both trying to explain social actions and human motivations, it would be 
unlikely to have one best way of approaching this (Waterbury 1977). Therefore, in 
this regard, each discipline applies its analytical tools in an effort to get a better 
understanding of the nature of interaction occurring under inequality. However, it 
is surprising that these two literatures have never been in dialogue, nor do they 
seem to acknowledge the work done by the other. As a result, authors have been 
treating these two frameworks as completely separate, thus approaching the 
problem of inequality in terms of one theory or the other, so that the two have 
developed parallel to one another rather than in consultation.  
 
By surveying the two frameworks together, this chapter has tried to highlight the 
similarities between these structures and the outcomes they predict. However, I 
stipulate that, depending on how we define a market, we can go further than 
merely looking for similarities. If we broaden the definition of markets to include 
not only formal monetized exchange, but also informal non-monetized ones 
(Bardhan 1980), it can be argued that patronage networks too are a type of 
interlinked market, in which exchange takes place through face-to-face interaction 
between members of unequal economic and social status. Thus while all patron-
client relationships are conducted in an interlinked market setting, interlinked 
exchange relationships that satisfy the conditions established by the patron-client 
literature, can also be classified as patron-client relationships.  
 
Putting the two together then allows us to draw on both frameworks so as to get a 
more holistic analysis of rural exchange relationships, as each discipline has a 
different approach to the problem and has a different set of questions that it 
considers to be important for inquiry (Bardhan and Roy 2008). So, while 
30 
 
economists studying interlinkages are concerned with the market exchange that 
takes place within relationships with asymmetric power distribution and the effect 
it has on equilibria, the patron-client framework places focus on the intangible 
aspect of the exchange, existing in the form of the political support and social 
following that peasants offer their patron in return for his services. Moreover, 
while the former treat the exchange as a bargaining relationship where each party 
is out to maximise its own surplus, the patron-client literature argues that the 
exchange need not always be driven by a desire to maximise profit. Rather, it may 
also be influenced by traditions and customs that create a sense of loyalty and 
deference and thereby tie the peasant to the landlord, so that the interaction is 
more than a simple material calculation of profits. By placing the two sets of 
literature together, we are forced to consider that the motivating factor behind 
these exchange relationships may not be known a-priori, nor can we assume that 
they are homogenous across communities and across peasants. Moreover, given 
that both frameworks highlight the potential these set-ups have for improving 
peasant welfare, policy recommendations may be better served if, as a first 
attempt, they tried to alter the relative bargaining powers in rural society rather 
than trying to break these networks completely. Hence, the next section looks at 
some policies adopted over the years that do exactly that. The section starts with 
looking at land reforms which would in effect break patron-client networks and 
would arguably also reduce, if not eliminate, market interlinkages. The remainder 
of the section looks at policies which are more likely to change bargaining powers 
but still maintain the integrity of the set-up.  
 
4. Policy Measures to Restructure Incentives to Date 
 
One of the most extensive measures used to alter power relations in rural societies 
is through land reforms, which in its extreme form aims to redistribute land to the 
landless population. At a minimum, these reforms strive to strengthen tenant 
security by making the conditions for eviction more stringent and legislating an 
upper limit on the extent of rent that can be charged (see Liption 2009 – see 
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particularly the appendix – for a detailed description of the various types of land 
reform policies enacted). As can be expected, each type of land reform affects 
rural households differently and has varying impacts on the household’s 
relationship with the local landlord. For instance, redistribution provides poor 
households with ownership of a tangible asset which can be used not only to 
generate an income, but also to gain access to formal credit and insurance 
markets, thus enabling the household to be fairly independent of the patron for its 
economic needs. Land ownership should also have a beneficial effect on a 
household’s social status due to the high social value attached to this asset 
(Deininger and Binswanger 1999). Lastly, Herring (2005) argues that land 
ownership also has a positive impact on a household’s political participation as 
such households are more likely to be more active at demanding their rights. Also, 
since landowning households are less dependent on the patron, they are less likely 
to agree to vote according to his preferences and are more likely to demand some 
amount of return from the politician for their political support. Reforms that alter 
tenancy agreements, on the other hand, improve the households’ security of tenure 
and help lower their costs, but it still leaves them dependent on the landlord for 
services such as credit and insurance. Nonetheless, even though the latter is not as 
extensive as the former, it does have the benefit of increasing tenants’ bargaining 
power vis-à-vis the landlord as it takes away the explicit threat of eviction7.  
 
The case in favour of land reforms can also be made on efficiency grounds which, 
of course, benefit the poor but also extend to the economy at large. Not only is it 
believed that family cultivators would be more efficient at managing the farm, but 
also, increased access to formal credit markets should incentivise these 
households to increase their level of investment, thus resulting in higher capital 
formation in the economy (Deininger and Binswanger 1999). Furthermore it is 
argued that, providing peasants with an income generating asset, would also 
increase the likelihood that they would invest in the development of their children 
through increased schooling and better health and nutritional outcomes (Banerjee 
                                                 
7 Of course this does not bar landlords from using implicit forms of harassment to force tenants 
into leaving. 
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1999). Such investment should provide the future generation with stronger skill 
sets and thus lower their chances of having to establish unequal exchange 
relationships.  
 
However, despite the benefits in terms of equity and efficiency, the success of 
land reform policies has been relatively limited. The problem, as highlighted by 
Radhakrishnan (1990), is that policies altering land ownership structures are a 
political rather than an economic decision. Thus, in order to be successful, they 
must be backed by a state that has the political will needed to change land holding 
patterns and the resultant power structure in the rural economy (Barraclough 
1999). However, such political will has not always been present as politicians 
have either been large land owners themselves, or have their support base strongly 
embedded in the landed elite (Zaidi 1999, Hussain 1989). As a result, countries 
have tended to enact land reforms without proper implementation, leading to land 
owners circumventing land confiscation and thus preserving their land holding. 
For instance Ahmed (1977), looking at Pakistan, found that in some ways land 
reforms made peasants worse off as landlords evicted tenants and shifted to 
owner-cultivation in an effort to maintain their estates. Hence, for the landless 
households the effect of land reforms was an increase in insecurity as it converted 
them from tenants to casual agricultural labourers.  
 
Countries which have been successful in altering the land tenure system have 
done so while taking advantage of some extraordinary circumstances. These range 
from a communist revolution as in the case of China, which drew its support from 
rural peasants, to external intervention as in the case of Japan, Korea and Taiwan 
(see Dorner and Thiesenhusen 1990 for an overview of land reforms in East and 
Southeast Asian countries) to strong political mobilization of the poor as in the 
case of Kerala (See Herring 1983 Chapters 6 and 7 for a detailed account of the 
process that led to land reforms in Kerala. See also Herring and Edwards 1983, 
Balakrishnan 1999, Radhakrishnan 1981). The success in each case was largely 
due to a state (through internal or external pressure) strongly motivated to change 
land ownership patterns.  
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Nonetheless, despite the success in the above mentioned and other countries, the 
last few decades have seen such redistributive policies fall off mainstream 
agendas to the extent that some have argued that land reforms are either dead as a 
policy option, or are in effect politically impossible. In this context Herring (2005) 
highlight how there has been a shift in emphasis from redistribution to economic 
growth, so as to benefit the poor by increasing the size of the pie. However, the 
extent to which increased growth benefits the poor can be debated, as it is 
stipulated that the benefits of growth tend to be more evenly spread in egalitarian 
societies (World Bank 2006, Hussain 2008). However, in the presence of 
inequality, it is quite likely that these fruits of growth would be captured by the 
resource rich thus perpetuating inequality. Therefore, it is still important to keep 
land reforms at the forefront of the policy agenda. Lipton (2009, see Chapter 7) 
argues in favour of this by stating that, even in countries where land reforms have 
popularly been viewed as failures, a certain amount of land has been redistributed 
causing land inequality to be lowered to some extent.8 Lipton (2009, see Chapter 
6) also states that new waves of land reforms – those which are less confiscatory 
in nature – are still quite popular amongst governments and donor agencies, thus 
making it premature to call land reforms dead. Herring (2005), taking a similar 
line of argument states that, before burying land reforms, it should be considered 
that there are always new opportunities arising which can be exploited for 
redistributive purposes. For instance, he gives the example of Columbia where the 
agricultural minister in 1996 was hopeful of redistributing assets captured from 
drug dealers amongst the rural poor. Moreover he finds that land reform policies, 
unsuccessfully implemented in the past, can mobilise future generations to claim 
the promises made to their fathers and grandfathers, thus resulting in 
redistribution. Such claims were made in the 1990s in the southern part of the 
United States by the descendents of freed slaves who had been promised land 
redistribution but never received it.  
 
                                                 
8 This optimistic view has to be weighed against the cost faced by tenants who are evicted by 
landlords trying to circumvent land confiscation (See Ahmed 1977).  
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When successful, land reforms have the potential to alter the power structure in 
rural societies and can significantly benefit the poor – not only by lowering their 
dependence on the landlord for generating a livelihood, but also by increasing 
their economic, social and political status (Deininger and Binswanger 1999, 
Barraclough 1999, Ghai et al 1979). However, for land reforms to be truly 
beneficial, they need to be accompanied by a number of additional services such 
as credit, insurance and access to markets, to fully benefit the poor. Deininger and 
Binswanger (1999), Dorner and Thiesenhusem (1990) and Barraclough (1999) all 
find that landless households, which were given ownership of land, often found 
themselves unable to run the farms effectively due to the absence of credit. As a 
result they ended up selling the land as it did not meet their subsistence needs. 
Moreover, while reforms that transfer ownership to tenants change little in terms 
of the management of the fields, those that distribute land to landless agricultural 
workers puts the responsibility of managing farms on to households who have no 
prior experience of doing so. Therefore, it is questionable whether they would 
have the skills and capacity needed to do this (FAO 2003). Thus, for land 
redistribution to be truly beneficial for the recipient household, it must be 
accompanied by auxiliary services such as credit, insurance, physical 
infrastructure and possibly also training programs on how to manage and run 
farms. 
  
Aside from land reforms, governments have also made other attempts to increase 
the welfare of poor households. One such effort has been the instituting of micro-
finance programs to cater for poor households (both landless and small 
landowners) need for credit. The idea behind these programs is to provide the 
poor with small loans that can be used to set up micro-enterprises, or invest on 
their fields. These investments, it is hoped, should enable poor households to 
establish a reliable and steady source of income that can possibly pull them out of 
poverty. Moreover, these programs also strive to reduce the poor households’ 
need to approach informal moneylenders and local landlords so as to prevent them 
from falling prey to exploitatively high interest debt traps (Marcus et al 1999). 
The benefits of these programs for poor households can arguably be of two types; 
35 
 
to reduce poverty, or to reduce the households’ level of vulnerability (Zaman 
2000). While the former aims to increase the level of the households’ income, the 
latter attempts to keep them from falling deeper into poverty by smoothing their 
consumption, providing them with emergency funds and helping them to engage 
in activities that can earn them a small income. Zaman (2000) asserts that, while 
there is clear evidence of micro-credit having beneficial impacts on the 
households’ state of vulnerability (see also Hashemi et al 1996, Montgomery et al 
1996, Hussain et al 2004), the evidence on poverty reduction is fairly mixed. He 
claims that this may be because of their being a threshold level for loan sizes, 
below which households are unable to invest in activities that could increase their 
income levels. Moreover, the highly fungible nature of money means that it is not 
uncommon for poor households to use these loans for consumption purposes 
(Hulme and Mosley 1996) – which in any case tends to be a more pressing 
requirement for poor households (Mahajan and Ramala 1996, Marcus et al 1999) 
– rather than investments. Furthermore, as argued by Wright (2000) micro-credit 
loans, by themselves, may not lead to increased productive activities. It is his 
contention that, for this to happen, the households needs to be exposed to an 
environment conducive to entrepreneurship. Amongst other things, this requires 
them to have access to a market large enough to absorb the goods and services 
that they sell. In rural economies, which are isolated from the external market, this 
becomes very difficult. As argued by Khan (2009), in the case of rural Pakistan, 
where women were given small loans to set up businesses, the skills possessed by 
most borrowers were that of tailoring. However, the village market was not large 
enough to provide the demand necessary for multiple households to set up such 
enterprises. Therefore, in isolated semi-autarkic rural economies, micro-credit 
may at best be able to only reduce households’ vulnerability – particularly for 
those engaged in agriculture. However, within this setting it may have only a 
limited effect on reducing poverty and the unequal exchange relationships that the 
poor inevitably tend to engage in. 
 
Furthermore, for micro-credit to be able to fulfil its goal of reducing poverty it 
needs to be accessible to the poor in general, and to the extremely poor in 
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particular. Evidence on the accessibility of these micro-credit institutions is found 
to be fairly mixed, with the more optimistic studies finding these programs 
successfully reaching the poor, and the relatively pessimistic ones highlighting the 
extent of leakages and elite capture. For instance, Van de Ruit et al (2001) looking 
at South Africa, found that in the case of targeted micro-credit programs 52% of 
the client households belonged to the poorest category, while 9% came from the 
least poor group. However, in the case of non-targeted programs, the majority 
were found to come from the least poor category. On the other hand, studies that 
are more pessimistic regarding the benefits of micro-credit, argue that leakages in 
micro-credit programs have caused loans to be skewed away from the poor and 
have been captured by households who could otherwise afford non-subsidised 
market based loans (Seibel 1994). However, a common finding amongst 
researchers is that, while these programs do tend to reach poor households, they 
are generally inaccessible to the poorest of the poor. For instance, Navajas et al 
(2000) found that, while the five leading micro finance institutions in Bolivia lent 
to 52000 borrowers in rural areas, only 8.65% of these came from the poorest 
households. Furthermore, Sebstad and Cohen (2000) in their synthesis of a 
number of empirical studies concluded that, while destitute households do not 
have access to micro-credit programs, most of the clients of these schemes are 
either moderately poor households or vulnerable but non-poor households. Thus, 
while the segment reached by these schemes may not comprise the extremely poor 
households, they are mostly households which are not affluent and are in need of 
subsidised financial assistance.  
 
Aside from capture, the benefits to poor households of micro-credit have been 
documented to be limited due to either micro-finance institutions discriminating 
against them – either directly or indirectly – or due to poor households themselves 
opting not to participate. Hashemi and Rosenberg (2006) argue that many micro 
finance institutions, in their desire to stay financially viable and thus reduce the 
probability of default, tend to favour those households who have some source of 
income aside from the loan. This condition often excludes the poorest of the poor. 
Moreover, since most institutions rely on the group lending strategy, again to 
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minimise the risk of default, this too may act as a barrier to entry for extremely 
poor households, as other members may not want to act as a guarantee for them 
due to their being a high default risk (Khan 2009). In addition, households which 
are socially excluded and marginalised may also find it difficult to gain 
membership into groups for the purpose of borrowing. On the demand side, 
interestingly, Dunford and Denman (2000) argue that conditions such as small 
loan sizes, high interest rates, short repayment schedules etc disincentivize poor 
households from approaching these institutions. Also, poor households, who lack 
an income source, may be hesitant to take these loans out of the fear of defaulting 
(Khan 2009). In fact Hashmi and Rosenberg (2006) go a step further and argue 
that extremely poor households may avoid such loans out of fear that they will get 
embroiled in a debt trap. Therefore, whether due to a choice made by the 
household based on its financial status, or due to external constraints barring 
them, households which are most vulnerable in rural society and most in need of 
formal credit facilities for breaking out of exploitative debt relationships, are least 
likely to receive them.  
 
An alternative policy tool that has received considerable attention over the last ten 
years, particularly in Latin America, is cash transfers. These have been given out 
both unconditionally (e.g. old age pensions in India) and conditionally (e.g. cash 
transfers in exchange for children’s school attendance in Mexico). The aim of this 
policy tool is to provide poor households with a steady flow of income that helps 
them to both increase and smooth out consumption. Unlike micro-finance, these 
cash transfers do not have to be repaid and thus do not impose the same 
constraints upon poor households. However, up until recently, cash transfers were 
relatively unpopular amongst governments and donor agencies as it was feared 
that cash would be more susceptible to corruption and elite capture when 
compared to in-kind transfers (Harvey et al 2006). Also, there was the concern 
that providing poor households with cash may result in it being misused (for 
drinking or gambling). Therefore, it was felt that the poor could be better served 
by directly providing them with the goods beneficial to their welfare (Farrington 
and Slater 2006, Gelan 2006). However, recent experiences with in-kind and cash 
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transfers have demonstrated that the above mentioned bias may in fact be ill-
founded. This claim is made, not only on the findings that in-kind transfers too are 
prone to corruption (Deshingkar et al 2005, Farrington et al 2006), but also that 
cash transfers are more efficient and can have a greater impact on poverty 
alleviation, as they have fewer administrative costs associated with them (Gelan 
2006). In-kind aid, on the other hand, has costs such as storage and transferring 
attached to it, making it much more costly to provide to poor households. Lastly, 
contrary to the argument that cash would be misused, it has been proposed that 
cash transfers may be better as they give the household the flexibility to procure 
the type and quality of goods and services that they want to consume (Chirwa et al 
2002). In particular, cash transfers have the benefit of reducing poor households’ 
need for credit, thus reducing their dependence on the resource rich and their 
chances of falling into debt-traps like those described in Section One. As a result 
cash transfers should enable poor households to keep their credit activities 
independent of all other markets, particularly their labour market.  
 
Aside from their direct effect on consumption, cash transfers have also been used 
by governments to incentivise poor households to undertake activities that can 
lead to improved human development indicators. This has been used particularly 
in Mexico and Brazil, where governments have given poor households cash in 
return for sending their children to school and having regular health checks (See 
Handa and Davis 2006 for an overview of conditional cash transfer programs in 
Latin America and the Caribbean). Faguet and Shami (2008) find that targeting in 
conditional cash transfer schemes has been fairly successful – particularly in 
Mexico – not only because of the target group being easily identifiable, but also 
due to there been a social stigma attached to rich households accepting these 
transfers. Hence, aside from lowering poor households’ dependence on the 
resource rich, such transfers also equip poor children with better skill sets that 
could help pull them out of poverty in the future – thus reducing the likelihood of 
them engaging in unequal exchange relationships.  
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However, despite Latin America’s success with conditionalities, their feasibility 
needs to be evaluated carefully as some countries may not have the capacity to 
provide the services that these transfers are conditioned on. Schubert and Slater 
(2006) find that in the case of education in Africa, the constraint to child 
attendance is not always unwillingness on the part of the parents, but rather is due 
to teacher absenteeism and the fact that the school is more than an hour’s walk 
away. Schubert and Slater also argue that, a further drawback of conditionalities is 
that it may take the focus away from poverty reduction and place it more on the 
condition itself. In fact the emphasis may fall so strongly on increasing poor 
households’ demand for certain services – such as health and education – that 
little attention may be paid to the quality and adequacy of the services in place.  
 
Thus, as an alternative, some governments have relied on unconditional transfers 
to households that have limited alternative means of earning an income. These 
include programs such as old age pensions in India (see Farrington et al 2003 for 
details), social cash transfers in Zambia (see Schubert and Goldberg 2004) and 
income stipends through a charity tax in Pakistan (see Gazdar 2009). However, 
even though these programs are solely focused on reducing poverty, they have not 
always been able to achieve this goal. This is largely due to developing countries 
lacking the capacity to implement such programs. For instance, in the case of 
Ethiopia, Kebede (2006) found that district level governments often lacked the 
ability and the machinery needed to handle and distribute cash to the poor, but 
were quite well equipped to distribute food. Furthermore, Kakwani, Saores and 
Son (2005), using a simulation model based on 15 African countries argued that, 
in order for cash transfers to help reduce poverty, the extent of the transfer would 
have to be fairly large which would thus place considerable strain on 
governments’ budgets. Also, as with the case of micro-finance, Farrington and 
Slater (2006) argue that for cash transfers to be effective in helping households to 
pull themselves out of poverty, they need to be accompanied by a number of 
auxiliary goods and services, such as access to external markets and road 
networks, that help apply the cash to profitable and productive activities. In the 
absence of such goods and services, these cash transfers may have a limited 
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impact on a household’s ability to pull itself out of poverty and could result in the 
perpetuation of unequal relationships of dependency.  
 
Aside from budgetary constraints, these programs have also been criticized for 
having no, or limited, productive value and may even disincentivize households 
from working. In line with this concern, a number of transfer schemes come in the 
form of employment on rural infrastructural projects (Farrington and Slater 2006). 
The benefits of such schemes are arguably two-fold. Firstly, and foremost, they 
provide poor vulnerable households with employment, thus reducing their 
economic dependence on others for generating an income. This reduction of 
households’ vulnerability has made these programs particularly popular in times 
of drought and financial crises, as they provide households in distress with a 
means of stabilizing their income (Chirwa et al 2002). Secondly, these schemes 
come with the additional benefit of supplying the rural economy with a public 
good that has advantages for the economy at large (Ravallion 1991). Herring and 
Edwards (1983), looking at Maharashtra’s employment guarantee scheme, argue 
that it was the presence of the latter benefit that enabled the scheme to be passed 
through the legislative assembly, despite the assembly being populated by large 
landowners.  
 
The advantage of these schemes, over cash transfers, is also found in their 
improved targeting mechanisms that make them more likely to reach the poor. 
This is due to the scheme allowing poor households to self select themselves into 
the program, thus reducing the need for information which in any case is difficult 
to collect accurately from rural areas in developing countries (Ravallion 1991). In 
order to reach the poor effectively, the main job of the administration is to ensure 
that wage rates are not above the minimum wage (or market wage rate if that is 
lower), as the requirement for fairly menial unskilled work acts as a disincentive 
for non-poor households to participate (Ravallion (1991). Teklu and Asefa (1999) 
found this to be the case in Botswana and Kenya, where the majority of the 
participants came from the poorest category – particularly in poorer regions where 
there were few other options for employment. Similarly, in India the employment 
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guarantee schemes were found to benefit a vast majority of the rural population by 
guaranteeing them employment (Shah and Mehta 2008, Herring and Edwards 
1983 World Bank 1990). However, while the low wage rate acts as a deterrent 
against leakages, it has the disadvantage of minimizing the effect that the program 
has on poverty reduction (Chirwa et al 2002). Nonetheless, these employment 
programs do have the benefit of preventing poor households from falling deeper 
into poverty. Moreover, the presence of guaranteed employment, even if only for 
a certain number of days a year, should act as a viable alternative for poor 
households and should thus place restrictions on the extent to which landlords can 
extract surpluses from their exchange with the peasants. In fact Gaiha (1997), 
analysing the impact of Maharashtra’s employment guarantee scheme, found that 
it had a positive impact on agricultural wages by raising the rate by 18%. This was 
not only due to the increase in demand for labour, all year round, but also due to 
the increased bargaining power that it gave to peasants as a collective.  
 
Furthermore, if timed properly, these programs have the potential of having a 
strong stabilizing effect on the income of poor households. In the case of India for 
example, Subbaro (1997) notes that because these programs coincided with slack 
seasons, the rural poor were able to rely on them for seeing them through to the 
next cropping cycle. Ravallion (1991), in his study of rural households in India 
found that landless households, residing in villages that had rural works schemes, 
experienced 50% less variation in their income when compared to landless 
households living in villages without these schemes. The financial benefits to the 
households came not only in the form of income during slack seasons, but also in 
terms of search costs saved by not having to go looking for jobs (Teklu and Asefa 
1999). This financial boost should also have had the added advantage of reducing 
the households’ need for getting consumption loans to see them through the slow 
months (Ravallion 1991). However, not all programs were designed to provide 
employment in slack seasons as Teklu (1994) found in Kenya and Tanzania. 
There these schemes ran through high labour demand seasons, thus limiting the 
benefits to rural households. However, before condemning these programs for 
having limited welfare effects, it is worth considering that their benefits may have 
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been more indirect as they may have provided poor households with an alternative 
form of employment that they could have used as a bargaining chip against the 
local landlord. Unfortunately Teklu does not explore this possibility. 
 
Moreover, despite the potential benefits that these schemes have for the poor, they 
are not immune to corruption and elite capture. For example, in India, weak 
accountability enabled records to be distorted to show employment levels higher 
than they actually were. Farrington et al (2003) noted that, as a result of these 
false claims of employment, the poor workers got only Rs. 10-15 as wages as 
opposed to the intended Rs. 60. The rest was appropriated by bureaucrats and 
politicians. Furthermore, Herring and Edwards (1983) found that the flexibility 
regarding the placement of projects allowed politicians to ration them out to local 
patrons, in exchange for their political support. The latter then used it as a tool for 
strengthening their legitimacy with their clients. Hence, instead of these jobs 
acting as alternatives to the patron, they became another resource for which the 
peasants had to depend on their patron.  
 
While this review is far from exhaustive, it is sufficient to highlight the extent to 
which the success of policies aimed at altering levels of inequality has varied in 
developing countries. We find that even though some governments have been able 
to successfully target the poor (e.g. conditional cash transfers in Mexico and rural 
works programs in India), some have still faced significant barriers which have 
prevented them from benefitting fully from these strategies (for instance, ill-timed 
rural works programs, or patrons lobbing to have schemes channelled through 
them so as to strengthen their patronage network). As a result of these limitations 
many of these poverty alleviating schemes have not been effective at altering 
bargaining powers in rural societies. The problems, as the review has highlighted, 
were two interrelated ones. Firstly, the implementation of these policies, is likely 
to impose high costs on the land owning elite – either directly in the case of land 
reforms or indirectly due to the restructuring of relative bargaining powers. Thus 
they are likely to face resistance from the landed elite. Secondly, some of the 
policy options create incentives and opportunities for elite capture, resulting in the 
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benefits flowing to the rich rather than to the resource poor. Either ways, whether 
due to elite evasion or elite capture, the effects of redistributive policies in many 
areas have been fairly limited in terms of poverty alleviation, and thus are unlikely 
to have altered the relative bargaining powers in those rural societies. Therefore, 
there are grounds for proposing an alternative approach to altering power 
dynamics in rural societies – one that can improve the welfare of the poor. In this 
vein the next section calls for a shift in policy focus, at least in the short to 
medium term, from redistribution to improving connectivity – thus increasing 
peasants’ ability to walk away from a deal they may deem detrimental to their 
welfare.  
 
5. An Alternative Approach – Connectivity 
 
This section extends a slightly un-orthodox policy tool to help alter the relative 
bargaining powers within unequal exchange relationships. Instead of focusing on 
inequality and resource distribution, this alternative aims to target the 
environment in which the relationship plays out. As was argued earlier, these 
exchange relationships, even with their requirement for inequality, in and of 
themselves need not be detrimental to peasants’ welfare. In fact, in line with 
Waterbury’s (1977) argument, given the right setting, these relationships can even 
be seen as second-best solutions in the presence of state and market failures. 
However, what does make them exploitative is when they are the peasants’ sole 
means of satisfying their needs; in which case the peasants’ opportunity cost of 
interacting with the landlord is starvation. As argued in Sections 1 and 2, such 
conditions only arise when inequality is interacted with isolation. Within such a 
setting the landlord has considerable scope for surplus extraction, as any deal 
which offers terms above starvation make the peasants better off. Therefore, I 
propose analysing policy options that help increase the peasants’ opportunity cost 
by providing them with access to alternative options. While there are a number of 
ways in which peasants can be provided with outside options, this thesis explores 
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the effect of connectivity through road networks,9 on exchange relationships 
cultivated in previously isolated rural economies. The main strength of this policy, 
in my perception, is that aside from creating external opportunities for peasants, it 
also benefits the local landowners by both increasing the value of their property 
and by making the external market more accessible for them as well. As Herring 
and Edwards (1983) found in the case of Maharashtra’s employment guarantee 
scheme, the presence of benefits extended to the landed elite makes it less likely 
for them to oppose such policies. Moreover, the benefits of this policy are by no 
means confined to the rural economy, rather they extend to traders, merchants, 
businessmen etc, as it provides the economy with basic physical infrastructure.  
 
Once implemented, by far the greatest and most direct effect of connectivity 
would be to increase peasants’ access to new labour markets. These can 
potentially be found at three levels. At the highest level connectivity may make it 
possible for peasants to participate in the external labour market through 
migration to urban centres. The extent to which they can exercise this option is, of 
course, dependent on the number of employment opportunities available in the 
external economy for unskilled workers (Platteau 1995) and their access to the 
initial capital needed to migrate. For households that lack the resources to migrate 
to major urban centres there may also be the option of commuting to nearby towns 
and cities, thus reducing the costs associated with seeking new employment. 
Lastly, for peasants who are unable to either migrate or commute to the external 
market, there is the option of engaging in new employment opportunities created 
by the increased traffic that now passes to and through the village itself. These are 
arguably of two types. Peasants can either take advantage of the increased motor 
traffic by setting up what Epstein (1962) termed as “hotelu” (p. 32) – small shops 
that service passing traffic – or they can take advantage of the reduced transport 
costs that come with road improvement (Songco 2002) and begin exporting goods 
to the outside market. Each of the three options for market participation implies 
                                                 
9 Connectivity could also come about through telephone connections or access to computers and 
the internet, though this would require levels of literacy and education which are rarely present in 
many rural societies. 
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differing levels of independence for the peasant and thus have different welfare 
implications. However, at the very least, all three should increase the opportunity 
cost of peasants’ labour require a re-evaluation of the terms of exchange as, in its 
old form, the cost of what the peasants offer in the relationship may now exceed 
the benefits they receive from the interaction. Furthermore, the availability of 
alternative options should, to a large extent, reduce the landowner’s ability to 
impose economic sanctions on non-complying peasants, thus resulting in a 
reduction in his level of control.  
 
The fall in the landlord’s ability to impose economic sanctions should also have 
spill over effects in the social and political spheres. In particular, the landlord may 
no longer have the ability to threaten to ostracize a non-complying peasant. The 
absence of strong economic sanctions would make it fairly difficult for the patron 
to coerce peasants to cut off a fellow villager for an activity which is independent 
of everyone except the landlord and the defiant peasant (Blok 1974, Wingrod and 
Morin 1971). Furthermore, an increase in outside options should reduce the level 
of competition between peasants for the patron’s resources, as any need not 
satisfied through the patron can now potentially be serviced in the external 
market. While the extent to which this pressure is reduced would depend on the 
number of opportunities created through connectivity, even in its minimalist form 
it should still make peasants better off than when they were residing in an isolated 
village economy dominated by a large patron. This, aside from decreasing the 
peasants’ dependence on the patron, should also help improve their horizontal ties 
with fellow villagers. The improved cohesiveness of peasants’ horizontal 
networks, as will be discussed in Chapter 5, should make it more possible for 
peasants to engage in collective action for the purpose of self provision, thus 
further lowering their dependence on the landlord. Lastly, connectivity should 
also have a positive impact on the peasants’ level of awareness. This should come 
about, not only through an increase in access to newspapers, but also due to 
increased contact with outsiders who bring with them news about the external 
economy. Amongst other things, this increased level of awareness should make it 
harder for politicians and patrons to ignore the peasants in their public spending 
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decisions. As will be discussed in Chapter 4, it is well established in the literature 
that informed citizens are better able to exert pressure on public officials in order 
to increase their level of responsiveness (see for example Prat and Strömberg 
2006, Besley et. al. 2002, Besley and Burgess 2000, Olsen 1982). Therefore, 
peasants in connected villages should see higher levels of public spending being 
diverted towards their needs. 
 
The landlord has limited ability to bar villagers from participating in these new 
opportunities, as it would entail erecting a barrier on the road network to restrict 
traffic (and external traders) from coming to the village. The costs of doing this 
would be prohibitively high. Alternatively, resource owners could make use of 
violence to bar peasants from participating in the newly available market 
opportunities. However, besides its legal implications, this too would be a costly 
option as it would lead to a loss of peasant loyalty in an environment where 
peasants are valuable, at the very least, for their political support (Scott 1972). 
Therefore, the landlord would be left with no choice but to compete with the 
peasants’ alternative options by altering the terms of the exchange in favour of the 
peasants so as to maintain the integrity of the relationship. His incentives for 
doing this could arguably be three-fold. First and foremost, the political services 
provided by the peasants are important to the patron, as they place him in a 
position of influence vis-à-vis the local politician.10 Besides increasing the 
patron’s authority in rural society, this influence enables him to appropriate public 
resources for his own private benefit (Mason and Joshi 2008, Powell 1970, Keefer 
2004, Scott and Kerkvliet 1977). Therefore, the patron would have an incentive to 
maintain his clientelist following in order to continue enjoying access to public 
resources. Secondly, if the peasants were to choose to break out of the clientelist 
relationship, the landlord would lose his supply of guaranteed labour during peak 
seasons, and would then face the uncertainty of having to frequent the spot labour 
market. Therefore, when deciding whether to alter the balance of exchange, the 
                                                 
10 The more votes that the patron controls, the more politicians would be inclined to align with 
him.  
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patron would need to factor in the benefits of his clients’ labour supply, albeit 
now at market wages. This would have to be weighed against the potential losses 
that would accrue if he were unable to secure the needed workers at the required 
time, or the cost of hiring alternative labourers, which would include the added 
risk of their shirking as these workers would have no ties to the village or the 
landlord. Lastly, as the patron enjoys a high status in rural society due to the size 
of his clientelist following. This too would have to factor into his decision of 
whether or not to alter the balance of exchange.  
 
In fact it can be argued that, in the presence of alternative options, it is now the 
peasants who can sanction the patron if he behaves in a manner they deem 
detrimental to their welfare.11 These sanctions could be economic, by choosing to 
work in the market rather than for the patron, or political by not agreeing to vote 
for the candidate supported by the patron (especially one that does not channel 
public spending towards them), or social by choosing to withdraw from the 
clientelist network completely. The outcome would then be a change in the 
relative prices of the goods and services being exchanged within the network. 
While the value of the clients’ time and support should go up in accordance with 
their increased opportunity cost, the patron’s resources, when placed in 
competition with alternative forms of provision, would lose most of the 
monopolistic value they enjoyed under isolation (Michie 1981). According to 
Scott and Kerkvliet (1977) such a change should cause the legitimacy of the 
patron, and thus the integrity of the patron-client network, to come into question, 
as the network is only deemed legitimate as long as the inequality of the exchange 
is maintained, i.e. the value of the goods and services given by the patron exceeds 
those that the clients offer in return.  
 
Provided the exchange is not exploitative, peasants too have an incentive to 
maintain their relationship with the patron. This is largely due to the costs 
                                                 
11 Of course, this is dependent on the extent of opportunities available in the external market 
(Platteau 1995) and the household being willing to take the risk of leaving the patron. 
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associated with pursuing external options. These could be set-up costs, such as 
moving costs if the household is migrating, travel costs if the household is 
commuting, or the costs of establishing new customers if the household is 
pursuing new options found within the village. There could also be learning costs, 
as peasants have to acquire new skills and learn how to establish and integrate into 
a new network without their patron. Finally, there are costs due to uncertainty, as 
peasants may be venturing into a labour market about which they have little 
information.  
 
The overall effect of connectivity then, is to give peasants the ability to walk away 
from an exchange that lowers their overall welfare. When looking at pre-colonial 
Southeast Asia, Scott (1972) found that the availability of unclaimed land gave 
peasants the option of leaving the local landlord if the exchange became too 
exploitative. While this move was not costless, it was still cheaper than a 
relationship of extreme exploitation. Connectivity, through road networks, should 
have a similar effect, as it gives peasants the freedom to leave the patron when the 
costs of interaction exceed the costs of pursuing alternative options. Once 
connected to the external market, the only way for landlords to sustain the 
patronage network would be to change the balance of exchange to reflect the 
change in the relative prices of the goods and services exchanged.  
 
However, before concluding it must be stressed that the extent to which peasants 
benefit from connectivity depends not only on the level of demand in the urban 
labour market, but also on the nature of this market. There is a rich literature that 
documents high levels of exploitation of workers in the cities, through debt 
bondage. These workers tend to be employed in brick kilns and carpet factories 
situated in, or around, major cities. So despite being surrounded by road networks, 
these bonded workers have limited freedom to pursue alternatives (Ercelawn and 
Nauman 2004). Through a combination of high interest loans, psychological 
abuse, and physical violence (or the threat thereof), factory owners are able to 
limit workers exit options and can thus force them into subservience (ILO 2004, 
Churchill and Guérin 2004). Therefore, employment in urban markets does not 
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guarantee freedom from exploitation, so for peasants to take advantage of 
connectivity they would still need to steer clear of options that tie them into 
relationships of bondage.  
 
In order to test the feasibility of the proposed hypothesis I make use of a natural 
experiment found in the construction of a motorway in Pakistan. This motorway 
passes through villages which were previously isolated from the external 
economy. Moreover, most of these villages also have high levels of inequality 
whereby most of the village land is often owned by one or two big landlords. As a 
result, prior to the construction of the motorway, the peasants were highly 
dependent on monopolistic landlords. However, connectivity has changed this by 
forcing the landlords to compete with peasants’ new options found in the market 
place. The next chapter explains the motivation for situating this study in 
Pakistan, along with a brief description of its socio-economic and political 
structure. The chapter also explains the details of the natural experiment, the case 
villages chosen and the empirical questions investigated during the field study. 
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2. The Political Economy of Rural 
Pakistan 
 
 
 
Pakistan is a country plagued by high levels of inequality, particularly in its land 
distribution. Land distribution in Pakistan was historically determined by the 
British State and its revenue collecting machinery, and varied by the mandate of 
the state at the time of allotment. At times this allotment was found to be largely 
coincidental: for instance, in the early waves of settlement in the Punjab – the 
largest agricultural region in the country – the British administration was faced 
with the perplexing problem of no one claiming rights to village land, as some 
villagers found the burden of revenue payable to the state outweighing the 
benefits of land rent. Therefore, those who successfully claimed ownership of the 
land – be it for a portion of the village land or for the entire village – were granted 
allocation by a willing administration (Nelson 2011; see also Ali 1988, 1994). 
Although the British left South Asia in 1947, the pattern of land distribution has 
remained relatively unchanged, with large land holdings continuing to be held by 
a relatively few big landowners. Since independence the Pakistani state has made 
multiple attempts at land reforms. However, these have all been in vain as 
landlords have used their influence to circumvent surrendering their large 
landholdings. As a result, according to Anwar et al (2004), 68% of the rural 
population in Pakistan in 2002 was landless. This landlessness, they argue, is a 
major contributor towards a household being poor, which is evident from their 
finding that 41% of the landless population lived below the poverty line. 
  
Aside from land reforms, the state has also made attempts to institute various 
forms of poverty reducing strategies meant to increase the welfare of the poor, but 
corruption, combined with badly designed mechanisms for identifying and 
targeting the poor, has resulted in these too having a limited effect. Further, to 
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make matters worse, the state has largely been unable to provide its citizens – 
particularly in rural areas – with essential public services, thereby resulting in 
them suffering from poor social indicators (Chaudry 2003, Easterly 2003). Hence, 
in the absence of formal mechanisms that help provide for and protect the poor, 
the latter have had to find alternative sources for satisfying their needs. Often, this 
has resulted in their creating alliances with the resource rich, thus leading to the 
establishment of patron-client relationships quite similar to those described in 
Chapter 1. The resource rich provide services such as employment, housing, credit 
and social protection, while the poor reciprocate by providing a guaranteed supply 
of cheap labour, social following and political support. Moreover, as argued in 
Chapter 1, the terms of the exchange vary considerably depending on the relative 
bargaining powers of the two parties. Hussain et al (2004), doing research in 8 
poor communities across Pakistan, found that the daily wage rate that rural 
households were paid by the landlord varied considerably depending on the 
household’s economic status. So, while relatively well off households received the 
market rate, those economically worse off were paid a considerably lower wage 
for the same services. Their findings illustrate how the households’ dependence 
on the landlord, due to a lack of any alternative options for provision, made them 
highly vulnerable to exploitation. As will be argued, the limitation of peasants’ 
outside options was not only because of the state being largely absent and them 
not owning any tangible assets, but also due to the relatively closed and isolated 
nature of many Pakistani villages, that restrict peasants to the village economy 
and its resources for satisfying their needs. Isolation in these villages is largely 
driven by two interconnected factors; high levels of poverty and poor 
infrastructure. While poverty confines most poor peasants to the village economy, 
as the cost of the journey to the market is prohibitive, poor infrastructure makes 
travelling to these villages difficult thereby keeping traders out (Rouse 1988 pg 
836). Hence, when peasants are not only landless but also isolated, they have few 
options other than to approach the resource rich for satisfying their most basic 
needs. Therefore, given the urgency, and thus inelasticity, of peasants’ demands, 
they have very low bargaining power.  
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The presence of inequality, combined with the existence of patron-client 
networks, makes Pakistan a good case study for analysing policies which would 
alter bargaining powers in the rural economy. What further makes Pakistan a good 
choice for this study, is a natural experiment found in the construction of a 
motorway in 1998, connecting Lahore – a major cosmopolitan city – to the 
country’s capital, Islamabad. Along the 365 km of the road there are multiple 
exits, each of which has a link road connecting the motorway to the nearest 
city/town. These link roads run past villages which were previously connected 
only by dirt trails, thus minimizing traffic and restricting peasant mobility. The 
construction of this motorway enables us to test the viability of the solution 
proposed in Chapter 1, i.e. to gauge whether, providing peasants with alternative 
options, results in a change in their bargaining power vis-à-vis the patron to the 
extent that the relationship ceases to be exploitative, and becomes one which 
performs a functional role for both patrons and their clients. The aim of this 
chapter therefore, is to give a brief overview of the inequality that exists in 
Pakistan, highlighting how state efforts to reduce it have largely failed to have a 
significant impact, thus creating a need for alternative, and possibly unorthodox, 
policy measures to help bring about change. In this vein, the chapter explores the 
possibility of exploiting the natural experiment found in the construction of the 
motorway, to gauge whether connectivity does in fact change bargaining powers 
in favour of the rural poor.  
 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 1 gives a brief 
overview of the level of inequality in rural Pakistan and surveys the relatively 
scarce literature on rural Pakistan to analyse the coping strategies adopted by poor 
households. While the section finds that households have multiple informal 
institutions they can rely on, focus is placed on the role of patron-client networks. 
The section illustrates the extreme disadvantage that poor households face at the 
hands of the local landlord due to their having no alternative, aside from him, for 
satisfying their needs. Amongst other things, the section also illustrates that the 
most vulnerable households in these villages are those that are most dependent on 
the landlord, and thus have the lowest bargaining power in the village economy. 
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Section 2 highlights the policies adopted by the state to try and mitigate inequality 
and help improve the economic welfare of the poor. However, as will be shown, 
the combination of corruption and bad policy design has resulted in the 
persistence of inequality in rural Pakistan. Section 3, therefore, argues for the 
need to implement alternative policy measures that can possibly change the 
relative bargaining powers in rural societies in favour of the poor. One such policy 
is to increase connectivity as was suggested in Chapter 1. Pakistan presents a rare 
opportunity to test the feasibility of this unorthodox policy recommendation due 
to the availability of the abovementioned natural experiment. The section 
describes this natural experiment and gives a general overview of the research site 
in order to acquaint the reader with the area. The Chapter ends by laying out three 
testable hypotheses which go on to constitute three succeeding chapters in this 
thesis.  
 
1. Inequality and Patronage Networks in Pakistan 
 
Inequality, and thus poverty, is found to be extremely high in Pakistan, 
particularly so in rural areas where 68% of the population resides (GoP 2000, See 
also for example World Bank 2002, Anwar and Qureshi 2003, Cheema 2005, 
Anwar et. al. 2004, Cheema, Khalid and Putnam 2008). According to Anwar et al 
(2004), one of the driving forces of this poverty is extreme inequality in the 
distribution of land, resulting in a vast majority not having control over their 
livelihood. Cheema, Khalid and Putnum (2008) reaffirm this with their findings 
that the landless population almost always falls in the lowest expenditure quartile. 
Furthermore Anwar et al (2004), using data from the Pakistan Integrated 
Household Survey (PHIS 2002), find that within Pakistan, the highest levels of 
inequality are found in the Punjab where 74% of the population is landless. Also, 
they document that while the average land holding in Punjab is 8.2 acres, the 
maximum landholdings of a single individual is over a 100 times the mean. 
However, as argued by Gazdar (2005), the problem of land inequality has 
historically been mitigated to some extent by the landless having access to land 
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through leasing agreements, both in the form of share tenancy and fixed rent 
contracts. Such arrangements enable the poor to ensure themselves a steady food 
supply, even in times of adverse shocks, thus reducing some of the insecurity in 
their environment. However the problem, as identified by Cheema (2008) and also 
acknowledged by Gazdar (2005), is that in the last two decades there has been a 
substantial fall in sharecropping, which has not been accompanied by an increase 
in tenancy farming. Instead, owners have taken control of their fields in order to 
operate them as large scale capital-intensive farms, thus forcing the landless to 
find alternative means for earning a livelihood. 
 
The plight of the poor is further worsened by the presence of a relatively non-
responsive government, which has been unable to provide its citizens with basic 
social services that could help mitigate some of the symptoms of poverty. As 
Easterly (2003) described it, Pakistan is a country that achieved ‘growth without 
development’. His basis for calling it that lies in the finding that, for its level of 
growth rates, Pakistan has very low social indicators1. This is particularly the case 
in rural areas where the bulk of the population suffers from low levels of literacy, 
particularly of females but also of males, high population growth rates which put 
pressure on already precarious resources, poor health and sanitation facilities, and 
poor or non-existent physical infrastructure (Chaudhry 2003). As a result the rural 
poor lack the skill set, the assets and the institutional support needed to, not only 
pull them out of poverty, but also to provide for many of their basic needs.  
 
Thus in the absence of formal institutions which could provide the poor with 
safety nets, they are forced to seek out informal mechanisms to satisfy their socio-
economic needs. According to Bari et al (2005) these informal institutions can be 
classified into three main categories; private charity, biradery (kinship) linkages, 
and patronage networks. Private charity, given through philanthropic 
                                                 
1 These low social indicators are largely due to a high priority given to defence in the national 
budget. 
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organisations and by private individuals as part of their religious obligations2, 
makes a significant contribution to the economy of those poor households that 
receive it (Sayeed 2004). However, the problem with this source is that it is purely 
voluntary and is thus bound to fluctuate considerably. Moreover, who receives 
this assistance is completely arbitrary and it may not be extended to those 
households who are socially excluded for one reason or another. In addition to 
these charities, rural households have also been documented to rely on biradery 
linkages to help remove some of the uncertainty in their environment. These 
networks act as a form of informal insurance and provide peasants with protection 
against idiosyncratic shocks. Such networks are by no means peculiar to rural 
Pakistan. Dasgupta (1993, see particularly Chapter 8) documents that it is quite 
common for rural households, in developing countries, to rely on informal 
insurance provided by members of the community to help see them through any 
disruption in their day to day environment. These networks perform a vital 
function in peasants’ lives and an inability to tap into them can be a major 
handicap which could result in a household falling prey to extreme destitution. 
However, it must be pointed out that, the extent of services that these networks 
can provide varies according to the social status of the biradery. As documented 
by Ahmad (1977), different biraderies have different social status in the rural 
economy, and thus have differing levels of resources and influence (discussed 
later). Therefore, while a lower class biradery may be able to do little more than 
provide moral support to their fellow kin, those belonging to an upper class 
biradery may have the ability to see its members through a wide variety of crises.  
 
Lastly, poor households in rural Pakistan augment the above mentioned sources 
by approaching individuals of higher status, both economically and socially, in an 
effort to gain access to their resources. In exchange, these households provide the 
resource rich with guaranteed labour, often at below market rates, social following 
and political support by voting for the candidate supported by the resource holder 
(Hasnain 2008, Kabeer et al 2010). In the presence of high inequality these 
                                                 
2 According to Islamic tradition Muslim households are obligated to give 2.5% of their income as 
charity. 
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exchange relationships are found to be the proto-typical patron-client relationships 
described in Chapter 1. The resource rich patron caters for his poor clients’ 
survival needs and, at the very least, ensures their physical protection and that 
their subsistence needs are met. The clients, in return, reciprocate with the above 
mentioned intangible services. As argued by Bari et al (2005) and Nelson (2011), 
in the presence of an ineffective state and high levels of corruption, these 
networks can act as a conduit for poor households to gain privileged access to 
state resources. 
 
However, as was highlighted in Chapter 1, the extent of benefits that peasant 
households receive from being members of a patronage network varies 
considerably depending on their relative bargaining powers. By definition the 
patron, of course, has a higher bargaining power in this relationship. Pakistani 
patrons are no exception as they are often large landowners in the rural economy 
(Ahmed 1977, Rouse 1988, Hussain et al 2004). However, the extent to which 
their bargaining power is higher depends on the assets and skill set of the clients, 
their number in the rural economy3, and the availability of outside options. Clients 
in rural Pakistan range from landless unskilled workers, found both in the 
agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, to small landholding households 
possessing some amount of skills. While the former rely on their patron for most 
of their survival needs, the later look towards the network to improve their well-
being, but are able to survive without the services of the landlord (Hussain et al 
2004). Therefore, the former are more likely to have very low bargaining power 
and thus are fairly vulnerable to exploitation. On the other hand, peasants who 
have the ability to pursue alternative avenues of provision, either in the form of 
other patrons or in options found outside the village economy, are found to be in a 
stronger bargaining position, as the terms of the exchange have to, at least, match 
their opportunity cost in order for them to engage in the network. In contrast to 
this, when peasants reside in villages where the patron has monopolistic control, 
                                                 
3 The more clients a patron has the greater will be the competition for his resources. 
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both due to inequality and isolation that limits peasants’ options, the clients are in 
a weaker bargaining position. 
 
The patron’s superior bargaining power stems largely from his asset holding that 
allows him to have influence in multiple aspects of the villagers’ lives. By virtue 
of being the owner of most of the village land, he is found to be not only the main 
source of employment for many peasants but also is often a major, and possibly 
even only source of credit for poor rural households. The importance of these 
services, particularly credit, is highlighted by Hussain et al (2004), who found that 
poor households in rural Pakistan were unable to meet their basic needs through 
their own resources and, unless they were able to borrow from external sources, 
faced the possibility of starvation. However, as mentioned in Chapter 1, in the 
absence of tangible assets they are unable to access the formal credit market, and 
so their only recourse is to approach the local landlord who can make use of their 
labour services in exchange for credit facilities. Table 1 below reproduces Hussain 
et al’s findings on the extent to which rural households in their sample borrowed 
from the local landlord, stratified by the households’ economic status.4 From the 
table we find that, by far, the largest percentage of households borrowing from the 
landlord were the extremely poor; 50.8% of these households claimed to have 
taken a loan from the local landlord to finance their consumption needs. While the 
average explicit interest rate documented for these loans was 0.06%, the actual 
interest rate paid by the household was much higher. This was because access to 
credit facilities was found to come with an obligation to work for free for the 
landlord, which 57.4% of the extremely poor households did. Moreover, amongst 
the households which were paid for their labour services, the wage rate was found 
to vary substantially depending on the economic status of the household. While 
the non-poor received a daily wage equal to the market rate, the poor and 
extremely poor received a much lower rate for the same services. Therefore the 
                                                 
4 It is worth mentioning that the non-poor category referred to in this table is a relative category. 
As Hussain et al (2004) explain, these households are by no means affluent, but are simply better 
off when compared to the other two categories, as they own a certain amount of land that allows 
them to be self-sufficient regarding their basic needs. Despite this they still interact in the 
patronage network as it enables them to improve their overall well-being. 
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table highlights how the vulnerability that poor and extremely poor households 
faced due to their material depravation enabled the landlord to extract 
considerable surplus from his interaction with them. And, lacking any alternative 
options, these households usually found themselves in no position to reject the 
landlord’s offer, even when it was against their long term interest.  
 
Table 1 Household borrowing  
 
Source Hussain et al (2004) 
 
Apart from credit, the patron may also be the owner of several villagers’ 
homestead land where they reside in a rent-free arrangement. While the incidence 
of this was extremely high prior to land reforms in 1972 now, though still 
prevalent, such arrangements are not as widespread (Gazdar and Mullah 2011). 
Where these arrangements still persist it is found that, although they place no 
direct financial burden on peasant households, they come with the implicit 
obligation of them providing some services to the patron – possibly cheap labour 
or an agreement to vote in line with the patron’s wishes. Moreover, ownership of 
the peasant's house also acts as a mechanism of control for the landlord over 
peasant household, as the latter faces the threat of eviction if it falls on the wrong 
side of the patron’s grace5. Rouse (1988, pg 834), in her study of a village in 
Sahiwal Pakistan, found that peasants were obligated to do odd jobs for the 
landlord and his manager in exchange for the right to live on his lands. A refusal 
to do so could result in immediate eviction. Interestingly, from my own 
experience doing field work in rural Punjab, I found that most households did not 
                                                 
5 Due to weak judicial and policing services, and the informal nature of these arrangements, this 
eviction can occur without any prior notice. 
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own their homestead land but, at the same time, were also unaware as to who the 
owner was. Patrons at times took advantage of this ignorance to use eviction as a 
sanction against non-complying peasants. During the course of my field work 
many households recounted stories about villagers being thrown out of their 
homes overnight, following a major disagreement with the local landlord.  
 
The influence of the patron is also found to extend to the social sphere as land 
ownership in Pakistan provides the holder with social authority, making the owner 
fairly active in peasants’ social lives. In particular, the patron is sought to act as an 
arbitrator in peasants’ disputes, as judicial and policing services in Pakistan are 
plagued by rampant corruption due to which the poor are unable and unwilling to 
rely on them. Mohmand and Gazdar (2007), from their study of 7 villages across 
Pakistan, found that peasants often preferred to approach panchayats (informal 
courts headed by village influentials) rather than police stations or courts for 
settling their disputes. Their reasons for avoiding the authorities lay both in the 
high costs associated with formal dispute resolution, and the threat of harassment 
by the police. Hussain et al (2004) have similar findings from their sample 
villages where they document that, even though poor households are more 
vulnerable to crime, ranging from petty thefts to life threatening feuds, they are 
least likely to register a case with the police. Instead, peasants seek alliances with 
village influentials, not only to gain protection against any possible attack, but 
also to ensure that if a dispute does arise they can rely on their patron to side with 
them in the resolution process. Of the few poor households that did approach 
formal institutions, an overwhelming majority of them had cases decided against 
them. This is in line with the findings of my own field research, both for this 
thesis and for an earlier study on the interaction of patronage networks and the 
local government system. I found that the vast majority of households avoided 
approaching the police and, instead, settled their disputes either through their 
biradery network (if it was a small issue), or through the local patron. Those who 
did register a case tried to get their patron to accompany them so as to increase the 
chances of their case being given some importance. As argued by Nelson (2011), 
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irrespective of the regime in power in Pakistan it, along with its policing and 
judicial machinery, tends to be biased in favour of the rural elite.  
 
Lastly, the patron performs an important political function for his clients as often 
he is well connected with the local politician. Cheema and Mohmand (2004), 
while studying public provision in rural Faisalabad, Pakistan, found that simply 
voting for the incumbent politician did not result in increased provision for 
peasant households. Rather, provision depended on the household being aligned 
with a patronage network that could negotiate increased provision for them as 
they found that public provision, instead of flowing from the politician to his 
constituents, was channelled through such networks. Nelson (2011) and 
Mohmand and Gazdar (2007) too have similar findings in their respective studies 
of villages across Pakistan. As Hasnain (2008) notes, politicians in Pakistan are 
more concerned with distributing public resources for patronage than with 
providing for the general masses. Their incentive for such targeted provision lies 
in the guaranteed votes that local patrons can provide to them, which are far in 
excess of what can be procured through political campaigning (see generally 
Keefer 2004). The ability of the patron to make this guarantee comes from his 
control over multiple votes – which he can offer by virtue of the reciprocal 
agreement he has with his clients. Once promised, peasants are unable to renege 
on this commitment, not only because ballot casting is not always secret in rural 
Pakistan, but also because the sanctions that would follow disobedient behaviour 
could be extremely high. In all my research trips in rural Punjab, Pakistan, I have 
often heard accounts of the openness of the ballot casting process – particularly 
where women were concerned. During my interviews some women recounted 
how, during elections, they filled out their ballot and sent it to the polling station 
with one of their children, because their conservative household did not allow 
them to physically go to the polling station.  
 
Control over multiple votes places the patron in a fairly strong bargaining position 
vis-à-vis the local politician. This high bargaining power is then used by him to 
extract public resources, both for his own private benefit and for public goods 
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provision to some selected clients (Nelson 2011). The power and importance of 
these networks, in the distribution of public funds, is highlighted by Cheema and 
Mohmand’s (2004) findings that, in spite of the fact that one of the patronage 
networks in their sample villages, voted against the incumbent politician in the 
previous election, the patron and his clients still received higher public goods 
provision when compared to villagers who had voted for the politician but were 
not part of a patronage network. Their explanation for the network receiving 
public funds was the incumbent mayor making an effort to try and lobby the 
support of this patron in the coming election.  
 
The influence that un-elected patrons have in the decision regarding the 
distribution of public resources, is well documented in the relatively scarce 
literature available on the political economy of Pakistani villages (see for example 
Ahmad 1977, Rouse 1988, Wilder 1999, Hasnain 2008, Cheema and Mohmand 
2004, Cheema et al 2005). In 2001, the Musharaf Government tried to bring these 
un-elected patrons into the political process by instituting an additional tier to the 
government machinery – one that would reside at the local level (Cheema and 
Mohmand 2004). These local government reforms were aimed at bringing 
democracy closer to the masses and increasing citizen participation in the political 
process. The hope was to either make the local patron more accountable to the 
citizens by having him run for public office, or to provide him with electoral 
competition by having an elected official close to the villagers. Moreover, efforts 
were made to increase citizen involvement by making provisions for three types 
of participatory bodies; those accommodating citizen oversight on the politicians’ 
activities (School Councils), those providing citizens with funds to self-provide 
for their needs (Citizen Community Boards) and those including citizens in the 
budgetary process (Village Neighbourhood Councils).  
 
However, up until now these reforms seem to have fallen short of these aims for 
two reasons. Firstly, the above mentioned bodies have yet to be instituted on an 
acceptable scale. Also, peasants are often unawares of the possibility that they can 
play a direct role in the decision of funds allocation (Cheema and Mohmand 2004, 
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Takashi 2007). In line with Hall’s (1974) argument, patrons have an incentive to 
block information regarding such bodies as they could act as catalysts for social 
change. Given that it was the responsibility of the lowest tier of government (the 
union council) to facilitate the creation and functioning of these bodies the patron, 
in conjunction with the politician, also had the ability to control the trickling down 
of such information. Secondly, the effect of bringing the politician closer to the 
masses has meant that he is also now closer to the patron, thereby making political 
contracting much easier6. Hence, we see a continuation of the practice of public 
provision being channelled through a patron, rather than directly to the voting 
citizens, thus highlighting how elaborate decentralization reforms, without well 
instituted mechanisms to disburse information and ensure transparency regarding 
public spending, have failed to alter the political economy of service provision in 
rural Pakistan.7  
 
 
2. Policy Efforts to Alter Relative Bargaining Power 
 
Apart from trying to increase the unelected patrons’ political competition, the 
government of Pakistan has also made several other attempts at reducing poverty 
with the intention of altering the incentive structure in rural economies. Amongst 
these the most extensive, albeit least effective, have been land reforms. Since 
independence in 1947, the Pakistani government has made three attempts at land 
redistribution through the imposition of land ceilings in 1959, 1972 and 1977, but 
all three have had limited impact on the levels of inequality. For instance, while 
the reforms in 1959 were able to confiscate 2.5 million acres of land (4% of total 
cultivated land), 0.93 million acres of these (37.2 %) were non-cultivatable 
(Qayyum 1980). Similar outcomes were observed in the 1972 and 1977 reforms, 
where high levels of corruption enabled landlords to either circumvent land 
ceilings without the imposition of sanctions or, to use loopholes in the law to 
                                                 
6 This contracting between the patron and the politician is discussed in much more detail in 
Chapter 4 which deals with public goods provision. 
7 The persistence of patronage politics, even after the decentralisation of government, is evident 
from Cheema and Mohmand’s (2004) study which was conducted after power was devolved. 
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preserve their landholdings (see for example Zaidi 1999, Nelson 2011, Hussain 
1989, Arif and Ahmed 2001, Rashid 1985). In fact, as was documented by Rouse 
(1983), Lyon (2002) and Nelson (2011), in some ways the effects of these reforms 
were actually welfare reducing for local peasants, as they incentivised landlords to 
evict their tenants through explicit and/or implicit harassment, and engage in 
capital-intensive farming so as to maintain their land ownership. Rouse (1988) in 
particular, delves quite deeply into the impact that land reforms had on rural 
peasants, especially since these reforms coincided with the green revolution in 
Pakistan. She finds that prior to 1959, despite the village land being almost 
exclusively owned by two major landholding families, peasants had access to land 
through tenancy arrangements. Moreover, since the landholders were absentee 
landlords, the peasants had considerable discretion regarding crop choices and the 
cultivation methods applied.8 This flexibility enabled peasant households to grow 
crops that also catered to their subsistence needs and thus protected them against 
starvation in times of bad harvests. However, the implementation of land reforms, 
with its encouragement of large mechanised farms9, Rouse argues, changed this 
significantly. In an effort to preserve their land holdings, the landlord started to 
take over control of his fields so as to cultivate them as capital-intensive farms. As 
a result, a considerable number of tenants were either evicted, or harassed into 
leaving, thus forcing them to find alternative means for securing a livelihood. This 
not only had an adverse effect on the evicted households, but also infringed on the 
welfare of casual agricultural workers, as they now had to compete with this new 
group of unemployed households for jobs which were historically theirs by virtue 
of their social class10. As for peasant households’ who were able to hold on to 
their rented land, not only were they moved to less fertile pieces of land11, but also 
found the landlord to be much more active in the production process, essentially 
telling them what to produce and how to go about doing it. Moreover, the 
landlord’s focus on cash crops, so as to increase his profits for sustaining his 
                                                 
8 Although they were supervised by the landlords’ managers, they still did enjoy a certain degree 
of freedom on the fields that they rented. 
9 This, she documents, was on the advice of the World Bank and the Harvard Advisory Board.  
10 The role of class in the rural society is described in detail later on. 
11 The more fertile tracts of land were taken over by the landlords for self-cultivation. 
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lavish lifestyles, meant that tenants were no longer allowed to grow crops that 
catered to their subsistence needs. Therefore, for those agricultural households 
that did not receive any redistributed land, the reforms actually worked to increase 
their level of insecurity.  
 
Moreover, while tenancy reforms have been enacted at various points in 
Pakistan’s history, their implementation has been fairly limited, thus resulting in 
continued tenant insecurity (Naqvi et al. 1989). In fact, as mentioned earlier, in 
recent years there has been a considerable fall in landless households’ access to 
land for cultivation under sharecropping arrangements, as landlords have taken 
over control of their lands for the purpose of large scale mechanised farming 
(Cheema 2008). This has forced the poor to either work as agricultural labourers 
or pursue other avenues for earning a living. The last attempt made by members 
of parliament to implement land reforms was in October 2010, with a proposal 
that closed several of the loopholes in previous reforms. However, this proposal 
was shot down by a major religious political party (Jamiat Ulema-e- Pakistan – 
JUP) on the contention that land reforms were un-Islamic and thus against Sharia 
Law (The Express Tribune Oct. 13, 2010)12. Therefore, in the current political 
(and religious) climate in Pakistan, it will be difficult for political parties to revive 
the issue of land reforms.  
 
Other measures for reducing inequality have also had limited success. Here too 
ineffective targeting, combined with corruption, has meant that these schemes 
have failed to reach the target group and thus have had a limited impact on the 
income gap (See Bari et al. 2005 for an overview of these projects. See also Arif 
2006, Heltberg 2004, Malik 2003). These measures included cash transfers, 
microcredit schemes, food subsidization and labour welfare programs. The cash 
transfer program was enacted on the recognition that households, which were 
extremely poor, were unable to meet their consumption needs with their own 
resources. Thus, in order to assist them with their basic needs, the program aimed 
                                                 
12 http://tribune.com.pk/story/62096/mqms-land-reforms-bill-un-islamic-jup/ 
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at giving them a small stipend every month. Cash transfers were made through 
two separate schemes; the Zakat Fund and the Bait ul Maal Scheme. While the 
first was financed through a religious charity tax applied to the bank accounts of 
Muslims13, the latter was funded through government funds ear-marked for 
poverty reduction. However, the total amount transferred in 2000 was only 0.27% 
of GDP and thus reached only 2.9 million people14 (Bari et al 2005). Hussain et al 
(2004), in their, survey found that these cash transfers funded only 0.12%15 of the 
extremely poor households’ consumption needs.  
 
Limitation of funds, combined with poor targeting and corruption, meant that only 
35% of those receiving money transfers under these schemes, actually resided 
below the poverty line (Heltberg 2004). This leakage occurred largely due to the 
obscure nature of the selection process, which allowed for patronage and bribes to 
play a significant role in determining who received state support (Kabeer et al 
2010). In the case of the Zakat Fund, the beneficiaries had to be Muslims and 
were selected by a committee established in the local mosque. While a selection 
criterion was established –based on the criterion established for zakat in 7th 
Century Arabia (Gazdar 2011) – there was significant variation in the 
characteristics of the households selected across Pakistan. Interestingly, Arif 
(2006) finds that of those households that did receive cash transfers from the 
government, less than 60% were nominated by the selection committees. The rest 
had been recommended by local influentials (landlords, religious leaders, family 
members of people on the committee and so forth). Therefore, he argues that the 
Zakat Fund is used more as a political tool to disburse patronage than to help 
mitigate poverty. Kabeer et al (2010) too, find a strong correlation between 
households being aligned with a strong patron and their chances of receiving 
transfers from the Zakat Fund. The Bait ul Maal Scheme, the other main cash 
transfer program, was meant for all citizens, irrespective of religion, who were 
                                                 
13 As argued by Gazdar (2011) in a country where close to 97% of the population is Muslim the 
exclusionary element of this clause is fairly limited.  
14 The population of Pakistan according to the 1998 censes was close to 137 million people (GoP 
1998). The CIA Factbook’s estimations for 2011 are 187 million. 
15 This figure also includes transfers made through private charity. 
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identified as being poor by a district level committee. Here too, the basis for 
selection was fairly vague and thus left significant room for rent-seeking and 
patronage. As a result, it was often found that a household’s acceptance into a 
program depended on its connections rather than its need.  
 
In 2007 the Government of Pakistan, in a report on social protection, 
acknowledged that the cash transfer program was not sufficient to meet the needs 
of the poor and that there was a need to increase the amounts allocated to these 
types of schemes (Gazdar 2011). In this vein in 2008/09, the newly elected 
government enacted a new cash transfer scheme called the Benazir Income 
Support Program aimed at targeting poor women. These transfers were made 
through the parliament, with each member of the national assembly (MNA) being 
provided with selection criterion to help pick 8000 eligible households from 
amongst his/her constituents. However, as in the case of the other cash transfer 
programs, this too fell prey to patronage and rent seeking. Gazdar (2011), while 
surveying five villages, found that the scheme was absent in one of the villages 
because its inhabitants were the constituents of the political rival of the incumbent 
MNA. Even in the other villages he found that, while the money was given to 
poor households, some of the poorest had been excluded due to their weak 
political connections. Gazdar notes how the government, due to criticism from the 
World Bank, acknowledged that the parliamentary based allocation was prone to 
capture and thus devised a poverty score on the bases of which to allocate future 
funds. The success of this new targeting mechanism is still to be seen. 
  
Another attempt to assist poor farmers was made through microcredit facilities 
provided by government sponsored banks. However, this scheme also failed to 
benefit the extremely poor segment of the population. This failure was due to lack 
of effective mechanisms to identify the poor, combined with a policy of excluding 
people who showed limited ability to repay loans (Toor and Nasar 2003). 
According to findings by Anwar et al (2004), in 2001-02 only 6% of the 8.3 
million households living below the poverty line actually received microcredit 
loans. Having said that, Khan (2004, cited in Arif 2006) stipulates that while the 
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benefits of microcredit may not have reached the extreme poor, these schemes are 
found to be beneficial for rural households who are poor, but not below the 
poverty line. For households that are denied access to formal credit institutions, 
the only option is to approach informal sources of credit (local moneylenders, 
landlord, friends, relatives etc) (Bari et al 2005, Chaudhry 2003). As mentioned 
earlier, although these loans charge low or zero explicit interest rates, they have at 
times been found to be fairly exploitative, charging implicit interest rates as high 
as 200% (Aleem 1990).  
  
Efforts to reduce poverty have also been made by instituting labour welfare 
schemes that have dealt mostly with pensions, education and social security 
provision. However, coverage of these programs has been fairly limited, as they 
are restricted to workers in the formal sector only. Even then, it was found that 
they have benefitted only 4% of the non-agricultural workforce (Bari et al 2005). 
The government also implemented a food subsidisation program, giving price 
subsidies for wheat and bread. While this was the largest safety net offered to the 
poor, it was an untargeted program that was largely confined to the urban areas 
(DFID 2006). The untargeted nature of these schemes makes it difficult to 
evaluate the extent of its benefits. However, according to the DFID report, the 
Government of Pakistan has indicated that these subsidies are by no means meant 
as long term support.  
 
3. The Empirical Study 
 
The limited impact of government programs due to budget constraints, poor 
targeting, or to elite capture and patronage politics, has meant that a vast majority 
of the poor are unable to benefit from them, and thus continue to rely on the 
resource rich for satisfying their needs. Hence, as an alternative, I propose looking 
at policy options that alter the environment in which the patrons interact with their 
clients, rather than those that change the distribution of assets. One such policy is 
to increase peasants’ access to the external market through road networks, as was 
described at the end of Chapter 1. The benefit of connectivity, as highlighted in 
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the previous chapter, is to provide peasants with alternative options so as to 
increase their opportunity cost of interacting with the resource rich. Rouse (1988), 
in her study of a village in central Punjab, Pakistan, looked at the impact a road, 
along with other changes in the village society, had on the socio-economic setup 
of the village. However, the road in her village was built by the landlords, in an 
effort to make it easier for them to access the market, and thus gave them some 
discretion regarding how it was used. One restriction they placed was to bar 
animals from coming onto the road. This meant that peasants were unable to use 
their donkey carts to access the external economy, and thus mostly used it for 
human traffic. Therefore, she found that accessing the external market entailed 
some costs for the peasants. As a result, she argues that rural markets remained 
imperfect and unregulated. Nonetheless, at a time when landlords were evicting 
tenants in order to prevent the state from confiscating their land under land 
reforms (see Section 2 above), the accessibility of the market, albeit at a certain 
cost, allowed peasants occupational mobility and thus reduced their dependence 
on the landlord. Alongside connectivity, she also documents the emergence of 
new landowners, either by allotments through land reforms or by certain peasants 
(such as the goldsmith) buying up village land whenever the landlords sold any of 
their property. These new land owners also provided peasants with alternative 
options for satisfying their needs. Interestingly, she finds that amongst the group 
of latter landlords, one was particularly aggressive at mobilising peasants’ 
support, to the extent that he guaranteed peasants economic security if they defied 
the landlord on the political front (pg 84). However, it is worth highlighting that in 
Rouse’s study connectivity was not the only change taking place in the rural 
economy, as it also experienced two rounds of land reforms, mechanisation, a 
change in the political structure with a move away from party based elections for 
Local Government and the general monetization of the rural economy. Still, she 
stipulates that connectivity played an important role in reducing peasants’ 
dependence on their local landlord, by providing them with an alternative avenue 
for satisfying their economic needs.  
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Drawing on Rouse’s (1988) results, and on the findings in the wider literature that 
isolation plays a critical role in providing the landlord with extracting powers, this 
thesis argues that connectivity should be advocated as a policy tool for reducing 
the authority enjoyed by large landlords in rural societies. In order to test the 
feasibility of such an option, I make use of a natural experiment found in the 
construction of a motorway in Pakistan which came into operation in 1998, 
connecting Lahore (a major cosmopolitan city and the provincial capital of 
Punjab) to Islamabad (the capital of the country). Along the 365 km of the road 
there are multiple exits, each of which has a link road connecting the motorway to 
the nearest city/town. 16 These link roads run past villages which were previously 
connected only by dirt trails, making it difficult and expensive for peasants to 
travel outside the village and cumbersome for outsiders to venture over, thus 
leaving them highly dependent on the village economy and its resources for 
fulfilling their needs. Unlike the road in Rouse’s (1988) village, the motorway, 
along with its link roads, was constructed by the federal government, and 
therefore, landlords are unable to place any restrictions on how it is to be used.  
 
The decision regarding the placement of the road was made by the federal 
government, based on considerations completely unrelated to village level 
characteristics. These were broadly geography, connectivity and defence 
(Republic Engineering Corporation Limited 1988).17 Firstly, efforts were made to 
ensure that the road ran through as few geographical hazards as possible so as to 
minimise the risk of road accidents.18 Secondly, the federal government wanted to 
connect these two major cities with a motorway that was not very close to the old 
highway, and one which passed through as many towns and villages as possible 
                                                 
16 When talking about villages being close to the road, reference is made to their distance from a 
link road. The motorway itself is a fenced off road and presents no benefit to villages close to it. 
17 Mr. Chaudry Muhammad Altaf, Chairman National Highway Authority, interview, 15 April 
2008. 
18 Particular attention was paid to a salt range situated between Lahore and Islamabad, as passing 
through the salt range required the construction of winding roads which, it was believed, would 
increase the chances of motor accidents. Therefore the government wanted to minimise the stretch 
that ran through this area.  
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without hampering the economic benefits to traders.19 Lastly, the Air Force has a 
bombing range situated between Lahore and Islamabad which made some of the 
suggested routes unusable. None of these factors are systematically related to 
specific village characteristics.  
 
There were rumours however, that the placement of the road was changed from 
the original plan so as to allow it to run past the lands of large landlords. While I 
was unable to find evidence to confirm this, I identified areas where the motorway 
was not altered from the original plan in any way. Among these was Hafizabad, 
Punjab. In the area selected for this study the landlords, while commanding 
considerable authority in their own villages, would be considered part of the lower 
middle class in urban settings. This was quite evident from the houses they lived 
in, the cars they drove, the schools they sent their children to and their own levels 
of education. Therefore, they lacked the influence needed to alter the federal 
government’s decision regarding the placement of a national highway, making it 
an exogenous shock to the rural economy.  
 
The motorway passes through district Hafizabad with two exits connecting it to 
the cities of Hafizabad and Pindi Bhattian. Hafizabad district is also a good choice 
for this study because of its being an average Pakistani district in terms of its 
human development indicators. According to Hussain et al’s (2004) calculations, 
Hafizabad district’s Human Development Index (HDI), when compared to 
Pakistan as a whole, is ranked number 46 amongst the 91 districts of the country. 
Furthermore, in terms of land tenure systems, the district has been described as a 
typical Punjabi society with a few large landlords dominating economic and 
political activities in the area (Kurosaki 2005, Alavi 1983). Hence we should 
expect to find poor peasants engaging in exchange relationships similar to patron-
client networks in the area.  
 
                                                 
19 The benefits of connecting additional towns and villages had to be weighed against the costs of 
the route, between the two main cities, being stretched to facilitate increased access. 
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Ideally the study would have been conducted with time series data so as to 
compare outcomes before and after the construction of the motorway. 
Unfortunately, such data do not exist as data collection in rural Punjab has been 
fairly limited. The two organisations that have collected data in Hafizabad district 
were the Punjab Agricultural Census Department (a government department) and 
the Punjab Rural Support Programme (a government sponsored NGO). However, 
when examining their data for the villages included in this study, it contradicted 
outcomes I myself had observed, despite the fact that it had been collected a few 
months prior to my own data collection.20 Therefore, I chose not to use it. Instead 
I have tried to overcome this disadvantage through my research design, which 
compares outcomes in villages dominated by large landlords (landlord based 
villages) close to the road to similarly tenured villages situated far away. 
Moreover, the study makes use of villages with relatively egalitarian distribution 
of land (peasant based villages) as a control group based on Banerjee and Iyer’s 
(2004) finding that villages with disbursed land holdings are significantly better 
off when compared with villages dominated by large landlords. By using peasant 
based villages as a control group I am, therefore, able to evaluate whether 
outcomes in landlord dominated villages close to the road are converging towards 
those found in their peasant based counter-parts. For this reason too, Hafizabad 
district was a good choice for this study as the district has considerable variation 
in its land distribution, thus allowing me to find villages with both types of land 
tenure systems. Hence in this study a village is considered to be dominated by a 
large landlord when the landholding of one household is greater than 100 acres. In 
my sample landlord dominated villages land holdings of the patrons varied from 
100 acres to 300 acres. However, despite there being two landlords in some of the 
landlord dominated villages, the extent to which peasants can defect to other 
patrons is questionable when we consider Platteau’s (1995) argument that 
landlords in South Asia may abide by time honoured traditions of not accepting 
other patrons’ run-away peasants. Therefore peasants are unable to use the threat 
of defection to another patron as a means of increasing their bargaining power. 
                                                 
20 These primarily dealt with the provision of public goods such as drains and paved streets, where 
the level of provision was grossly overestimated. 
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Before proceeding further it is worth mentioning that, even in peasant based 
villages, the incidence of landlessness is just as high as in landlord dominated 
villages. The difference is that while no single landowner is powerful enough to 
wield control in peasant based villages, the main landowner in landlord dominated 
villages is large enough to be, for most peasants, the main source of employment, 
both in the fields and for domestic work, the owner of their homestead land and, 
most of the time, the main source of credit.  
 
Within the district, eight villages located at varying distances from the motorway 
were chosen. In order to evaluate the differential impact of connectivity on these 
two types of villages, four of the eight selected villages are dominated by large 
landlords while four are peasant based villages. Moreover, for each group, two 
villages are found to have the motorway run through them, while two are situated 
far away. Distant villages were situated between eight and eleven kilometres from 
the road.  
 
Apart from connectivity, the descriptive statistics in Table 2 show that the eight 
villages are relatively very similar. Also, wherever data is available, the table 
compares the villages to the district average for rural areas to illustrate the 
representativeness of these villages. However, it needs to be pointed out that the 
district level averages were obtained from the census data which was conducted in 
1998, while my data was collected in 2008. As mentioned before, the absence of 
data collection in the region means that I was unable to find district averages from 
a later period. Starting with household occupation, we can see that 46% of 
households close to the road and 48% of those that are far away, derive their 
primary source of income from agriculture, working as self-cultivators, 
sharecroppers or tenant farmers. The district average was 42.5% households 
engaging in agriculture. Amongst cultivating households, my sample shows that 
only 44% and 48% of households that own less than 5 acres of land rent land in 
villages close and far from the motorway, respectively. By far the majority of 
these contracts, in all the villages, are tenancy arrangements with the tenant 
paying a fixed rent to the landlord. Furthermore, most cultivating households 
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belong to the socially upper class biradery in the villages. Apart from cultivation, 
the second largest occupation is also related to agriculture, with 22% households 
in all 8 villages being employed as agricultural workers. These workers generally 
tend to come from the lower class biraderies in the village and most often do not 
possess any skills and/or tangible assets. As a result, these households tend to be 
highly dependent on the village and its resources for securing their livelihood, and 
thus have relative weak bargaining power within the patronage network. This is 
partially evident from the fact that, in isolated villages, only 18% were paid a 
wage rate for their services. The remainder were paid various combinations of 
wages and in-kind payments. The corresponding figure close to the road was 26%. 
Moreover, despite the fact that close to 70% of villagers in the area draw their 
livelihood from land, 51% of households close to the road and 54% of those 
situated far away do not own land themselves. The 30% of households which are 
not engaged in agriculture, derive their livelihood either as shopkeepers or by 
providing various goods and services around the village. These include 
professions such as those of a barber, milkman, school teacher, domestic help etc. 
A few households also work as day labourers on construction sites or any other 
projects that come along. It is worth mentioning that every household in my 
sample reported having at least one source of income. 
 
The extent of benefits that the motorway extends to rural households intuitively 
should vary considerably depending on their occupation. For instance, while we 
should expect households working as agricultural labourers to be more flexible 
and thus better able to pursue outside options, households engaged in tenancy 
arrangements are more likely to be tied to the village economy and should, 
therefore, be less able to walk away from the tenancy contract when a better 
opportunity presents itself. While there is strength in this argument, its 
applicability is questioned for two reasons. Firstly, it is interesting to find that 
amongst those agricultural households that rent land, the majority belong to the 
upper class biradery (68%). As will be explained later, these households tend to 
enjoy a higher social status in rural society and thus have a stronger bargaining 
position relative to other households. Secondly, a household may choose to take 
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advantage of the connectivity by employing a second person from the house in the 
external market, while still honouring its tenancy contract. Given that labour in 
developing counties agrarian sector tend to be underemployed (Laanjouw and 
Lanjouw 2001, Newbery and Stern 1987), this should not affect total productivity. 
Furthermore, Hussain et al (2004) argue that a major criterion for a household 
being able to pull itself out of poverty is its ability to secure a second source of 
income. Of course, the ability of a household to attain an additional source of 
income outside the village economy is not only a function of connectivity but also 
depends on the state of the urban labour market. According to the 1998 census 
data, a total of 4.6% of the population was unemployed in Hafizabad district. Of 
these 3.4% claimed to be unemployed due to the unavailability of jobs (GoP 
2000).  
 
Amongst households that did try their luck in the urban labour market, jobs 
available to them ranged from construction jobs to working in local shops, 
restaurants and hotels, to working on gas stations to working as domestic staff. 21 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, for those households that do not manage to venture 
outside the village, connectivity should still have a beneficial impact by creating 
new employment within the village, much like the ones described by Epstein 
(1962). These opportunities were highly visible during my visits to these villages 
as, not only did I find a wide variety of stores lining both sides of the road, but 
also it was quite common to have people approach passers-by to sell them small 
handmade products, or to offer to clean their car while they waited in the village 
for one reason or the other. While the benefit to the household in terms of its 
bargaining power vis-à-vis the local patron would vary depending on the type of 
options that open up to the household, even in its lowest form the effect should be 
positive, albeit relatively marginal.  
 
                                                 
21Landlord 1, interview, connected landlord dominated village 1, 15 April, 2011. 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics     
Hafizabad 
Districta 
Close to the 
Motorwayc 
Far from the 
Motorwayc   
Percentage households engaged in 
agriculture 42.5% 46.3% 47.7% 
Percentage of agricultural households 
renting land when their own holding is less 
than 5 acres  
44.0% 48.7% 
Percentage households working as agricultural 22.1% 22.3% 
day labourers 
Percentage of agricultural workers paid a 
wage 26.0% 18.0% 
Percentage of households that are landless 51.0% 54.0% 
Average monthly household spending $109 $101 
Percentage of households having three meals 
a day 80.0% 74.0% 
Average number of rooms in the house 2.2b 3.0 3.2 
Average number of people in the house 7.1b 8.3 8.3 
Percentage of households residing in a brick 
house 58.5% 50.0% 41.5% 
Percentage of households with an indoor 
bathroom 14.7% 11.0% 12.4% 
Percentage of households headed by an 
illiterate person 50.0% 48.0% 
Percentage of households sending their 
children to school 78.0% 75.0% 
Percentage of households which own a TV 47.0% 53.2% 59.6% 
Percentage of households which own a radio 29.1% 24.7% 25.9% 
a. Census of Pakistan 1998, only rural households. 
b. Rural and urban households. 
c. Author’s own calculations. 
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Poverty levels within the villages were found to be relatively high, with the 
average monthly spending being $109 and $101 for those situated close and far 
from the motorway, respectively.22 As this was meant to sustain, on average, a 
family of eight people living in a three room house, it enabled only 80% of 
households in connected villages and 74% in far away villages to consume three 
meals a day. The houses that villagers resided in were evenly split between brick 
structures and mud houses, with the vast majority in these villages, and the district 
at large, not having an indoor bathroom. Toilet facilities for the household ranged 
from shared outside toilets, for the relatively better off households, to the open 
fields for the poorer members of the village community. The limited impact of the 
motorway on households’ income levels is not surprising when we consider that 
the road only became operational 10 years prior to the survey. Therefore this may 
not have been a long enough time period for households to take advantage of the 
economic benefits brought about by connectivity. 
 
Furthermore, most households in these villages are headed by an illiterate person 
– 50% households in connected villages and 48% in isolated ones. The education 
level of the household head is important as often he or she is the main decision 
maker for the entire household. Still, despite 50% of household heads being 
illiterate, 75% households in villages far from the road sent their children to 
school, illustrating the importance placed by them on education. The 
corresponding figure for villages in proximity to the motorway was 78%. The 
households that failed to send their children to school cited reasons such as the 
school being too expensive, education being un-Islamic, or the need for the child 
to work to supplement the family income. 
 
Given the relative similarities between the villages it is, therefore, safe to make 
the counterfactual that, prior to the construction of the motorway, the outcomes in 
villages close to the road would have been largely similar to those found in 
isolated ones. Therefore, this allows us to use the spatial variable (close and far) 
                                                 
22 Most households claimed to spend everything they earned. 
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as a proxy for time (before and after) with respect to the road, thus overcoming 
the disadvantage faced by the absence of any data collected in the region prior to 
my fieldwork.  
 
Within the villages data was collected from two main sources; household level 
surveys and key respondent interviews. The household level surveys were 
conducted by a team of 14 surveyors, supervised by myself, over a period of three 
months. The surveying process involved mapping the villages,23 identifying the 
biradery (kinship group) of each household and surveying the selected 
households. The surveys were collected from a stratified random sample of 20% 
households. Stratification was done along biradery lines as literature on South 
Asia documents this as being a good proxy for social status and relative 
bargaining power (see for example Alavi 1972, Ahmad 1977, 1970 Cheema and 
Mohmand 2007, Gazdar 2007). While initially I set out to stratify by income, as I 
thought that would be a good proxy for the households’ dependence on village 
resources and thus their relative bargaining power, interviews with key 
respondents and the abovementioned literature on rural Pakistan revealed that the 
social status of a household is determined by its biradery and not by its income 
level. This holds to the extent that a well off household, belonging to a lower class 
biradery, is considered to be socially lower than a household which is poor but 
belongs to an upper class biradery. When talking to the villagers, I observed that 
households always referred to their biradery when discussing their placing in the 
village’s society. This came out most strongly when talking to households who 
were poor but belonged to the upper class biradery, as they made it a point to 
stress that they belonged to a superior biradery and thus had a higher position in 
society when compared to other households.  
 
Furthermore, the biradery of the household plays an important role in determining 
the opportunities that it has available to it. For instance, Gazdar (2005) notes that 
the lower class artisan biraderies of Punjab are seldom ever offered tenancy 
                                                 
23 There are no official or unofficial maps of these villages. My maps are the first record of the 
layout of these villages, at least since 1947. 
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arrangements and thus are only able to work in agriculture as casual labourers. 
Moreover, Mohmand and Gazdar (2007) found that biradery, apart from 
determining the household’s social status, also govern social interaction in rural 
society and thus determined the political connections that it would have. 
Therefore, by stratifying by biradery, I was able to ensure that my sample was 
representative of all social classes in the village and that the results were not 
biased by over or under sampling of any particular social group.  
 
Stratifying by biradery also allows me to analyse the impact connectivity has had 
on the different social groups in the village. Bailey (1957), based on his findings 
from an Indian village, argued that connecting villages to the wider national 
economy and the administration should, among other things, break down the 
patron-client structure and considerably change the role and status of various casts 
in the village economy. This, he found, was not only due to an increase in 
employment opportunities outside the agrarian sector, thus enabling the lower 
castes to accumulate some amount of wealth, but also due to the creation of a 
market for land, so that the old patrons were able to/forced to sell some of their 
land. The outcome was then old patrons losing their monopoly over land and 
wealth and, therefore, no longer being able to maintain their clients. As a result 
agricultural labourers in the village were free to contract with any landowner they 
chose. Moreover, these were purely economic contracts which did not tie the 
labourers into any other obligation. Furthermore, he found that lower caste 
households were more likely to align themselves with the state and invoke their 
rights as citizens of India, rather than merely identifying themselves as members 
of the village. Their ability to do so, he stipulated, was due to their newly acquired 
wealth, while their incentive to do so, came from the village society’s refusal to 
allow them to improve their social status in line with their (now higher) economic 
status. Therefore, they chose to look outside the village economy to improve their 
standing.  
 
Bailey’s (1957) findings are based on fieldwork conducted almost 100 years after 
the opening of the village. During this time there was extensive migration to the 
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village economy, changes in government economic policy – particularly regarding 
liquor trading – and general changes in the political environment of India – not 
least of which was decolonization24. Given that data for this study was collected 
10 years after the motorway came into operation, the impact is bound to be much 
more muted then what Bailey found. However, it is worth mentioning that even 
after 100 years Bailey found that the change in the economy – in terms of the flow 
of goods – was fairly limited. The more substantial change, he found, came in the 
socio-political set-up of the village. As the chapters that follow will show, the 
same is true in the case of the impact of the motorway. 
 
Before moving on, it is worth mentioning that the survey does not ask any direct 
questions about the households’ earnings. This was due to a concern was raised by 
other researchers working in Pakistan that since the survey asked questions about 
public goods provision and voting behaviour, inquiring about a household’s 
income may make villagers suspect that my surveyors and I were sent by the 
government – particularly the tax authorities. It was feared that this may either 
bias the results or cause the household to refuse to be interviewed. Therefore, the 
survey omitted the question regarding the household’s income. Nonetheless, in an 
effort to get an idea of the households’ economic condition, the survey asked 
about their average monthly spending. Given that most households claimed to 
have very few savings, these spending levels can be seen as a proxy, albeit an 
imperfect one, for income and wealth levels of the households.  
 
Within each village I found households to belong to a wide multitude of 
biraderies. Of these the 4 most dominant25 were the Bhattis, Kharral, Ansari and 
the Muslim Sheikhs. The Bhattis and the Kharrals make up the upper class 
biraderies in the villages and were historically the land owning classes. 
Households belonging to this biradery enjoy a high status, even if they themselves 
do not own land. Their elevated status stems from the fact that, as these 
                                                 
24 Though this last point should have had limited impact on this mountain based village, which is 
also evident from the fact that Bailey makes limited reference to India’s independence.  
25 Dominant here simply means the biraderies that most households belong to.  
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households share their biradery with the landlord this creates an additional 
effective relationship with the patron. As argued by Scott (1972), such additional 
ties between the patron and his clients make the relationship more likely to be 
based on traditional affiliations and less on material self interest. As a result, they 
are not only more likely to have their needs catered for, but should also have more 
privileged access to the patron’s resources in comparison to other households in 
the village economy. The Ansaris and Muslim Sheikhs, on the other hand, belong 
to the lower class biraderies and were historically not allowed to own land. 
Interestingly, while there are now no legal restrictions against these two biraderies 
owning land, the vast majority are still found to be landless. Amongst the two, the 
Muslim Sheikhs are found to have the lowest status due to this biradery being 
responsible for doing menial tasks within the village which most other households 
find demeaning (e.g. cleaning the sewers).  
 
The biradery of the household also gives a rough indication of its occupation. 
While households are no longer tied to their traditional roles, and there no longer 
exists an ‘occupation of the biradery’, there does tend to be some correlation 
between biradery and occupation. Table 3 gives a breakdown of households’ 
occupations, split by biradery. As can be seen, while the Kharrals and the Bhattis 
are predominantly cultivators, either on their own fields or on rented land, the 
Muslim Sheikhs and Ansaris have a higher tendency to be labourers, either on 
agricultural lands or on odd jobs around the village. Therefore, going back to the 
earlier discussion about the link between a household’s occupational mobility and 
its bargaining power, there is no doubt that tenant farmers are more likely to be 
tied to the landlord and thus are unlikely to be able to use the threat of exercising 
outside options against him during negotiations. However, these households, due 
to their higher social status, are in a better bargaining position and thus are less 
likely to be exploited by the landlord. The lower class biraderies, on the other 
hand, who are vulnerable in rural society, are also more occupationally mobile as 
a large majority of them work as casual labourers. This occupational mobility was 
particularly evident amongst the Muslim Sheikh households when I split the 
landlord dominated villages by levels of isolation. The data revealed that, while in 
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isolated landlord dominated villages the majority of households worked as casual 
labourers (73%), in similar tenured villages close to the road only 47.6% 
households were found to do the same. Moreover, while in connected villages 
24% of households took advantage of the increased traffic facilities to earn a 
living by selling small items, only 6.7% households in isolated villages reported 
doing this. When talking to the landlord from one of the unequal but connected 
village, I was told that Muslim Sheikhs in his village had been most active to take 
advantage of these new opportunities. He informed me how they had opened up 
shops, and set up business so as to improve their economic wellbeing. This 
change of occupation, he stated, affected him acutely as it made it harder for him 
to find labourers to work on his fields26.  
 
Table 3: Occupation by biradery 
Close to the 
Motorway 
Far from the 
Motorway 
Kharral  Cultivators  87.5%  82.9% 
Bhatti  Cultivators   75%  69.4% 
Monthly laboureres  10%  8.3% 
Ansari  Agricultural workers  35.7%  43.8% 
Monthly Labourers  14.3%  0 
Sellers  28.6%  37.5% 
Muslim Sheikh  Agricultural workers  52.2%  57.2% 
Monthly Labourers  9%  14.3% 
   Sellers  18.2%  11.4% 
Author's own calculations.  
 
The survey used was broadly divided into four sections; public goods provision, 
politics, socio-political needs and household profile. It asked questions regarding 
five markets; employment, credit, housing, dispute resolution and voting patterns. 
For each market the household was asked who the supplier was and if they had 
any other relationship with him. Moreover, questions were also asked regarding 
                                                 
26 Landlord 1, interview, connected landlord dominated village 1, 15 April 2011. 
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the terms of the exchange. The data collected from these surveys was then coded 
to create a quantitative data set which was used to carry out regression analysis in 
the chapters that follow.  
 
The second main source of information in the villages was key respondent 
interviews. Key respondents were individuals who enjoyed a special place in 
village society, such as headmasters, school teachers, maulvis (the Muslim priest), 
the household holding the title of revenue collector under British rule,27 the editor 
of the local newspaper or the local patron. These interviews were open ended and 
provided rich qualitative information about social interactions in their respective 
villages. The combination of the two types of data allows me to make use of the 
Q2 approach so as to take advantage of the benefits of both methods. While the 
quantitative methods enable me to establish the level, type and direction of 
change, qualitative interviews provided a deeper understanding of the nature of 
the change. In particular, as will be seen in the chapters that follow, while the 
quantitative data documents the improvement in welfare outcomes for peasants 
residing in connected villages dominated by large landlords, the qualitative 
interviews illustrate how connectivity has resulted in a change in the nature of the 
clientelist relationship – from one focused on exploitation to one which performs 
a functional role. Thus the two methods are used as complements to obtain a more 
holistic picture of the change brought about by connectivity. 
 
3.1 The Villages 
As you get on the link road for the motorway exit to Hafizabad City you enter a 
village called Kot Serwar. Passing through you are struck by the hustle and bustle 
around the main road, which does not taper off as you pass other villages en-route 
to Hafizabad City. People are found either mingling in the various shops and 
cafes, or waiting for the bus to take them outside the village, or trying to hitch-
hike to their desired destinations. And then there are those who just loiter around 
                                                 
27 Introduced during British rule, this was the office of the numberdar. Even though the office of 
the numberdar has been abolished, the family that held the title still enjoys a certain elevated status 
in the village. 
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the road as that is now the centre of the village where all the activity takes place. 
As our bus passes by, little attention is paid to me and my surveyors, as ours is but 
one of the many vehicles that stream past in any given minute. Traffic and 
mobility is not something foreign or unaffordable for these villages, with peasants 
often travelling outside the village – either for work or to run errands or simply to 
take their children for a day out in town. But this was not always the case. I was 
told that prior to the construction of the motorway, travelling to the nearby town 
was quite an expedition, requiring peasants to leave at sunrise and return before 
sunset, as the dark and deserted road at night made them sitting ducks for thieves 
and robbers. And given that the journey itself took an hour each way, work in the 
city had to be rushed. Now, it takes twenty minutes to Hafizabad City and with 
the constant traffic peasants have the luxury of leaving at around nine in the 
morning, and are able to stay for dinner, and return safely late at night by bus, 
wagon or a hitch-hiked ride.28  
 
As I take a turn off the motorway and drive to the ‘isolated’ villages, the scene 
changes considerably. Very quickly the comfortable metal road is replaced by a 
bumpy dirt trail, requiring us to slow down considerably, as the road is infested 
with potholes. Traffic thins out the further you go along, and often ten to fifteen 
minutes pass before another mode of transport, private or commercial, is seen. In 
fact, it is more common to see people walking or sitting on donkey carts than to 
see cars, buses or rickshaws. The closest isolated village we visited is situated 
only eight kilometres from the link road, yet travelling there took around forty 
minutes. And that was on dry days; on a rainy day the journey would have taken 
even longer. As the ‘road’ – or rather the trail – reaches the village, the scene we 
are greeted by is starkly different. There is no one around to be seen, no people 
waiting for rides, no cafes and no loiterers. Moreover, the path leading into the 
village is very narrow so we carry on by foot. The centre is found deep inside the 
village, but unlike the villages on the road there is only one general store there, 
which also functions as the village tea shop. The few other stores are run from 
                                                 
28 Key Respondent 1, Interview, connected landlord dominated village 1, 30 April 2008. 
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private houses and are thus scattered around the village. Socialising, I found, was 
done within houses rather than in public areas.  
 
As I made my field trips to other isolated villages, the landscape turned out to be 
very similar. For all these villages bad road networks meant that few outsiders 
came visiting, leaving the village economy relatively closed. For the peasants 
there, the journey to Hafizabad City was typically around an hour. But it was not 
so much the distance that villagers found to be a hurdle; rather it was the lack of 
transport facilities. The peasants spoke of having to often wait up to an hour and a 
half to get a ride into town, and once there they were faced with the problem of 
trying to find a way to make the journey back home. Therefore unless they had 
their own mode of transport, leaving the village was something they tried to 
avoid.29  
 
Besides impacting peasants’ mobility, these differences also have far reaching 
implications on their dependence on the village and its resources for fulfilling 
their basic needs. As can be seen from Table 4, far more peasants situated on the 
road felt they could rely on the external market for satisfying their needs than 
those in isolated villages. This can be attributed to the increase in traffic, as it 
exposes peasants to new opportunities not only outside the village economy, but 
also within it. One of the ways households took advantage of these new 
opportunities was to sell small products to passers-by, which was something my 
surveyors and I experienced as we were constantly approached by someone or the 
other trying to sell us goods varying from slippers to food to little crowns made 
out of flowers and branches. In the isolated villages, on the other hand, limited 
interaction with the external economy meant that most peasants felt confined to 
the village economy and the agricultural sector within it. Thus the only ones 
approaching us were little children curious about the ‘outsiders’ from the city.  
                                                 
29 Key Respondent 2, interview, isolated landlord dominated village 1, 13 May 2008;  
Household interviews, isolated landlord dominated village 1, 16 May 2008;  
Household interviews, isolated landlord dominated village 2, 24 May 2008. 
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Table 4: Employment opportunities    
 
Villages 
connected to 
the road 
Villages far 
from the 
road 
Percentage of households that feel confined 
to the village labour market 
37% 49% 
Percentage of households that feel confined 
to the agricultural sector 
49% 63% 
Percentage of households that feel they can 
generate an income from passing-by traffic 
65% 39% 
Percentage of farming households that have 
experienced an increase in their market size 
over the last 10 years 
84% 58% 
Percentage of farming households that have 
been approached by a factory to buy their 
produce 
11% 2% 
Number of households 190 193 
Author's own calculations.  
 
Section 4: The Research Questions 
 
The chapters that follow make use of household level data, combined with key 
respondent interviews, to analyse three types of changes in villagers’ lives 
associated with connectivity. Chapter 3 starts the analysis by looking at market 
structures in rural Punjab. It finds that, in all four types of villages, most 
households have their markets interlinked so that equilibrium, in any single 
market, is jointly determined with other markets. However, the difference in these 
villages lies in the nature and incentives for the interlinked relationship. While in 
isolated landlord dominated villages markets were interlinked so as to maximise 
the landlords´ surplus extraction, in peasant based villages and connected landlord 
dominated ones, the data reveals that these interlinkages were largely meant to 
reduce transaction costs. The chapter also finds that the effect of connectivity on 
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landlord dominated villages has been, not only to reduce the overall level of 
interlinkages, but also to move away from exploitative interlinkages towards those 
more functional in nature. Chapter 4 goes on to look at political outcomes in the 
four types of villages, analysing the extent to which the patron diverts public 
resources, derived to him from the local politician, towards his clients. The 
chapter finds that public goods provision, in landlord dominated villages far from 
the road, is significantly lower when compared to all other villages. Moreover, the 
chapter highlights that connectivity, and the resultant increase in peasants’ 
bargaining power, have resulted in increased public provision in landlord 
dominated villages - so much so that the data finds convergence in outcomes 
amongst the different tenured villages. 
 
Nonetheless, despite increased public goods provision in villages close to the 
road, it is still not universal. Therefore, Chapter 5 looks at the level of collective 
action for the purpose of self-provision amongst the different types of villages. 
The chapter argues that, while collective action would be fairly limited under a 
strong patron, due to the patron finding such activities threatening to his authority 
and thus blocking them, in villages where peasants have higher bargaining power 
the level of collective action should be considerably higher. Complementing the 
household surveys with field interviews, the empirical findings reveal that, while 
patrons in isolated landlord dominated villages do indeed block their clients from 
engaging in collective action, they lose the ability to influence their clients’ 
independent activities once the village is connected to the motorway. In fact, it is 
found that in an effort to maintain their respective clientelist following, large 
landlords have actually gone as far as to assist their clients in their collective 
endeavours. As a result of this assistance, peasants in connected landlord 
dominated villages have been able to undertake a wide variety of projects, and 
have been relatively successful in providing themselves with the public good that 
they had set out to provide. Thus the effect of connectivity has been to alter the 
nature of the patron-client network so as to enable peasants to tap into this 
hierarchical network to facilitate their collective activities. 
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These three chapters, thus, set out to examine the effects of connectivity on three 
different avenues through which the landlord, when possible, tries to exercise 
control over the villagers’ lives. Chapter 3 looks at control over economic 
markets, through a study of market interlinkages and the extent of surplus the 
landlord can extract. Chapter 4 goes on to look at control in the political sphere, 
illustrating how connectivity, and the resultant increase in bargaining power, has 
enabled the peasants, to some extent, to convert their votes into public provision. 
Lastly, Chapter 5 illustrates the control landlords are able to exercise over 
peasants’ independent social decisions. The chapter highlights how the 
monopolistic landlord is able to restrict peasants from engaging with fellow 
villagers in activities which are mutually beneficial to them. Once again the data 
reveals that, when peasants are presented with outside options, the landlord loses 
the ability to control peasants’ independent activities. Overall, the three chapters 
highlight that, while there are considerable differences between landlord 
dominated villages and peasant based ones when isolated from the external 
economy, the outcomes in the different tenured villages tend to converge once 
connected, thereby making inequality less constraining for the peasants.  
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3. The Impact of Connectivity on Market 
Interlinkages 
 
 
 
In an article reviewing the literature on interlinked markets, Bardhan (1980) starts 
by stating “It is being increasingly appreciated in the literature on agrarian 
development that many of the key issues cannot be analyzed without an 
understanding of the nature of interlinkage of factor markets (particularly those of 
land, labour and credit) in the specific institutional context of a poor agrarian 
economy” (pg. 82). This statement was made in reference to a number of studies 
conducted in the late 1960s and 1970s that emphasised the shortcomings of 
standard economic theory by illustrating, both empirically and theoretically, that 
transactions in rural economies were not made at arm’s length, but rather markets 
were interlinked, with the outcome in a single market being jointly determined 
with those of other markets (see for example Bardhan and Rudra 1978, Griffin 
1974, Srinivasan 1979, Bhaduri 1977, Long 1968). The use of this theory for 
studying agrarian societies continued to grow over the 1980s and the early 1990s, 
with a plethora of studies analysing their effect on rural development (see for 
example Basu 1983, Basu 1986, Bardhan 1984, Aleem 1990, Siamwalla et al. 
1990, Udry 1990, Swaminathan 1991, Bell and Srinivasan 1989, Bell 1988). As 
highlighted in Chapter 1 this literature was appreciative of the fact that, besides 
distorting equilibria, this type of market structure had the potential for being 
highly exploitative of the rural poor particularly, as shown by Basu (1983, 1986), 
when peasants found themselves confined to the village economy with no one but 
the landlord to rely on for fulfilling their survival needs.  
 
However, around the end of the 1990s academic interest in interlinked markets 
started to lessen. This change was partly due to a general shift in academic interest 
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from market structures to the study of institutions and how they impacted 
developing economies, and partly due to theoretical advances in the theory of 
market interlinkages having reached a climax. An unintended consequence of this 
shift in interest was that the theory of interlinkages ceased to be a part of 
mainstream agrarian development literature. As a result, the last decade has seen 
very little reference made to market interlinkages when explaining outcomes in 
rural economies.1 The aim of this chapter is to use data from rural Hafizabad to 
show that rural markets continue to be interlinked, highlighting the importance of 
this literature in explaining economic, social and political outcomes in agrarian 
economies. Moreover, the chapter also illustrates the exploitative potential this 
market structure can have towards peasants’ welfare. However, by comparing 
outcomes amongst villages with different land tenure systems and varying levels 
of connectivity, the chapter highlights that this potential exists only when 
inequality is interacted with isolation, as the combination of the two results in 
high “transfer costs or exogenous barriers to entry” (Basu 1983, pg 272). 
Therefore it is argued that, one possible mechanism for curtailing the exploitative 
potential of interlinked markets is to connect isolated villages to the external 
economy, thus providing peasants with an opportunity to walk away from the 
landlord’s offer if they deem it to be detrimental to their welfare. The effect of 
connectivity, as will be shown, is not to break interlinkages completely – as they 
do have the functional effect of lowering transaction costs – but to minimise the 
exploitative potential of this relationship by increasing peasants’ opportunity cost 
of interacting with the landlord. 
  
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 1 makes use of 
game theory to illustrate the exploitative powers that an all-controlling landlord 
can have over peasants’ welfare, and the change that occurs in the power 
dynamics when peasants are exposed to outside options. Section 2 makes use of 
the empirical data to highlight the continued existence of interlinked markets in 
rural economies and the effect connectivity has on this relationship. The analysis 
                                                 
1 The few exceptions I could find were Swain (1999) and Gill (2006). 
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shows how the terms of the exchange vary, not only based on the availability of 
outside options, but also on the households’ status in the rural society. It is found 
that while the road has welfare enhancing effects on rural society at large, the 
group benefitting the most from market exposure is the historically neglected 
class – the Muslim Sheikhs. Section 3 concludes the chapter. 
 
2. The Game 
 
Interlinked markets have been modelled either as a dyadic relationship (Bell 1988, 
Basu 1983, Bliss and Stern 1982) or as a triadic one (Akerlof 1976, Basu 1986, 
Hatlebakk 2002, Naqvi and Wemhoner’s 1995). A dyad consists of two 
individuals interacting in one or more transactions, while a triad involves 
interaction between three individuals in multiple transactions. The difference 
between the two types of relationships lies largely in the extent of power the 
resource holder has, his ability to extract surplus from the relationship and the 
effect it has on a third, uninvolved party.  
 
In a dyadic model, surplus extraction is limited to a player’s threshold value2 
(Basu 1983), as anything below this yields a negative payoff thus disincentivizing 
the agent from playing the game. Given that the interaction is limited to the two 
individuals, and does not extend to agents’ independent relationships, the 
disadvantaged player has the option of walking away without incurring additional 
costs.3 The only way to get an unwilling player to participate in an exploitative 
exchange is to change the nature of the game – for instance by threatening to use 
brute force, in which case the benefit of participation becomes his physical well-
being4 (Naqvi and Wemhoner 1995).  
 
                                                 
2 The threshold value is that level below which the player incurs losses.  
3 This is a voluntary exchange as the players have the option and the ability to return to the state of 
no-interaction (Basu 1986). 
4 As argued by Basu (1986) this is no longer a voluntary exchange, as once the player has 
interacted in the game he does not have the option of returning to the old equilibrium of no- 
interaction. 
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Triads, on the other hand, enable a player to make others participate for values 
below their threshold level without having to resort to violence. Basu’s (1986) 
triadic interaction model, studying the relationship between a landlord, a merchant 
and a peasant, illustrates the ability of the landlord to coerce the peasant into 
accepting an offer below his threshold value by threatening to interrupt the 
peasant’s trading with the merchant if he does not comply. The merchant abides 
by the wishes of the landlord, as not doing so carries the consequences of the 
landlord ceasing all trading relations with him.5 Hence the peasant incurs an 
additional cost, imposed by the merchant, if he rejects the landlord’s offer. 
Furthermore, the peasant’s decision to reject the landlord’s offer, adversely affects 
the merchant, (as he has to ostracize the peasant which reduces his trading 
revenue), even though he plays no role in the labour market.  
 
The cost that the landlord levies indirectly, through the merchant, effectively 
changes the peasant’s exercisable options, as returning to the no-interaction state 
is no longer a possibility. He now has to choose between accepting a contract that 
offers returns below his threshold level or a situation where he is completely 
isolated in the rural economy. Interestingly, the ability of the landlord to impose 
these costs is largely dependent on the merchant abiding by his wishes and 
punishing the defector. As argued by Havel (1978), as long as a third party is 
willing to impose sanctions on the defector, the aggressor can achieve the desired 
outcome without having to impose any sanctions himself. Alternatively, if the two 
agents were to collude against the landlord and refuse to punish a non-complying 
player, e.g. the merchant continues to trade with the non-complying peasant, this 
exploitative state would break down and a new equilibrium would have to be 
negotiated.6 However, the problem with collusion is that it requires someone to 
make the first move in an environment that extends strong first mover 
disadvantages (Havel 1978). Hence, even though the collective benefit from 
defection is higher than the collective cost, the prohibitive cost to the individual 
                                                 
5 The value of trading with the landlord is assumed to exceed that of trading with the peasant. 
6 In the absence of indirect sanctions, the landlord may not be able to impose sanctions high 
enough to get agents to participate in an exploitative exchange. 
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prevents collusion from occurring, enabling the landlord to continue enjoying 
control over all agents in the economy (Basu 1986, Sen 1985, Havel 1978).  
 
Looking at the quantitative and qualitative data from the field, it becomes clear 
that triadic interaction games are only possible when inequality is interacted with 
isolation. It is the combination of these two that results in peasants being highly 
dependent on the landlord, thus enabling him to make demands that deal with 
peasants’ independent relationships. The control enjoyed by the landlord in these 
villages was fairly obvious when talking to the villagers, particularly those 
belonging to the lower classes. These households found the idea of defying the 
landlord unthinkable, even when his demands were detrimental to their welfare. 
While peasants’ reluctance to disobey the landlord was clear throughout the 
interview, it came out most strongly when I inquired whether the household had 
ever attempted to engage in collective action in order to provide themselves with 
public goods that the state and the landlord had failed to do so.7 By far the 
majority of households claimed not to have engaged in such activities as I was 
informed that the landlord greatly “frowned” upon villagers trying to self-provide 
for their needs.8 When I probed deeper into the reasons for the household obeying 
the landlord’s wishes regarding an activity that was completely independent of 
him, the respondents informed me that such an activity could result in the landlord 
cutting them off, in which case they would be unable to meet their subsistence 
needs.9 Talking to these households I realised that a falling out with the landlord 
would not only limit their access to his resources but also came with the risk of 
making the household a pariah in the village economy. This trepidation was felt 
most acutely by the lower class landless households, as they were least likely to 
be able to meet their needs without the assistance of the landlord and their 
informal biradery networks. Therefore they found it cheaper, and in their interest, 
                                                 
7 Collective action is discussed in much more detail in Chapter 5.  
8 Key Respondent 3, interview, isolated landlord dominated village 1, 13 May, 2008. 
Household ID 45, interview, isolated landlord dominated village 1, 16 May, 2008.  
Key Respondent 9, interview, isolated landlord dominated village 2, 21 May, 2008. 
9 Household ID 45, interview, isolated landlord dominated village 1, 16 May, 2008. 
Household ID 42, interview, isolated landlord dominated village 1, 16 May, 2008. 
Key Respondent 10, interview, isolated landlord dominated village 2, 21 May, 2008 
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not to defy the landlord even when his demands dealt with activities that were 
independent of him. 
  
Such control was neither evident, nor possible, in villages connected to the 
external economy, even in the presence of high inequality. The extractive powers 
of landlords in these villages were fairly constrained due to peasants having 
access to outside options. As illustrated in Table 4 in Chapter 2, connectivity 
meant that most peasants did not feel confined to the village and its resources, 
rather they felt they had the ability to approach the external market if they so 
desired. This increase in options was felt by all members of the village economy, 
irrespective of their initial endowments. For instance, Table 3 in Chapter 2 
highlighted that, amongst the Muslim Sheikh and Ansari households, a larger 
percentage worked as casual agricultural labourers in isolated villages when 
compared to those living in connected villages. Moreover, Table 4 in Chapter 2 
revealed that the vast majority of farming households felt an increase in the size of 
the market where they sold their produce, with some even being approached by a 
factory for buying their produce. As a result of these outside options the landlord 
was no longer able to use the threat of economic sanction to influence peasants’ 
activities. Therefore, market interlinkages in connected villages were found to 
exist through dyadic relationships. 
 
The following subsection makes use of game theory to illustrate the level of 
control enjoyed by the landlord under triadic interaction games. It highlights how, 
in line with Basu’s (1986) and Bhaduri’s (1977) argument, isolation and 
inequality make the landlord a defacto monopolist/monopsonist, enabling him to 
appropriate large surpluses from the peasants. The sub-section also explores the 
change in the power dynamics and the resultant pay-offs when an external 
element, outside the control and influence of the landlord, is brought into the 
game. The game is set up in three parts; the first looks at an isolated economy 
with few options outside of the landlord. The second part analyses the change in 
the interaction between the landlord and the merchant when the merchant gains 
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access to the external market. Lastly, the third part examines the change in the 
nature of the game when all three actors are exposed to the external economy.  
 
2.1. The Model10 
Consider a village society with three players: a landlord, a peasant and a 
merchant. The landlord hires the peasant to work on his farm for a certain wage 
and buys commodities from the merchant. The peasant is assumed to be landless 
with his only asset being his labour, which he sells to the landlord. The peasant 
also buys commodities11 from the merchant. The merchant trades with both the 
peasant and the landlord. They are his only two customers. The value of trade 
with the landlord far exceeds the value of trade with the peasant. The utility 
functions of the peasant ( PU ), merchant ( MU ) and landlord ( LU ) in this economy 
are as follows: 
[ ] [ ]PPPP PxxlwlYU −+−+= )()( τψ  
LPMM PxPxYU ++=     where Lx > Px  [ ] [ ] )()( MLLLL dPxxwlYU φλπ −−+−+=  
Utilities are calculated in the appendix. 
 
Starting with the peasant’s utility function; w  is the wage paid to the peasant per 
hour of labour worked (l). ψ  captures the disutility to the worker of every hour of 
effort put in. τ  is the utility from consuming Px goods bought from the merchant 
at a price of P . If the labourer (peasant) neither works for the landlord nor trades 
he gets a disutility of -20 ( PY ) as, in the absence of outside options, he has to be 
self-sufficient. Given that the peasant has no assets, the only way he can do this is 
by relying on others to ensure survival which may require him to beg from his 
fellow villagers. This should entail high disutility.12  
 
                                                 
10 The model draws extensively on the models by Hatlebakk (2002) and Naqvi and Wemhoner’s 
(1995). 
11 These commodities are assumed to be handmade from supplies found within the village. They 
do not require the merchant to import anything. 
12 During field work it was found that peasants who could not find work would go around the 
village begging for food and clothing. Besides the uncertainty involved in securing the needed 
goods this was also humiliating for the peasant and made him or her an outcast in society. 
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The merchant’s payoff includes utilities from selling Px  to the peasant and Lx  to 
the landlord. It is assumed that he charges both parties the same price. As Lx  is 
greater than Px , the merchant values trade with the landlord more than with the 
peasant. If he does not trade with either his payoffs are -10 ( MY ). Similar to the 
peasant, in the absence of trade the merchant needs to be self-sufficient which 
depletes his resources. However, it is assumed that the merchant is better endowed 
than the peasant and so his disutility is lower. 
 
The landlord makes a profit of [ ]wl−π  if the peasant works on his fields and gets 
utility equal to λ  for every good bought from the merchant ( Lx ), paying a price 
of P for it. The disutility faced by the landlord from the merchant trading with a 
non-complying peasant is )( Mdφ . If the peasant rejects the landlord’s offer and the 
landlord does not trade with the merchant he gets a payoff of 0 ( LY ). It is assumed 
that the landlord has outside options but exercising them incurs certain costs due 
to which his payoff is 0.13 
 
When setting up this model it is important to question the ability of the landlord to 
coerce the merchant and the peasant. Hatlebakk (2002) criticizes Naqvi and 
Wemhoner’s (1995) formalisation of Basu’s (1986) model on the grounds that the 
landlord does not share any of the surplus appropriated from the peasant with the 
merchant, thus questioning whether the merchant has any incentive to cut off the 
peasant as per the landlord’s wishes. However, in an isolated economy where the 
landlord wields complete control, not just of economic activities but also of social 
and political activities, there is no need for him to share the surplus with the 
merchant, as the lack of outside options weakens the merchant’s bargaining 
position to the extent that he has no option but to comply with the wishes of the 
landlord.  
                                                 
13 These outside options include hiring external, seasonal, labour to work in the fields. However, 
the problem with these workers is that their availability is not confirmed. Moreover, given that 
they are outsiders and have few, if any, other ties with the landlord, they present a serious moral 
hazard problem. As for trading, the landlord has the ability to travel to the nearby town to pick up 
the supplies he needs. However, this entails costs in the form of time, effort and money.  
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The sequence of the game is as follows. The landlord makes an offer to the 
peasant which he either accepts (A) or rejects (R). The merchant then decides 
whether to trade (t) with the peasant or not (n). Based on the outcome of the above 
two transactions, the landlord decides whether to trade (T) with the merchant or 
not (N). The payoffs and equilibrium depend considerably on the offer made by 
the landlord.  
 
In the first variant it is assumed that the landlord offers the peasant at least his 
reservation value. The payoffs in this case are as follows. The peasant gets 30 (wl-
ψ l) if he works for the landlord (A) and 30 (τ Px -P Px ) if he trades with the 
merchant (t). If he neither trades nor accepts the landlord’s offer he gets -20 ( PY ). 
The merchant gets 10 (P Px ) from trading with the peasant and 15 (P Lx ) from 
trading with the landlord. If he does not trade with either he gets -10( MY ). The 
landlord gets 10 [ ]wl−π  if the peasant agrees to work for him and 10 
[ ]LL Pxx −)(λ  if he trades with the merchant. However, if the merchant trades 
with the peasant after he rejects the landlord’s offer, he gets a disutility of -5 
( Mdφ ). The game is drawn in Figure 1.14 In a single interaction game the Nash 
equilibrium is (A, t, T), i.e. the peasant accepts the offer made by the landlord, the 
merchant trades with the peasant and the landlord trades with the merchant. No 
one can do any better by deviating, making it a stable equilibrium. The 
equilibrium remains unchanged in a repeated interaction game. 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 The peasant has the highest utility because of his low starting point. In the case of the merchant 
and the landlord, on the other hand, their higher starting point means that diminishing marginal 
returns set in fairly early. 
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Figure 1: No exploitation 
 
* Details of the payoff calculations are given in Appendix 1. 
The payoffs are (peasant, merchant, landlord). 
Single interaction Nash equilibrium. 
Repeated interaction Nash equilibrium. 
 
Now assume the exploitation case where the landlord offers the peasant a return 
of -5, which is clearly below his threshold value. This gives the landlord a payoff 
of 30 (as opposed to 10). The rest of the payoffs are unchanged. The game is 
shown in Figure 2.  
 
The sequence of the game is the same as before. The equilibrium in a single 
interaction game is now (R, t, T). This follows from Naqvi’s and Wemhoner’s 
(1995) argument that, in a single interaction game, the landlord has little incentive 
to punish a disobedient merchant as it gives him no benefit. Therefore he will 
always trade with the merchant. Knowing this the merchant will always trade with 
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the peasant as that maximises his payoffs. Given full information and assuming 
that all agents are rational, the peasant will always reject the landlord’s offer.15  
 
The equilibrium under a repeated interaction game, however, is considerably 
different as the landlord now has an incentive to punish the merchant for trading 
with a defecting peasant. This is achieved through an in-built trigger strategy 
which is to play N for K periods if the merchant trades with a non-complying 
peasant and T otherwise. The value of K will depend on the payoffs, on how 
patient the landlord is, and the extent of losses the merchant faces when the 
landlord does not trade with him. K is assumed to be long enough to ensure that 
the discounted cash flows from non-compliant behaviour are less than those from 
cooperation, thus creating a strong incentive for the merchant to cease trading 
with a non-complying peasant. Given this scenario, the peasant’s choice 
essentially becomes to either accept the landlord’s offer and get an overall utility 
of 5, or to reject it, not trade with the merchant and get an overall (dis)utility of -
20. In this situation the peasant will always accept the landlord’s offer.  
                                                 
15 This game assumes common knowledge. 
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Figure 2: Exploitation 
 
* Details of the payoff calculations are given in Appendix 1. 
The payoffs are (peasant, merchant, landlord). 
Single interaction Nash equilibrium. 
Repeated interaction Nash equilibrium. 
 
This equilibrium is sustainable mainly because the peasant and the merchant have 
no outside options and are unlikely to collude against the landlord.16 This allows 
the landowner to exploit isolation and inequality to his advantage. The question 
then arises is: what happens to this relationship when one player has outside 
options available? Arguably, with partial access to the market, Naqvi and 
Wemhoner’s (1995) model breaks down as the landlord loses the ability to impose 
sanctions. The presence of alternative options means that, in order to play the 
                                                 
16Collusion would result in the single interaction equilibrium of (R,t,T). 
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exploitation game, the landlord now has to collude with one party against the 
other, by offering to share the extracted surplus.17 
 
Assume that there are still three people in the village economy, but the merchant 
now has access to alternative trading opportunities. This allows the merchant to 
trade in the external market if he is unable to engage with the landlord. However, 
trading outside the village is assumed to entail some costs, making them less 
profitable than dealing with the landlord. A simplifying assumption is that at any 
one time the merchant must choose whether to trade with the landlord or his 
outside option.18 The presence of alternative trading options means that the 
landlord is no longer able to impose economic sanctions on a merchant who trades 
with a defecting peasant. Hence, the only way to stop the merchant from trading 
with a non-complying peasant is to collude with him by offering part of the 
surplus extracted. The peasant is still assumed to be confined to the rural 
economy.19 The utility functions are as follows: 
 
[ ] [ ]PPPP PxxlwlYU −+−+= )()( τψ  [ ] [ ]wlPxPxPxYU OLPMM −−++++= πα )1( where Lx > Px , Ox < Lx and 10 ≤≤α  [ ] [ ] )()()( oMLLLL ddPxxwlYU φφλπ −−−+−+=  
Utilities are calculated in the appendix. 
 
The utility function of the peasant is unchanged. The merchant now has an 
additional trading option Ox  in the equation. Moreover, the equation also includes 
a proportion of the landlord’s profit )1( α− , meant to incentivise the merchant to 
punish a defecting peasant. The landlord now gets only α  of the profit extracted 
from the peasant as the remainder is offered to the merchant.20 Lastly, if the 
merchant trades outside the village the landlord receives an additional disutility 
of )( odφ , as it signals a loss of control on his part. 
  
                                                 
17 The model that follows is a variation of the Hatlebakk (2002) model. 
18 Limited resources of the merchant make this a realistic assumption. 
19 High levels of poverty in rural areas restrict peasant mobility, making this a realistic assumption. 
20  also factors in the disutility the landlord faces due to the loss of control. 
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The payoffs of the game are as follows. The merchant can get 10 from trading 
outside the village (N) and 15 from trading with the landlord on normal terms (T). 
If the landlord shares his surplus with the merchant (F) then the merchant gets 24 
(this assumes that α  takes the value of 0.7).21 The landlord, on the other hand, 
gets 40 if the peasant agrees to work for him and the merchant trades with him on 
normal terms. If he trades on favourable terms with the merchant he gets only 31. 
If the merchant refuses to cooperate with the landlord and trades outside the 
village, then he experiences additional disutility giving him an overall payoff of -
5. The rest of the payoffs are unchanged. This game is depicted in Figure 3. 
 
This game, played over a single period, results in the same equilibrium as in the 
case of no collusion, i.e. (R, t, T). What has changed is the nature of the repeated 
interaction game. The landlord is no longer able to punish the merchant by 
playing N as the merchant is better off trading with the peasant and his outside 
options (10) than trading only with the landlord (5). Hence, in order to sustain his 
desired long run equilibrium, the landlord has to offer the merchant part of the 
surplus, making the repeated interaction equilibrium (A, t, F). This new 
equilibrium signals a significant shift in the power dynamics between the landlord 
and the merchant. The presence of the external market has eroded the landlord’s 
ability to impose economic sanctions on the merchant and forces him to collude 
with the merchant to get the desired outcome. Hence the landlord must treat the 
merchant as an equal and not as someone he can coerce into submission. For the 
merchant, access to the market not only gives him a higher payoff, but also has 
the benefit of removing the uncertainty stemming from the landlord’s ability to 
impose sanctions. Unfortunately, for the peasant nothing has changed. The only 
difference is that now, instead of only the landlord benefitting from his 
misfortune, the merchant is also doing so.  
                                                 
21  is assumed to be 0.7 for simplicity’s sake. The actual value will depend on their relative 
bargaining powers and the value of the merchant’s trade with the outside market. 
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Figure 3: Merchant has outside options 
 
* Details of the payoff calculations are given in Appendix 1. 
The payoffs are (peasant, merchant, landlord). 
Single interaction Nash equilibrium. 
Repeated interaction Nash equilibrium. 
 
However, if the peasant also gained access to alternative options, the exploitation 
game would break down completely, as it would no longer be possible for the 
landlord and the merchant to impose sanctions on the peasant. Moreover, the 
presence of alternative options, it is argued, converts the triad into a dyadic 
relationship as the landlord loses the ability to influence the peasant’s trading 
relationships. This then changes the utility functions as follows: 
[ ] [ ] [ ])('')()( llwPxxlwlYU PPPP ψτψ −+−+−+=   [ ]OLPMM PxPxPxYU +++=      where Lx > Px , Ox  ≤  Lx  and 10 ≤≤α  
   The availability of outside options enables the peasant to get [ ])('' llw ψ−  from his 
alternative options if he rejects the landlord’s offer. Therefore in order to enlist the 
[ ] [ ] )()()( oMLLLL ddPxxwl Y U φφλ πα −−−+−+=
103 
 
peasant’s services the landlord has to offer him his reservation value, otherwise 
the peasant will always reject the offer. The merchant’s utility function remains 
unchanged. As for the landlord’s utility function, )( odφ now represents the 
disutility if either the merchant or the peasant or both engage with their outside 
options. The payoffs of the game are as follows. The peasant gets 30 whether he 
accepts the landlord’s offer (A) or rejects it (R) as he will get the same utility from 
his outside options. The peasant also gets 30 from trading with the merchant. The 
merchant’s payoffs are as before, 10 from trading with the peasant (t), 10 from 
trading with his outside options (N) and 15 from trading with the landlord (T). 
Lastly, the landlord gets 20 if the peasant agrees to work for him and the merchant 
trades with him. If the merchant and peasant refuse to cooperate with the landlord 
and trade outside the village he experiences additional disutility giving him an 
overall payoff of -5. Also if the merchant trades with a non-complying peasant he 
experiences a disutility of -5. This game is depicted in Figure 4. 
 
The merchant now has a dominant strategy to always trade with the peasant, 
irrespective of whether the peasant accepts or rejects the landlord’s offer. 
Knowing this the landlord will always trade with the merchant as he lacks the 
ability to influence the merchant’s actions in any way. Also since the peasant is 
offered his reservation value he will accept the landlord’s offer. Thus the single 
interaction Nash equilibrium is (A,t,T), i.e. the peasant accepts the landlord’s 
offer, the merchant trades with the peasant and the landlord chooses to trade with 
the merchant. No one in this game can do any better by changing strategies and so 
the equilibrium remains unchanged under repeated interaction. 
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Figure 4: Merchant and peasant have outside options 
 
* Details of the payoff calculations are given in Appendix 1. 
The payoffs are (peasant, merchant, landlord). 
Single interaction Nash equilibrium. 
Repeated interaction Nash equilibrium. 
 
The outcomes of these games allow us to formulate two hypotheses, one at the 
village level and the other at the individual level: 
 
1. Market intervention should expose villagers to 
alternative avenues of provision, thus reducing and/or 
breaking market interlinkages and the exploitative 
hold of the resource rich.  
a. The beneficial effects of the market should be 
felt more strongly by peasants residing in 
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villages with asymmetric distribution of 
resources. 
 
2. Within the village the benefits of market exposure 
should be felt most by peasants who are landless 
and/or have low social status, making them highly 
vulnerable to exploitation. These peasants would have 
the greatest incentive to break out of this relationship. 
  
Infiltration of the market, and the alternative options that come with it, are thus 
hypothesised to be one viable way of reducing the exploitative powers of the 
landlord as he is unable to control or collude with them. The next section, making 
use of data collected in Hafizabad district, Pakistan finds that while interlinkages 
continue to exist even in close proximity to a major highway, their nature is 
considerably less exploitative when compared to those found in isolated villages.  
  
3. Empirical Analysis 
The analysis looks at five markets to see whether the household is in an interlined 
relationship; employment, credit, housing, dispute resolution and voting patterns. 
A household is defined to be in an interlinked relationship if it has two or more 
markets supplied by the same person. For example, if members of the household 
are employed as agricultural labourers and they live in a house provided by the 
landlord then the household is considered to have its markets interlinked. The 
same is true if the household takes a loan from the same person who owns their 
house and solves their disputes. Furthermore, for the purpose of this analysis 
interlinkages are split into two types; labour-tying and non-labour based 
interlinkages. Labour-tying interlinkages arise when the household’s labour 
market is tied to other markets, e.g. if members from the household are employed 
as agricultural workers, take loans from their employer and live in a household 
owned by their employer. Non-labour based interlinkages, on the other hand, are 
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those where markets other than employment are interlinked e.g. if the household 
takes a loan from the same person who solves their disputes and owns their house. 
  
The rationale for splitting interlinkages into these categories is the perceived 
variation in the power relations. In labour-tying interlinkages peasants have 
relatively low bargaining power as their livelihood, and thus their survival, is 
dependent on them agreeing to the resource holder’s terms in other markets. This 
low bargaining power enables the resource rich to play the exploitation game as 
peasants are not in a strong enough position to reject his offer. Thus in line with 
Srinivasan’s (1991) model, these types of interlinkages are highly undesirable to 
the peasant and therefore, whenever possible they try and keep their labour market 
independent. However, in the case of non-labour based interlinkages, peasants are 
believed to have some level of leverage as it can be claimed that, even without 
access to several markets, their survival is still ensured due to the independence of 
the labour market,22 arguably limiting the sanctioning powers of the resource 
holder. Moreover, given its low potential for exploitation, I conjecture that these 
interlinkages are driven more by a desire for efficiency than for surplus extraction.  
 
3.2. Basic Model 
Figure 5 illustrates the extent of interlinkages found across the different types of 
villages, highlighting the greater percentage of households found to be in an 
interlinked relationship when situated in an isolated village. We can see from the 
graph that in all four types of villages labour-tying and non-labour tying 
interlinkages co-exist, pointing towards the inability of the resource rich to control 
the entire village. Moreover, a larger percentage of households have their markets 
interlinked in isolated villages than those connected by a highway, significant at 
the 1% level. Also, in isolated villages the land tenure system has no significant 
effect on the overall level of interlinkages, but it does appear to impact the 
distribution between the two types of interlinkages. In landlord based villages a 
                                                 
22 This is on the assumption that an independent labour market would enable the peasant to buy the 
goods needed for basic survival. 
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larger percentage of households are in a labour-tying relationship while in peasant 
based villages there is a greater tendency towards non-labour tying relationships. 
The evidence suggests that the motorway has helped reduce both types of 
interlinkages, significant at the 10% and 5% level respectively.  
 
Figure 5: Level of interlinkages across the different types of villages 
 
 
Lastly, the impact of connectivity appears to be stronger in landlord dominated 
villages than in peasant based ones. This could be explained by the difference in 
the nature of the interlinked relationship and the peasants’ attitude towards the 
service provider in the two types of villages. In peasant based villages, dispersed 
land ownership has created a large number of suppliers in the market, limiting the 
ability of the resource holder to exploit the peasant.23 Markets in these villages 
were interlinked largely in an effort to increase efficiency, as high transaction 
costs make it costly to engage with peasants in only one market.24 Thus it is 
mostly a functional relationship and reduces the incentive of the peasants to break 
out of it, even when connected by the motorway. However, in the case of landlord 
based villages high inequality restricts the options available to villagers, thus 
giving the landlord the ability to establish triadic relationships with the peasants. 
                                                 
23 While landowners may be able to exploit, to some extent, the extremely poor members of 
society, the level is still much lower than that in landlord dominated villages. 
24 Large information costs expose service providers to potential risks (Basu 1983). 
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The high potential for exploitation in these types of interlinkages, as illustrated in 
the previous section, should incentivize peasants to break out of this relationship 
when presented with external options. Hence the only way for landlords to 
interlink markets in connected villages is to play the non-exploitative dyadic 
interaction game. In an interview with the landlord from one of the unequal 
connected village, I asked if he faced difficulty in finding workers to work on his 
fields. His response was: 
“Since the construction of the motorway it has been much harder to 
find agricultural workers. Previously all I had to do was say the word 
and peasants used to come running to the fields. Now it is different. 
Households that previously worked as agrarian labourers much prefer 
to pursue the new alternatives. So much so that I am now considering 
increasing the use of machinery so as to cut down the number of 
workers I need.”25  
 
With regards to the households in landlord dominated villages it was interesting to 
hear the difference in their attitude towards the landlord depending on their level 
of seclusion. In isolated landlord dominated villages peasants found the question 
of defying the landlord absurd and unthinkable. Their response to such a query 
would often be “Where would we go if we defied him?” 26 or “How would we feed 
our children if he cuts us off?”27 This fear of the landlord was not shared by 
villagers close to the road. When asked why the household aligned with the 
landlord the responses were usually: “He provides for our needs” 28, or “Because 
he helps get us drains and paved streets.” 29, or “He listens to us and does good 
work around the village.” 30 Moreover, these households were very clear that, if 
                                                 
25 Landlord 1, interview, connected landlord dominated village 1, 15 April, 2011. 
26 Household ID 45, interview, isolated landlord dominated village 1, 16 May, 2008. 
27 Household ID 286, interview, isolated landlord dominated village 2, 24 May, 2008. 
28 Household ID 249, interview, connected landlord dominated village 1, 3 May, 2008. 
29 Household ID 284 and 247, connected landlord dominated village 1, 3 May, 2008. 
30 Household ID 396, 393 and 407, interview, connected landlord dominated village 2, 23 May, 
2008.  
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the exchange with the landlord became unfair or exploitative, they would not 
hesitate to look for other service providers in the market.31  
 
3.3. Extended Model 
The tables that follow run more rigorous tests to see if the results found through 
the descriptive statistics hold after controlling for household specific 
characteristics. Moreover, the tables also analyse whether household 
characteristics impact its chances of being in an interlinked relationship. The 
following logit regression model is run to test for this: 
 
Y = α + β1MW + β2LL + β3Edu + β4Exp + β5Bh + β6Kh+ β7An + β8MS + ξ 
      
     (1) 
Y = α + β1MW + β2LL + β3MW*LL+ β4Edu + β5Exp + β6Bh + β7Kh+ β8An + 
β9MS + ξ     
 (2) 
Where Y= Household has its markets interlinked. 
MW= Household is situated in an isolated village. 
LL= Household resides in a village dominated by a large landlord. 
Edu = Education level of the household head. 
Exp = Average household expenditure per month. 
Bh= Household belongs to the Bhatti biradery. 
Kh = Household belongs to the Kharral biradery 
An= Household belongs to the Ansari biradery 
Ms= Household belongs to the Muslim Sheikh biradery. 
 
Y is a binary variable capturing whether the household is in an interlinked 
relationship or not. It takes the value of 1 if the household has two or more 
markets supplied by the same person, 0 otherwise. Moreover, when analysing the 
effect of the road on labour-tying relationship Y takes the value of 1 only if the 
household’s labour market is tied to another market. If the household is in a non-
labour tying interlinked relationship than Y is 0. The opposite holds when looking 
                                                 
31 This was particularly true when talking to the younger generation in the household. 
Household ID 258 and 266, interview, connected landlord dominated village 1, 3 May, 2008. 
Household ID 381, interview, connected landlord dominated village 2, 23 May, 2008. 
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at non-labour tying relationships. Distance from the road, MW, takes the value of 
1 if the household resides in an isolated village and 0 otherwise. Distance is 
analysed as a binary variable and not as a continuous one due to the research 
design which chose to look at villages which were polar opposite, i.e. while half 
are situated on the motorway the other half are far enough to be classified as being 
isolated. Within this setup modest changes in distance are irrelevant.32 LL is a 
dummy variable for whether the household resides in a village dominated by a 
large landlord. Edu captures the number of years of schooling of the household 
head, included on the assumption that he or she is the main decision maker in the 
house.33 This variable is included on the assumption that education, due to the 
awareness that comes with it, reduces the households’ chances of engaging in an 
exploitative relationship. Exp measures the total monthly expenditure for running 
the household, incorporated as an indicator for the household’s economic 
standing.34 This helps evaluate whether economically better off households are 
less likely to be in an interlinked relationship. The variable MW*LL in equation 2 
is an interaction term meant to capture the effect of belonging to a landlord 
dominated village far from the motorway. In Equation 2, due to the presence of 
the interaction term, MW now captures the effect of the road on peasant based 
villages only; i.e. it assumes LL is taking the value of 0. Similarly LL captures the 
effect of land tenure systems on villages close to the road only; i.e. when MW is 
0.35 
 
The last four variables are dummies for the major biraderies found in the villages, 
meant to control for the social status of the household.36 Bh and Kh represent the 
upper class biraderies of Bhattis and Kharrals. Their elevated social status places 
                                                 
32 This research design was, amongst other things, driven by practical considerations, as trying to 
find the distance from the road after which villagers considered themselves isolated would have 
been extremely expensive and would have required looking at a large number of villages.  
33 Household interviews revealed this to be the case. 
34 This figure is verified by asking the household questions about their consumption patterns and 
then checking if the consumption matched the stated level of spending. Moreover, most 
households claimed to have no savings. 
35 The effect of that variable cannot be read off the table directly. It requires further computation.  
36 For a detailed discussion on social stratification and biradery status in a Punjabi village see 
Ahmad (1977). 
111 
 
them in a slightly better position vis-à-vis the landlord when compared to the 
lower classes, making them synonymous to the merchant in our previous model. 
However, as we saw from the model, when isolated they too are vulnerable to 
exploitation. An takes the value of 1 if the household belongs to the Ansari 
biradery. These households were historically not allowed to own land which 
lowered their social status considerably. Lastly, MS is 1 if the household is a 
Muslim Sheikh. They too, like the Ansaris, were previously not allowed to own 
land and belong to the lowest strata of society. The low economic and social 
status of these two biraderies makes them similar to the landless peasants from 
our model, who were found to be extremely vulnerable to exploitation.37 The 
reference category is the small middle class biraderies.  
 
Table 1 presents the results for Equations 1 and 2 enquiring whether the 
household is in any kind of interlinked relationship. Starting with Column 1 we 
find that, in line with Figure 5, households situated in isolated villages are 23% 
more likely to be in an interlinked relationship when compared to those residing 
in connected villages. This result is significant at the 1% level. Moreover, Column 
1 finds that being situated in a landlord dominated village reduces the households’ 
chances of being in an interlinked relationship by 13% (significant at the 1% 
level). However, as can be seen from Column 2, this result is largely driven by the 
low levels of interlinkages found in landlord dominated villages close to the 
motorway. The education level of the household head lowers the probability of a 
household having its markets interlinked by 2% for every year of schooling 
attended.38 This result is also significant at the 1% level. Household expenditure, 
on the other hand, has a significant but not very substantial effect on the 
household’s chances of being in an interlinked relationship.  
 
 
                                                 
37 While there are now no legal restrictions against these two biraderies owning land, most of them 
were found to be landless. 
38 It must be pointed out that the effect of education on interlinkages is most likely not linear. The 
effect is probably stronger in the first few years and then tapers off with additional years of 
schooling. 
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Including the interaction term in Column 2 does not take away the significant 
effect of connectivity, highlighting the positive effect connectivity has had on 
peasant based villages. Furthermore, in landlord dominated villages situated on 
the motorway, a household’s chances of having the same provider for multiple 
markets is significantly reduced. However the interaction term itself is not found 
to be significant, supporting the findings in Figure 5 that in isolated villages, land 
tenure systems have no impact on the households’ chances of having their markets 
interlinked. This is not a surprising result as isolation leads to a reduction in the 
options available to peasants and an increase in transaction costs, both of which 
were cited as contributing factors for market interlinkages in Section 1. 
 
The table also highlights the significant impact that the households’ biradery has 
in determining its chances of being in an interlinked relationship. Muslim 
Sheikhs, the most disadvantaged in village society, are 22% more likely to have 
Table 1: Is the household in an interlinked relationship?  
  
 
 Basic Model 
  (1) (2) 
Household is situated in an isolated village 0.23*** 0.2*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Household belongs to a landlord dominated village -0.13*** -0.17** 
(0.01) (0.02) 
Household resides in an isolated landlord dominated village  
 
 0.08 
 (0.55) 
Education level of the household head -0.02*** -0.019*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Expenses (per Rs. 1000) -0.005** -0.005* 
 (0.04) (0.06) 
Bhatti -0.21*** -0.19*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Kharral -0.045 -0.06 
 (0.11) (0.24) 
Ansari -0.13** -0.13*** 
 (0.02) (0.01) 
Muslim Sheikh 0.22*** 0.22*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) 
N 356 356 
R2 0.1192 0.1200 
Robust standard errors calculated; p-values in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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their markets interlinked while the Bhattis, who make up the upper class of rural 
society, are 19% less likely, than any other biradery, to be in an interlinked 
relationship. These results are in line with our expectations. However, a curious 
result is the lower chances of Ansari households of having their markets 
interlinked. In order to analyse this further Figure 6 splits the data by biradery to 
see the level and type of interlinkages that households from different social groups 
find themselves in.  
Figure 6: Interlinkages across different biraderies 
 
 
The Muslim Sheikhs are by far the worst off with 60% of households having their 
markets interlinked in one form or another and 49% being in a labour-tying 
relationship. The Ansaris, on the other hand, due to their slightly more elevated 
status are better off with only 33% having their markets interlinked. This is 
similar to the level of interlinkages amongst the upper class Kharral households. 
However, where they differ from the Kharrals is in the type of interlinkages they 
find themselves in. Whereas most Ansaris have their labour market tied to other 
markets, Kharrals are more likely to enjoy a relatively independent labour market. 
The same holds true for Bhatti households; by far the majority have an 
independent labour market. The high status enjoyed by the Bhattis and Kharrals 
makes it highly unlikely that they will find themselves in an exploitative labour-
tying relationship. 
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Table 2 goes on to analyse the impact of connectivity, land tenure system and 
household status on the chances of a household engaging in a labour-tying 
relationship. Starting with the basic model we find that households situated far 
from the motorway are 8% more likely to have their labour market tied to other 
markets. This result is significant at the 5% level. Land tenure system, on the 
other hand, has no significant impact on households’ chances of having an 
interlinked labour market. Moreover, including the interaction term in Column 2 
takes away the significant effect of the road and the interaction term itself is not 
significant either.  
 
The more interesting story emerges when we analyse the impact of household 
specific characteristics. Starting with education we find that, once again, the 
education level of the household head has a significant impact on reducing the 
chances of the household having their labour market interlinked with others 
(significant at the 1% level). Also, as before, the impact of household expenditure 
is significant but not substantial. Turning next to the role of household biradery it 
can be seen that, in line with Figure 6, Bhatti and Kharral households are 11% and 
16% respectively less likely to have their labour market interlinked with another 
market. Muslim Sheikh households, on the other hand, are 15% more likely to be 
in a labour-tying relationship. This result is significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 2: Is the household in a labour-tying relationship?    
 Basic Model Close to 
The 
Motorway 
(3) 
Far From 
The 
Motorway 
(4)   (1) (2) 
Household is situated in an isolated village 0.08** 0.04   
 (0.05) (0.19)   
Household belongs to a landlord dominated 
village 
0.01 -0.04 -0.12 0.11 
(0.77) (0.33) (0.31) (0.30) 
Household resides in an isolated landlord 
dominated village  
 0.12   
 (0.31)   
Education level of the household head -0.015*** -0.01*** -0.06*** -0.01*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Expenses (per Rs. 1000) -0.006** -0.06** -0.02** -0.0058 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.18) 
Bhatti -0.12*** -0.11***  -0.15*** 
 (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) 
Kharral -0.15*** -0.16***  -0.18*** 
 (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) 
Ansari -0.0001 -0.003 -0.13** 0.08 
 (1.00) (0.93) (0.05) (0.35) 
Muslim Sheikh 0.15*** 0.16*** 0 13 0.31*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.12) (0.01) 
N 356 356 90 182 
R2 0.2673 0.2735 0.2566 0.1941 
Robust standard errors calculated; p-values in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Columns 3 and 4 split the data by distance to the motorway to see if connectivity 
impacts the role of households’ status on their chances of being in a labour-tying 
relationship. It can be seen that Muslim Sheikhs, situated in isolated villages, are 
31% more likely than any other biradery to be in a labour-tying relationship, 
significant at the 1% level. These households are some of the poorest in rural 
society and have always been considered part of the lowest stratum in the village39 
(Ahmad 1977). Moreover, almost all of them are landless which, combined with 
their low social status, limits their options, thus making them highly prone to 
exploitation. Hence, when presented with alternative options, they appear to be 
breaking away from this exploitative relationship, as Column 3 finds that, in 
                                                 
39 Most villagers do not like even associating with the Muslim Sheikhs. While collecting data I 
was often told by other households not to bother interviewing the Muslim Sheikhs as “They are 
unimportant and their opinion is not worth anything.” (Key respondent 9).  
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villages close to the motorway, belonging to the Muslim Sheikh biradery no 
longer presents a disadvantage in terms of being in a labour-tying relationship. As 
mentioned in Chapter 2, these households, according to the landlord, were most 
active in engaging with the external market. In fact, as the landlord himself 
complained in his interview, their shift in occupation meant a fall in the number of 
households available to work on the fields. Results for the Ansari households 
show those situated in connected villages are 13% less likely to engage in a 
labour-tying relationship, significant at the 5% level. Hence it seems that, as per 
Hypothesis 2, the road is taking away the age old disadvantage of belonging to the 
lower classes (Ahmad 1977, Rouse 1988). However, this is not to say that 
connectivity is not impacting the upper class of society. In villages connected to 
the external economy there are no Bhatti or Kharral households engaged in 
labour-tying relationships. 
  
Table 3, inquiring into households engaged in non-labour based interlinkages, 
finds that those in isolated villages are 13% more likely to be engaged in such 
types of interlinkages than those situated close to the motorway, significant at the 
1% level. However, from Column 2 we can see that it is peasant based villages, 
rather than landlord dominated ones, that favour these relationships. Households 
in isolated landlord based villages are 8% less likely to be in a non-labour based 
relationship, significant at the 5% level. In fact, when we split the data by distance 
from the road, we find that households in isolated landlord based villages are 23% 
less likely to engage in a non-labour based relationship when compared to 
similarly isolated peasant based villages (significant at the 1% level). This is not 
entirely unexpected when we consider that this is a relationship born more out of 
the desire for efficiency and has low exploitative powers. Therefore, a landlord 
wanting to maximise surplus extraction, and able to do so because of isolation, 
would be more inclined to tie-in the labour market. 
 
Turning to the effect of household level characteristics on non-labour based 
relationships, we find that the education level of the household head and the 
households’ average spending levels have no impact on the probability of the 
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household being in a non-labour tying relationship. Furthermore, we can see that 
belonging to the Muslim Sheikh biradery also has no significant impact on 
households’ chances of being in a non-labour tying relationship. This can largely 
be attributed to high levels of poverty amongst Muslim Sheikh households, 
making it difficult for them to keep their labour market independent. This is true 
in both isolated and connected villages. Kharral households, on the other hand, 
have a 15% higher probability of engaging in a non-labour tying relationship. This 
result is significant at the 1% level. This effect is even stronger when looking at 
the Kharrals in isolated villages.  
 
Table 3: Is the household in a non-labour tying relationship?  
 Basic Model Close to 
The 
Motorway 
(3) 
Far From 
The 
Motorway 
(4)   (1) (2) 
Household is situated in an isolated village 0.13*** 0.17***   
 (0.00) (0.00)   
Household belongs to a landlord dominated 
village 
-0.12*** -0.07* -0.06 -0.23*** 
(0.00) (0.06) (0.18) (0.00) 
Household resides in an isolated landlord 
dominated village far from the motorway 
 -0.08**   
 (0.03)   
Education level of the household head 0.0007 -0.00008 0.00012 -0.00043 
 (0.83) (0.98) (0.95) (0.95) 
Expenses (per Rs. 1000) -0.0005 -0.0007 0.0013 -0.003* 
 (0.8) (0.66) (0.65) (0.07) 
Bhatti -0.02 -0.03* -0.047 -0.05 
 (0.56) (0.07) (0.3) (0.27) 
Kharral 0.15*** 0.17*** 0.15*** 0.24*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Ansari -0.13* -0.13* -0.03 -0.20** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.83) (0.03) 
Muslim Sheikh -0.07 -0.07 0.02 -0.14 
  (0.39) (0.37) (0.87) (0.11) 
N 356 356 174 182 
R2 0.0752 0.0773 0.0727 0.0720 
Robust standard errors calculated; p-values in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
Given the disadvantage Muslim Sheikh households face, it is worth investigating 
what is driving this, i.e. is it due to their landlessness, and the resultant poverty 
forcing them to approach the landlord, or their low social status, making it 
difficult for them to break out of exploitative relationships? We can try and tease 
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this out by observing if all landless households suffer from higher chances of 
having their markets interlinked or if it is specific to Muslim Sheikhs. Table 4 
makes use of a restricted sample to analyse the effect of connectivity and land 
tenure systems on the chances of a landless household being in a labour-tying 
relationship. From the table we can see that distance from the road increases 
households’ chances of being in any type of interlinked relationship by 16%, 
significant at the 10% level. However, including the interaction term takes away 
the significance of the motorway variable and the interaction term too is not 
significant. As before, the household head’s education level lowers their chances 
of interlinking their labour market, significant at the 5% level. Interestingly, from 
Columns 3 and 4 we can see that the positive effects of education are confined to 
connected villages, as these are where peasants actually have the option to break 
out of exploitative relationships. 
 
Moreover, looking at the impact of biradery we find that even amongst the 
landless, Muslim Sheikhs are significantly more likely to have their labour market 
interlinked when compared to other biraderies. Furthermore, landless Bhatti and 
Kharral households are 22% and 28% less likely to be in a labour-tying 
relationship. These results too are significant at the 1% level. This gives weight to 
the argument that Muslim Sheikh households are disadvantaged, not so much 
because of poverty, as these are all landless households, but more so because of 
their low social status. However, connectivity is helping to reduce this 
disadvantage, as from Columns 3 and 4 we find that, while Muslim Sheikh 
households in isolated villages are 25% more likely than any other biradery to 
have their labour market interlinked, significant at the 1% level, in villages 
connected to the motorway belonging to this biradery has no significant effect.  
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Table 4: Is the household in a labour-tying relationship?  
(Landless households only)  
 Basic Model Close to 
The 
Motorway 
(3) 
Far From 
The 
Motorway 
(4)   (1) (2) 
Household is situated in an isolated village 0.16* 0.1   
 (0.07) (0.19)   
Household belongs to a landlord dominated 
village 
-0.04 -0.10 -0.13 0.08 
(0.65) (0.28) (0.33) (0.57) 
Household resides in an isolated landlord 
dominated village  
 0.14   
 (0.43)   
Education level of the household head -0.03** -0.03** -0.06*** -0.01 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.54) 
Expenses (per Rs. 1000) -0.01 -0.01 -0.025* 0.01 
 (0.25) (0.24) (0.08) (0.89) 
Bhatti -0.22*** -0.20***  -0.18*** 
 (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) 
Kharral -0.28*** -0.28***  -0.29*** 
 (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) 
Ansari -0.06 -0.06 -0.16** -0.006 
 (0.34) (0.41) (0.02) (0.95) 
Muslim Sheikh 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.14 0.25*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.12) (0.00) 
N 198 198 81 105 
R2 0.1429 0.1462 0.2242 0.0995 
Robust standard errors calculated; p-values in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Overall the results paint an interesting picture of how social and spatial 
characteristics interact to determine market interlinkages. First and foremost, we 
find that markets continue to be interlinked in rural Punjab, both in villages 
dominated by a large landlord as well as peasant based ones. However, the nature 
of the relationship varies considerably in the different types of villages and 
amongst households of different social standing. In peasant based villages the 
multiplicity of service providers restricts the ability of the resource holder to 
exploit the peasant, even when engaged in a labour-tying relationship. It has been 
argued that interlinkages in these villages are created more for the service 
provider to protect himself from potential losses than for him to extract surplus. In 
isolated landlord dominated villages, on the other hand, the evidence is consistent 
with the findings of the game theoretic model which argued that the landlord is 
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able to use inequality and seclusion to his advantage so as to establish triadic 
relationships with the possibility of forcing peasants to engage in transactions that 
lower their utility.  
 
Secondly, the tables highlight that the most disadvantaged group in these villages 
are the Muslim Sheikh households, not just because of their extreme poverty, but 
also due to their low social status. These households are seen to play a role similar 
to the landless peasants from the game theoretic model in Section 2, who have 
relatively little, if any, access to the external market thus making them highly 
vulnerable to exploitation. The Kharrals and the Bhattis, on the other hand, play 
the role of the merchant trading social interaction. In isolated villages they too 
have restricted options, though they are better off than the Muslim Sheikhs due to 
their higher social status and the fact that some of these households own land. The 
question then is; if a Muslim Sheikh peasant was to reject the landlord’s offer 
would the Bhattis and Kharrals comply with the landlord’s wishes and ostracise 
him, or would they defy the landlord and continue to interact with the defector? In 
isolated villages the landlord provides Bhatti and Kharral households with social 
(dispute resolution and social insurance) and political (public goods provision and 
access to the local politician) goods which they otherwise do not have access to. 
The Muslim Sheikhs, on the other hand, can only offer their labour40 and their 
support in case the upper class households decided to engage in collective action. 
Thus, in an isolated economy, the upper class has more to gain from interacting 
with the landlord than with the Muslim Sheikhs, and so they are more likely to 
comply with the wishes of the landlord. Being aware of this the Muslim Sheikhs 
are unlikely to reject the landlord’s offer, even if it lowers their utility.41 This can 
be seen by the high percentage of Muslim Sheikh households found in a labour-
tying relationship. However, as the tables show, this disadvantage is limited to 
isolated villages. For Muslim Sheikh households residing in villages close to the 
motorway, their social status has no significant impact on their chances of being 
                                                 
40 These are mostly unskilled households that can only perform odd jobs around the village.  
41 This was evident from their response to the question of defying the landlord. They thought such 
a question was ridiculous, as defying the landlord could mean starvation. 
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in an interlinked relationship. Connectivity, similar to peasant based villages, 
leads to peasants having access to multiple service providers, thus limiting the 
landlord’s ability to exploit them.  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Market interlinkages provide development researchers with two problems. Firstly, 
they have the potential for being exploitative, particularly when found in isolated 
villages with high inequality (Basu 1983, Bell 1988). Secondly, they make 
standard economic theory incapable of conducting equilibria analysis, as 
transactions are no longer at arm’s length (Bardhan 1980). However, in the last 
decade, literature on agrarian economies has not focused on the theory of 
interlinked markets and their implications for today’s rural poor. This chapter has 
argued for the need to bring the theoretical framework of market interlinkages 
back into mainstream agrarian development literature by establishing, through 
empirical data, that rural markets continue to be interlinked. The chapter has also 
illustrated the dire welfare implications that this market structure has had in 
isolated villages with high inequality, particularly for the social underclass.  
 
The empirical section found that while markets in rural Punjab were interlinked, 
irrespective of the level of inequality, there was a difference in the nature of, and 
incentive for, the interlinking of markets. In egalitarian villages the multiplicity of 
service providers forces the resource holders to engage in a dyadic relationship 
with the peasants, thus enabling the latter to walk away from the interaction if 
they deem it to be exploitative. This is seen through the higher incidence of non-
labour tying relationships in peasant based villages, and the relatively equal 
percentage of households engaged in a labour-tying relationship in peasant based 
villages connected to the external market and those situated far away. Hence the 
multiplicity of service providers in these villages has meant that, the only way for 
the resource rich to increase their benefits is by lowering their costs of interaction, 
as surplus extraction is no longer an available option. In isolated landlord 
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dominated villages, on the other hand, interlinkages have at times been used as a 
mechanism for exploitation, as peasants lack any alternative to the landlord for 
satisfying their needs. This could be seen through the peasants’ obvious fear of the 
landlord, their inability to envisage defying him in any way and the low 
percentage of households found to be in a labour-tying relationship in connected 
landlord based villages.  
 
Moreover, the data has highlighted the role a household’s social status plays in 
determining its chances of being in an interlinked relationship. We saw that, by 
far, the most disadvantaged group in isolated landlord dominated villages was the 
lower class Muslim Sheikhs. This group has the highest probability of being in a 
labour-tying relationship, even when compared to other landless households. 
Their low social status, combined with poverty, has placed them in the lowest 
stratum of society resulting in the upper class biraderies placing little value on 
interacting with them. This makes it rather likely for them to sever ties with a non-
complying Muslim Sheikh household. Knowing this, Muslim Sheikh households 
are unlikely to reject the landlord’s offer even when it is exploitative. 
  
However, this disadvantage was not evident in villages connected to the highway. 
Households in such villages had a significantly lower probability of finding 
themselves in an interlinked relationship. Moreover, the tables find that a 
household’s biradery extends no significant disadvantage on its chances of having 
its markets interlinked when situated close to the road. This can be explained by 
the increase in external options that connectivity provides to lower class peasants, 
thus taking away the landlord’s ability to impose sanctions on them. Hence, as 
long as the household is connected to the wider national economy, the land tenure 
system of a village seems to be unimportant, as outcomes in villages with large 
landlords are found to be relatively similar to those in villages with dispersed land 
ownership. 
 
The results from this chapter, therefore, highlight that inequality and isolation by 
themselves are not detrimental to peasants’ welfare as far as market interlinkages 
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are concerned. Rather, it is the interaction of the two that creates a 
monopolistic/monopsonistic landlord who is able to extract the maximum surplus 
possible from the peasants.  
124 
 
4. The Impact of Market Exposure on Public 
Goods Provision 
 
 
The literature on economic development places considerable emphasis on public 
goods1 provision as a means of enhancing the welfare of the poor and reducing 
inequality. However, despite this concern, researchers have found that public 
investment in many developing countries is skewed in favour of wealthier ‘elites’ 
(see for example Banerjee and Somanathan 2007, Bardhan and Mookherjee 2002, 
Gazdar 2000, Charlton, et al. 2003). Pakistan is no exception where elite capture 
has meant that public funds, which are ear-marked in the budget for alleviating 
poverty, are being appropriated for the benefit of the resource rich (Gazdar 2000). 
This failure on the part of the state to provide for its citizens has meant that the 
poor have had to find alternative avenues for fulfilling their needs. Often this has 
involved approaching someone who has command over resources, both financial 
and social, and is willing to act as a patron (Scott1972, Powell 1970). However, as 
stipulated in Chapters 1 and 2, aligning with a patron does not guarantee provision 
of public goods. Depending on the patron’s bargaining power vis-à-vis citizens, 
clients might find themselves in a situation where the patron contracts with the 
local politician to secure public resources for his own private benefit in exchange 
for his clients’ votes (Powell 1970, Keefer 2004, Scott and Kerkvliet 1977), 
leading to their exclusion from public spending decisions.  
 
Thus the vulnerable groups in society, who are most in need of state resources, are 
most likely to get caught in a low-provision equilibrium. This chapter explores the 
impact connectivity has on peasants’ bargaining power, and whether the change in 
the relationship is large enough to enable them to negotiate higher levels of public 
goods provision for themselves. However, before exploring the effects of policies 
                                                 
1 Public goods are defined not as pure public goods, rather as all goods provided by the state 
(Banerjee and Somanathan 2007).  
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that could change relative bargaining powers, it is important to take a step back 
and first analyse what enables the un-elected patron to influence public spending 
decisions. In this vein Section 1 argues that by guaranteeing the politician a 
certain number of votes the patron is able to ensure that public spending, instead 
of being spent directly on rural citizens’ welfare, is channelled through him. These 
resources are then used by the patron to strengthen his own patron-client network 
as he decides who enjoys the benefits of public spending. Hence, a household’s 
status in the patronage network and its relative bargaining power, have a direct 
impact on the amount of public goods that it would receive. Based on this, Section 
2 goes on to analyse the extent to which the motorway has been able to alter 
bargaining powers, and whether the change is enough for households to negotiate 
increased public goods provision for themselves. Aside from looking at whether 
the overall level of provision in the village has increased, the section also explores 
who within the villages is benefitting from increased connectivity. As in the case 
of market interlinkages, it is found that the benefits of connectivity, in terms of 
public goods provision, are experienced most strongly by the Muslim Sheikh 
households who belong to the lowest end of the social strata and thus were most 
vulnerable under isolation. 
  
1. The Deals Politicians Make 
 
Despite the well documented link between public goods provision and poverty 
alleviation, Pakistan is found to suffer from very low levels of public goods 
provision, particularly in its rural areas (Hasnain 2008). One of the problems 
regarding public spending in rural Pakistan is the presence of patronage politics, 
which results in public resources being channelled through the local patron, rather 
than being spent directly on citizens’ welfare. As a result, public spending 
decisions are made by patrons in the rural economy and not by elected politicians 
(Cheema et al 2005, Gazdar 2000). These decisions deal not only with what goods 
and services are to be provided, but also towards whom public spending is to be 
diverted. Therefore as argued in Chapter 2, those peasants who have a stronger 
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position in the patronage network, either due to their initial endowments or due to 
their having additional ties with the landlord, are most likely to see public funds 
used for their welfare. In contrast poor villagers, who are most in need of public 
assistance, are least likely to receive it as they are unlikely to be able to negotiate 
increased provision in exchange for their services to the patron.  
 
The politicians’ incentive for dealing with their constituents through a patron 
rather than directly are arguably two-fold. Firstly, as stipulated by Keefer (2007), 
in young democracies politicians are severely constrained in their ability to make 
credible pre-election commitments to their constituents as they have limited 
precedence to draw on. This certainly holds true in the case of Pakistan given that, 
in its 63 years of existence, it has only had 8 general elections (PILDAT 2008). 
The inability to make credible promises makes campaigning very expensive and 
ineffective for politicians and, therefore, forces them to create alliances with 
someone who has credibility with the voters. In the presence of clientelist 
networks, patrons can perform this function as their face-to-face contact with 
peasants makes them fairly credible (Scott and Kerkvliet 1977, Powell 1970). 
Thus politicians, who want to secure votes, are found to approach local patrons 
and campaign through them rather than attempting to do so independently.  
 
Secondly, dealing with a patron comes with a guarantee of a certain number of 
votes. The patron is able to deliver these votes as one of the services peasants 
provide to their patron is to agree to vote in accordance with his political 
preferences (Powell 1970, Scott 1972, Mason 1986). As mentioned in Chapter 2 
once promised, the client is unable to renege as voting in rural Pakistan is not 
always secret, This is particularly true for women voters whose conservative 
households may not permit them to go to the polling station. Instead, as reported 
by some of these women, they have been sending their filled ballots to the voting 
booth through their children.2 Moreover, as stipulated by Strokes (2005), the close 
knit nature of small towns and villages makes it unlikely for people’s voting 
                                                 
2Household ID 81, interview, isolated peasant based village 1, 2 May, 2008. 
Household ID 120, interview, connected peasant based village 1, 2 May, 2008.  
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decisions to remain hidden as patrons (and party officials) can rely on their 
operatives, based in the village, to report non-compliant behaviour to them.3 
Therefore she argues that, in developing countries that are new democracies, the 
poor are unlikely to renege on their promises, as they would not expect their 
voting decisions to remain private.4 The same is true in Pakistan, as peasants in 
my sample villages never considered the voting process to be private or 
confidential. Rather, they considered it to be a communal activity that was to be 
carried out based on consultations with fellow peasants and under the direction of 
the patron.5 Interestingly, the peasants’ lack of faith in the secrecy of the balloting 
process was in spite of the Pakistani Government’s assurances to its citizens that 
their votes would remain anonymous. However, peasants had no reason to believe 
these formal assurances as, in line with the argument by Mason and Joshi (2008), 
they had no precedence of secret balloting. Hence the outcome is that the patron, 
in effect, ‘controls’ a few hundred (if not more) votes which he then trades with 
politicians. 
 
Politicians reciprocate in this relationship by providing patrons with a 
combination of private and public goods.6 While private goods entail the payment 
of money, housing or land, public provision involves making public resources 
available to the patron to distribute as he sees fit. These public resources are then 
used by the patron to both improve his own well-being and to strengthen his 
patronage network by offering ‘rewards’ to those clients who have relatively 
stronger bargaining power within the network. The extent of public funds that 
                                                 
3 Strokes (2005) looks specifically at how party operatives can ensure that paying citizens for their 
votes results in them actually voting as promised. This can be adapted for the analysis of voting 
under patronage networks to help explain how the patron ensures that the clients vote according to 
his preferences. 
4 Strokes (2005) lists a number of examples from countries such as India, Argentina and Russia to 
illustrate the various tactics used by party officials to intimidate the voters and ensure that they 
vote in accordance with their promises.  
5 Household ID 386, interview, connected landlord dominated village 2, 23 May, 2008.  
During the interview with this household I asked the head of the household as to why he did not 
vote independently based on his own preferences? His response was to inform me that, since I was 
from the city I didn’t know how things were done. While in the city we might do things 
independently, that is not how it worked in the village, as here decisions were made jointly so as to 
cater for the overall welfare of the village. 
6 Corruption, coupled with low levels of accountability, enable politicians in Pakistan to 
expropriate resources without having to face the consequences. 
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patron receives, in exchange for the votes they offer, would also be determined 
though a bargaining game. How strong each party is vis-à-vis the other would 
depend on factors such as the number of votes the patron is offering, the strength 
of the politicians’ position in the upcoming election and the relative social status 
of the two. So, while a politician, who himself is a large landlord with a 
substantial clientelist following may be in a stronger position vis-à-vis the local 
patron, a small time politician who relies on other landlords for political support 
would have to offer considerable rewards, in the form of public resources, to the 
patron in order to secure his support. Nevertheless, public spending in rural 
Pakistan is mostly found to be directed through the patron and not directly to the 
voting citizen. Therefore, villagers who are not aligned to a patron run the risk of 
having limited access to public resources. Cheema and Mohmand (2004) highlight 
this fact through their finding that villagers in their sample, who supported the 
incumbent politician but were not aligned with a patronage network, were less 
likely to receive public goods as public resources were used by the incumbent 
mayor to gain the support of the local landlord.  
 
Contracting with patrons is ‘cheaper’ for the politician than providing public 
goods to the masses as, in the presence of patronage politics, the number of people 
that the politician needs to satisfy shrinks from a winning majority of constituents 
to a winning majority of patrons (Mason and Joshi 2008). Moreover, contracting 
with a patron guarantees results as defection on the part of the patron is easily 
detectable due to the large number of votes he controls.7 This is contrasted with 
contracting with citizens who, by virtue of constituting a minute fraction of the 
voting body, have a higher chance of reneging (mostly by choosing not to vote) 
without detection (Keefer 2004).8 Contracting with the patron solves this problem 
and thus takes away the probabilistic nature of success in democracies. 
 
                                                 
7 The large number of votes the patron controls may make defection so detectable that the 
politician may not have to invest in monitoring technologies.  
8 Monitoring citizens’ voting decisions, by the politician, is either not possible when balloting is 
secret, or prohibitively expensive when it is not as there are too many citizens. 
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This is an ideal situation for both politicians and patrons. Provided politicians can 
contract with enough patrons, they can guarantee victory in an election, something 
they could never achieve in the absence of clientelist politics. For patrons this is 
yet another avenue through which to expropriate resources, either for their own 
benefit or for strengthening their patronage networks. The only losers are the rural 
clients as the decision regarding public goods provision in their village is made by 
the un-elected patron (Mason and Joshi 2008, Keefer 2007), rather than the 
politician who, as a result of this contracting, is bound to feel disengaged from the 
masses (See also Strokes 2005, Karlan 1994, Strokes 1994, Kochin 1998 for an 
overview of the effects of vote buying). As a result, those peasants who enjoy 
high bargaining power vis-à-vis the patron are most likely to see public spending 
diverted towards them, while peasants with low bargaining power are bound to 
receive few, if any, public goods provision. The next section makes use of 
empirical data to analyse the extent to which a monopolistic landlord, situated in 
isolated villages, is able to appropriate public resources for his own benefit. 
Moreover, the section goes on to study the effect that connectivity has on 
peasants’ bargaining power and thus their ability to negotiate increased provision 
for themselves. The data reveals that while in isolation public spending is 
significantly lower in villages dominated by large landlords when compared to 
relatively egalitarian villages, once connected to the external economy, outcomes 
in the different tenured villages tend to converge.  
 
2. Empirical Analysis 
 
This section makes use of the data to evaluate the impact connectivity has had on 
public goods provision. The analysis is restricted to two public goods: paved 
streets and drainage systems. The decision regarding the provision of these goods 
officially lies with the Tehsil Mayor (the second tier of the Local Government 
System), who receives funding from the federal government. However, these 
decisions are meant to be made in consultation with Union-level Mayors (the 
lowest tier of local government). These Union Mayors, aside from having better 
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information regarding villagers’ needs, also form the electoral college for the 
election of the Tehsil Mayor and thus have considerable leverage to acquire 
development funds for their own political constituents9. The reason for selecting 
these two public goods lies in the nature of these goods and the way in which they 
are provided in Pakistan. Paved streets and drains in Pakistan are not ‘pure’ public 
goods.10 While they are non-rival, others can be excluded from their usage. This 
holds true even within a neighbourhood, where one would intuitively expect 
goods like paved streets and drainage systems to be non-excludable in order to be 
effective. However, upon observation I found that this is not necessarily the case. 
The politician and the patron can exclude a single household from the provision of 
these goods, even if the houses next door are being provided with them. Walking 
around the villages I would at times find paved drains stopping in front of a single 
house, and starting again next to its neighbour’s house. Upon inquiry I learnt that 
the excluded house belonged to a peasant who was not aligned with the local 
patron, thus resulting in his not receiving public goods provision.11 This 
excludability makes these goods well suited for the purpose of this study. 
 
Schooling and health care, the other main public goods, are not being considered 
for two interconnected reasons. Firstly, these goods are universal public goods, 
which once provided, are usually available for everyone to use.12 Secondly, these 
goods, as provided in rural Pakistan, are meant to service not only the village in 
which they are situated, but also other villages in its proximity. This means that 
restricting peasants’ access would entail barring them from the usage of public 
goods found in other villages. This is difficult for the patron to ensure as his 
                                                 
9 The only directly elected officials are those who make up the Union Council. The higher tier 
officials are then elected by all the union council members within the District (See Cheema et al 
for details regarding the Local Government Spending). Interestingly, Cheema and Mohmand 
(2004) highlight that the structure of the Local Government System encourages bargaining 
between the various tiers over decisions regarding the spending of development funds.  
10 Pure public goods are non-rival – one person’s use does not diminish the quantity available for 
another person – and are non-excludable – it is not possible to bar others from using it. 
11 Clearly the functionality of the drains and pavements were not taken into consideration. As long 
as a household was able to get the waste water out of its house and away from its front door, its 
occupants were happy.  
12 Barring some peasants may require constant monitoring, which may be too costly and not worth 
the effort. 
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jurisdiction usually does not extend to other villages.13 Thus it is reasonable to 
assume that the patron and the politician do not enjoy the same level of control 
over these goods. The basic logistic regression models estimated are: 
 
Y = α + β1MW + β2LL + β3Land+β4Bh+ β5`Kh +β6An + β7MS+ ξ  
     (1) 
Y = α + β1MW + β2LL + β3MW*LL+ β4Land +β5Bh+ β6Kh +β7An + β8MS + ξ 
     (2) 
Where Y= Household has been provided with a public good. 
MW= Household is situated in an isolated village. 
LL= Household resides in a village dominated by a large landlord. 
Land = Amount of land owned by the household. 
Bh= Household belongs to the Bhatti biradery. 
Kh = Household belongs to the Kharral biradery 
An= Household belongs to the Ansari biradery 
MS= Household belongs to the Muslim Sheikh biradery. 
 
Y is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if the household has a public good 
provided to it, 0 otherwise. Distance from the road, MW, takes the value of 1 if 
the household resides in an isolated village and 0 otherwise. Distance is analysed 
as a binary variable and not as a continuous one as the research design was to look 
at villages which were polar opposite, i.e. while half are situated close to the 
motorway the other half are far enough to be classified as being isolated. Within 
this setup modest changes in distance are irrelevant.14 LL is 1 if the household 
resides in a village dominated by a large landlord, 0 if it is in a peasant based 
village. Land is a continuous variable, measured in acres, capturing the amount of 
land owned by peasant households. This variable is included based on the 
argument that land owning households have higher bargaining power vis-à-vis the 
landlord as they are less dependent on him when compared to landless households 
(Scott 1976). Hence controlling for household land ownership allows us to test 
whether these households have greater access to public resources. The last four 
                                                 
13 While these patrons are big men in their own villages, in urban terms they belong to the lower 
class or lower middle class at best. Thus their influence, outside their own villages, is fairly 
limited. 
14 This research design was, amongst other things, driven by practical considerations, as trying to 
find the distance from the road after which villagers consider themselves isolated would have been 
extremely expensive and would have required looking at a large number of villages.  
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variables are dummies for the major biraderies found in the villages included as a 
control for the social status of the household (Ahmad 1977, Cheema and 
Mohmand 2006). The reference category is the small middle class biraderies. The 
variable MW*LL in Equation 2 is an interaction term which captures the effect of 
belonging to a landlord dominated village far from the motorway.15  
 
Connectivity is also expected to have a spillover effect on a household’s level of 
awareness. It could be argued then, that the impact of the motorway on public 
goods provision, is not a direct one through an increase in peasants’ bargaining 
power brought about by increased options, but rather an indirect effect channelled 
through increased awareness. This follows from the argument that an informed 
citizen is able to demand higher levels of public investment and should be able to 
put considerable pressure on politicians (see for example Prat and Strömberg 
2002, Besley et. al. 2002, Besley and Burgess 2002, Olsen 1982). Hence it is 
possible that Equations 1 and 2 suffer from an omitted variable bias and are over-
estimating the effect of the road. Therefore the basic model is adjusted to include 
controls for levels of awareness:  
Y = α + β1MW + β2LL + β3Land + β4N + β5H + β6Bh+ β7Kh +β8An + β9MS + ξ 
     (3) 
Where N = Access to a newspaper. 
H = Household has heard of local government participatory bodies. 
 
Awareness is measured through two proxies; whether the household has access to 
a newspaper16 (N) and whether the household has heard about local government 
participatory bodies (H).17 The local government ordinance in Pakistan has made 
provision for a number of participatory bodies which are meant to facilitate 
                                                 
15 The inclusion of the interaction term in Equation 2 means that MW now captures the effect of 
the road on peasant based villages only; i.e. it assumes LL is taking the value of 0. Similarly LL 
captures the effect of land tenure systems on villages close to the road only; i.e. when MW is 0. 
The effect of that variable cannot be read off the table directly, as it requires further computation.  
16 Access simply means they are able to get information from a newspaper, irrespective of whether 
they subscribe to it themselves, are reading it at a nearby shop or friend’s house, or are having a 
friend read it to them (making it unnecessary for them to be literate).  
17 The correlation between distance from the motorway and having heard about participatory 
bodies is -0.07 while the correlation between distance to the motorway and access to a newspaper 
is 0.03. Thus there is little fear of multicolinearity biasing the results.  
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participatory development.18 The aim of these bodies is to try to mobilize civil 
society. However, their functionality has been fairly limited, ironically due to 
citizens being unaware of their existence (Kurosaki 2007).  
 
2.1. Empirical Results 
Figure 1 illustrates the level of provision of drains and paved streets across the 
different types of villages. First off, we find that households situated in isolated 
landlord dominated villages have the lowest levels of provision, both for paved 
streets and drainage systems. Moreover the figure indicates that the effect of the 
road is stronger on provision in landlord dominated villages than peasant based 
ones. Dispersed land ownership in peasant based villages has meant that, even 
when isolated, peasants have alternative options in the form of other patrons and 
so no single patron is powerful enough to withhold public resources from his 
clients. In the case of landlord based villages close to the road, the availability of 
outside options has a similar effect, as it considerably weakens the influence of 
the landlord, which also restricts his ability to appropriate public funds. Thus the 
figure highlights that isolation and inequality alone do not adversely impact the 
level of public goods provision made to the peasants. Rather it is the interaction 
between the two that creates a monopolistic/monopsonistic patron able to exclude 
peasants in his contract with the local politician. 
 
                                                 
18 The ordinance makes provision for four such committees aimed at increasing citizen 
participation, both for the purpose of public goods provision and to increase accountability of the 
politician. 
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Figure 1: Public goods provision  
 
 
The graphs also illustrate public spending, in all villages, being skewed towards 
the provision of drains rather than paved streets. The result seemed confusing at 
first, as villagers showed no preference for one over the other.19 There are two 
possible explanations for this. One could lie in the relative costs of the two goods. 
Drains in rural Punjab are almost never underground and at best may have been 
cemented to ensure that the waste does not flow onto the streets and goes straight 
to the main drain.20 This makes them easy and relatively cheap to construct. 
Paving streets, however, requires both materials and a certain level of skill. Given 
the limitation of funds, a politician wanting to reach the maximum number of 
constituents, may be more inclined to build drains than to pave streets. This seems 
to be the case in peasant based villages far from the road. 
 
A second possible explanation lies in the interaction of drains with the streets. In 
the absence of a functioning drainage system, household waste flows directly onto 
the street outside their main door. Irrespective of whether the street is paved or 
not, this creates a mess and, besides spreading diseases, makes it difficult for 
people to move around. Mud (non-paved) streets, on the other hand, are not so 
much of a problem for mobility, provided they are not covered in dirty water and 
household waste.21 Therefore, providing paved streets in areas without drains may 
                                                 
19 Households were asked what their three main needs were. When looking at the data for 
households without paved streets and drains, it was found that the number of households listing 
these two as their needs were relatively equal.  
20 The main drain, in all villages visited, is a big pond on one side of the village.  
21 I would like to thank Hadia Majid for bringing this point to my attention. 
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not have the desired impact. The data show that of all the households provided 
with paved streets, only 23% lack drains.  
 
Before continuing to the regression analysis, it is worth commenting on the 
substantiveness of the increase in provision in landlord dominated villages close 
to the road when compared to similarly tenured isolated villages. From the graph 
we can see that, while 12% households had paved streets in isolation, 33% did so 
in unequal but connected villages. Moreover, while 58% received drains in 
isolated villages, 70% households did so when connected to the external 
economy. These results need to be evaluated keeping two factors in mind. Firstly, 
it must be remembered that this data relates to provision levels 10 years after the 
motorway came into operation. Therefore, it is not surprising that the difference is 
not very large. Secondly, when evaluating the results, it is important to look at 
both goods together as that highlights the overall spending decisions made by 
patrons. So, while in isolation large patrons diverted fewer funds towards their 
clients, in connected villages the patron used public resources to try and satisfy 
peasants’ public goods needs. So much so that, in unequal connected villages, we 
find that public spending levels are converging towards those found in relatively 
egalitarian villages. Therefore, there is clearly a shift in public spending in the 
right direction. The change in the clientelist network was something the landlord 
himself was also aware of, as in an interview the large landlord from one of the 
connected villages told me that even though the street outside his house was 
broken, he could not get it fixed till other villagers had received paved streets. 
When I questioned him as to why that was necessary, he replied:  
“If I get my own street fixed, villagers will come and shout at me and will 
accuse me of using their votes for my own personal benefits. Then I will 
never be able to get their political support again.”22 
 
                                                 
22 Landlord 1, interview, connected landlord dominated village 1, 15 April, 2011. 
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The large landlords in isolated villages had no such qualms, as the streets and 
drains outside their houses were in perfect condition, while most of the other 
neighbourhoods stood in disrepair.  
 
The tables that follow test whether the effect of connectivity and land tenure 
systems on the households’ chances of having public goods provided to them 
holds after controlling for household-specific characteristics. Table 1, in an effort 
to get an overall idea of the impact of connectivity and land tenure systems, 
inquires whether the household has had any public good provided to it. Column 1 
presents the results using data pertaining to provision made before the 
construction of the motorway. This regression is run to test for endogeneity with 
respect to the motorway. The result is found to be negative, allowing us to rule out 
the possibility that there are some systematic differences between these eight 
villages in terms of public goods provision. Interestingly, from Column 1 we can 
see that the households’ land ownership had a positive impact on its chances of 
receiving public goods prior to 1998.23 Each additional acre of land increases a 
household’s chances of provision by 0.3%. This result is significant at the 1% 
level. The small percentage effect per acre implies that the beneficial impact of 
land ownership accrues mostly to the medium and large landholders. This is not 
surprising when we consider that landed households have higher bargaining 
power vis-à-vis the patron when compared to the landless, as the patron is unable 
to impose economic sanctions on them. This implies that they can demand a 
higher level of public goods in exchange for their political support of the patron 
and the political candidate he aligns with. 
 
                                                 
23 In one of the background regressions I replaced land owned with land held (land owned + land 
rented in). The aim was to see if sharecroppers and tenant farmers were benefitting from provision 
due to their access to land. It had no significant impact. 
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Table 1: Does the household have any public good provided to it? 
 
Pre-
Motorway 
(1) 
Post-
Motorway 
(2) 
Post-
Motorway 
(3) 
Post-
Motorway 
(4) 
Household is situated in an 
isolated village -0.028 -0.037 0.089 0.093 
 (0.35) (0.488) (0.277) (0.252) 
Household belongs to a landlord 
dominated village 
0.0134 -0.113** 0.005 0.004 
(0.63) (0.02) (0.844) (0.874) 
Household resides in an isolated 
landlord dominated village 
  -0.234*** -0.24*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) 
Amount of land owned by the 
household (acres) 
0.0034*** 0.00014 -0.0002 -0.0002 
(0.003) (0.903) (0.826) (0.813) 
Household has heard of 
participatory bodies    0.027 
    (0.682) 
Household has access to a 
newspaper    0.005 
    (0.941) 
Bhatti 0.0065 -0.0096 -0.059 -0.065 
 (0.943) (0.92) (0.544) (0.438) 
Kharral 0.128* -0.066* -0.013 -0.017 
 (0.051) (0.096) (0.656) (0.653) 
Ansari 0.153 -0.08 -0.077 -0.079 
 (0.161) (0.317) (0.331) (0.411) 
Muslim Sheikh -0.094 -0.15 -0.132 -0.059 
  (0.024) (0.158) (0.215) (0.51) 
N 383 383 383 383 
R2 0.0329 0.0228 0.034 0.0314 
Robust standard errors calculated. P-values in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Columns 2 to 4 look at provision made after the construction of the motorway. 
Starting with Column 2, we find that while the variable measuring isolation is 
insignificant, households residing in landlord dominated villages are 13% less 
likely to have access to public provision when compared to those residing in 
peasant based villages. This result is significant at the 5% level. Introducing the 
interaction term in Column 3 reveals that it is actually households situated in 
landlord dominated villages far from the motorway who are most disadvantaged. 
These households are 23% less likely (significant at the 1% level) to have any 
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public goods provided to them when compared to households in both peasant 
based villages and landlord based villages close to the motorway.  
 
Isolation, combined with inequality, creates a monopolist/monopsonist landlord 
who is able to maintain a large clientelist following without having to broker 
political goods for them (Michie 1981). The same does not hold for villages 
connected to the motorway. The insignificance of the land tenure system variable 
in Column 3 illustrates that, when connected to the external market, the type of 
village that peasants reside in becomes unimportant for the purpose of public 
goods provision. These effects hold even after controlling for levels of awareness. 
Lastly, when looking at provision made after the construction of the motorway, 
land owning households are no longer targeted for public goods provision as 
households’ land holdings is found to be insignificant. The insignificance of this 
variable highlights the beneficial impact connectivity has had on landless 
households by reducing their disadvantage with regards to public spending 
decisions.  
 
The table highlights the importance of land tenure system for public investment, 
as argued by Banerjee and Iyer (2005), but only as long as the villages are 
isolated. Once connected to the external economy, with all the options and 
opportunities that come with it, patrons are no longer able to ignore peasants in 
their contracts with politicians. Hence we find no evident disadvantage, regarding 
overall public goods provision, of living in a village dominated by a large landlord 
once connected to the road. However, given the differences between the provision 
of paved streets and drains, as illustrated in Figure 1, it is worth investigating the 
impact connectivity has had on these two goods separately. Moreover, following 
from the theoretical argument that households’ economic and social disadvantages 
lower their bargaining power vis-à-vis the patron, thus negatively impacting their 
chances of provision, the tables that follow disaggregate the data by land tenure 
systems and distance from the motorway to evaluate who within the village is 
benefitting from connectivity.  
 
139 
 
As with overall provision, Table 2 first runs a test of endogeneity to check if there 
are any systematic differences based on geography, driving the differences in 
drainage provision. The result, as shown in Column 1, is found to be negative. 
However, what is significant is the households’ land ownership, at the 1% level, 
on their chances of having drains provided to them prior to 1998.  
 
Column 2 looks at provision made after the construction of the road, finding that 
it is land tenure systems and not distance from the motorway that significantly 
affects the probability of a household having drains provided. However, including 
the interaction term in Column 3 discloses that it is actually households residing 
in secluded landlord dominated villages who are most disadvantaged. These 
households have a 45% lower chance of having access to drainage systems when 
compared to both peasant based villages and landlord based villages situated on 
the road. This result is significant at the 1% level. Thus it seems that the 
monopoly/monopsony power enjoyed by the patron in isolated landlord based 
villages is enabling him to direct public resources away from the peasants and 
towards himself. While walking around these villages it was found that the area 
around the landlords’ houses had perfectly paved streets and well functioning 
drains. However, as you moved away from his neighbourhood the quality of 
public goods provision tended to fall considerably.  
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Table 2: Does the household have drains? 
 
Pre- 
Motorway 
(1) 
Post-
Motorway 
(2) 
Post-
Motorway 
(3) 
Post-
Motorway 
(4) 
Household is situated far from 
the motorway 
-0.003 -0.077 0.326*** 0.32*** 
(0.946) (0.427) (0.006) (0.006) 
Household belongs to a landlord 
dominated village 
0.025 -0.23** 0.005 0.013 
(0.517) (0.012) (0.953) (0.884) 
Household belongs to a landlord 
dominated village far from the 
motorway 
  -0.45*** -0.44*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) 
Amount of land owned by the 
household (acres) 
0.003*** 0.005 0.003 0.004 
(0.002) (0.341) (0.412) (0.367) 
Household has access to a 
newspaper 
   -0.005 
   (0.114) 
Household has heard of 
participatory bodies    0.096 
    (0.268) 
Bhatti 0.029 0.0365 -0.096 -0.108 
 (0.766) (0.75) (0.359) (0.315) 
Kharral 0.172 -0.0383 0.15 0.130 
 (0.037) (0.759) (0.103) (0.154) 
Ansari 0.186 -0.0829 0.053 0.059 
 (0.132) (0.653) (0.783) (0.763) 
Muslim Sheikh -0.092 -0.142 -0.12 -0.113 
  (0.153) (0.41) (0.495) (0.529) 
N 383 227 227 227 
R2 0.0435 0.0666 0.0984 0.1046 
Robust standard errors calculated. P-values in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Furthermore, the significance of the isolation variable in Columns 3 and 4 reveals 
that the impact of the motorway is reversed on peasant based villages as far as 
drainage provision is concerned. Households residing in isolated peasant based 
villages have a higher probability of having drains provided to them (significant at 
the 1% level). Patrons in these villages have been very active in securing drains 
for their clients,24 while those in connected peasant based villages chose to split 
                                                 
24 This can be seen from Figure 1.  
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public investment between the provision of drains and paved streets.25 These 
results hold even after controlling for households’ level of awareness. While these 
results are interesting, it is curious that household specific characteristics are 
found to be insignificant. This could be due to the impact of these variables being 
averaged out in the aggregate data. Therefore, the effect of connectivity within the 
different villages may be more evident if we disaggregate the data. Table 3 does 
this by splitting the data four ways; by distance to the road and land tenure 
systems. 
  
Starting with villages at varying distances form the road, we find that land tenure 
system matters for provision of drains, but only as long as the villages are 
isolated. Households living in isolated landlord dominated villages are 45% less 
likely, significant at the 1% level, to have drains provided when compared to 
equally secluded peasant based villages. However, once connected to the road, the 
type of village the household resides in has no significant impact on its chances of 
provision. Secondly, while land ownership continues to matter for drainage 
provision in isolated villages, once connected by the road, landed households do 
not seem to enjoy the same advantage. Therefore, the evidence suggests that the 
increase in outside options has the same effect as land ownership, i.e. it provides 
households with alternative options for earning a livelihood, thus limiting the 
patrons’ ability to impose sanctions. Lastly, the adverse effect of belonging to a 
socially lower class biradery is seen only in isolated villages. Muslim Sheikh 
households living far from the motorway are 50% less likely, significant at the 1% 
level, to have drains when compared to any other biradery. Belonging to the 
Muslim Sheikh biradery in connected villages, however, has no significant effect. 
Furthermore, Ansari households are actually targeted for provision in villages 
close to the road, as they are 28% more likely to have drainage provision, when 
compared to any other biradery. This result is significant at the 10% level. 
                                                 
25 The local mayor has considerable discretion regarding the allocation of public funds between the 
various public goods in the villages. As mentioned earlier, in isolated peasant based villages the 
politician chose to invest mostly in drains while the politician in peasant based villages close to the 
road chose to split spending between drains and paved streets. 
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Interestingly, Bhatti households are 19% less likely to have drains when compared 
to other biraderies in isolated villages, significant at the 5% level.  
 
Splitting the data by land tenure systems in Columns 3 and 4 illustrates the 
positive effect of connectivity on landlord dominated villages, as those residing 
close to the motorway are 21% more likely (significant at the 5% level) to have 
drains in comparison with isolated landlord dominated villages. Furthermore, 
within these villages, Kharral and Ansari households are 22% and 36% more 
likely to have drains compared to all other biraderies. While the higher level of 
provision to the Kharrals is not unexpected, given that they belong to the upper 
class, the increased provision to the Ansaris is. The data reveal that it is actually 
the Ansari households living close to the motorway in landlord dominated villages 
who are enjoying the higher levels of provision. This can also be seen from 
Column 1 which highlights the beneficial impact of being an Ansari household in 
villages close to the motorway. 
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Table 3: Does the household have drains? 
 
Drains provided post 1998 
Close to 
the Motor 
Way 
(1) 
Far from 
the Motor 
Way 
(2) 
Landlord 
Based 
Villages 
(3) 
Peasant 
Based 
Villages 
(4) 
Household is situated far from 
the motorway 
  -0.21** 0.24** 
  (0.014) (0.023) 
Household belongs to a landlord 
dominated village 
0.013 -0.45***   
(0.882) (0.00)   
Amount of land owned by the 
household (acres) 
0.0002 0.02*** 0.001 0.024*** 
(0.935) (0.00) (0.797) (0.00) 
Bhatti -0.016 -0.197** -0.05 -0.096 
 (0.871) (0.012) (0.577) (0.422) 
Kharral 0.24** -0.097 0.22** -0.019 
 (0.016) (0.357) (0.019) (0.897) 
Ansari 0.28* -0.22 0.362*** -0.132 
 (0.072) (0.249) (0.00) (0.398) 
Muslim Sheikh 0.13 -0.50*** -0.11 -0.074 
  (0.371) (0.00) (0.636) (0.784) 
N 111 116 103 124 
R2 0.0378 0.2226 0.0718 0.1224 
Robust standard errors calculated. P-values in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
When focusing on peasant based villages we find that households situated in 
isolated peasant based villages are 24% more likely to have drains provided to 
them. This can be explained by the local politician’s decision to provide drains in 
villages far from the road and not focus on paved streets. In villages connected by 
the motorway, as can be seen from Figure 1, the local politicians split resources 
between drainage provision and paved streets.26 Furthermore, in peasant based 
villages land ownership has a significant impact on the households’ chances of 
having public goods provided to them. However, given the high levels of drainage 
provision in these villages, a substantial proportion of landless households have 
also been provided for.27 Lastly, it is interesting to find that in peasant based 
                                                 
26 Since paving streets is more expensive than the provision of drains the exchange is not one to 
one. Moreover, the decision regarding which of the two goods to provide is purely up to the 
politician. As far as the villagers are concerned, due to low levels of provision and their resultant 
low expectations, they are happy as long as some public good is provided to them. 
27 65% of landless households had a drain provided to them in peasant based villages. 
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villages the households’ biradery has no significant impact on its chances of 
having drains provided to them. 
 
Turning next to the provision of paved streets, Table 4 analyses the impact of 
connectivity and land tenure systems on households’ chances of receiving these 
goods. As before, Column 1 first runs a test of endogeneity to analyse if there are 
any systematic differences, based on location, between the eight villages, driving 
the differences in the provision of paved streets. The test is found to be negative. 
Moreover, as with drainage provision, the pre-motorway data finds that 
households’ land ownership has a significant impact, at the 1% level, on their 
chances of having their streets paved. However, the level is not substantial.  
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Table 4: Does the household have paved streets? 
 
Pre-
Motorway 
(1) 
Post-
Motorway 
(2) 
Post-
Motorway 
(3) 
Post-
Motorway 
(4) 
Household is situated in an 
isolated village 
-0.017 -0.13** -0.083* -0.084** 
(0.514) (0.021) (0.057) (0.022) 
Household belongs to a landlord 
dominated village 
0.015 -0.0018 0.027 0.027 
(0.489) (0.973) (0.737) (0.725) 
Household resides in an isolated 
landlord dominated village 
  -0.0769 -0.075 
  (0.367) (0.285) 
Amount of land owned by the 
household (acres) 
0.0006** 0.0004 0.0003 0.0004 
(0.026) (0.482) (0.478) (0.953) 
Household has access to a 
newspaper 
   -0.001 
   (0.469) 
Household has heard of 
participatory bodies    0.003 
    (0.59) 
Bhatti -0.019 0.0252 0.0065 0.006 
 (0.329) (0.678) (0.919) (0.93) 
Kharral -0.039 -0.003 0.011 0.01 
 (0.292) (0.935) (0.802) (0.79) 
Ansari -0.038 -0.033 -0.0316 -0.032 
 (0.338) (0.596) (0.603) (0.601) 
Muslim Sheikh -0.028 -0.061 -0.056 -0.056 
  (0.533) (0.437) (0.466) (0.467) 
N 383 346 346 346 
R2 0.0156 0.0506 0.0543 0.0544 
Robust standard errors calculated. P-values in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Turning to provision after the construction of the motorway, we find that 
households situated in isolated villages are 13% less likely to have their streets 
paved, significant at the 5% level. Including the interaction term in Column 3 
does not take away the significance of the motorway variable, highlighting the 
positive impact that connectivity has had on peasant based villages. The 
interaction term itself though, is insignificant. Furthermore, the positive impact of 
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the motorway continues to hold even after controlling for levels of awareness in 
Column 4.28 
 
To sum up, the tables above highlight three important and interconnected 
findings. Firstly, as argued by Banerjee and Iyer (2005), land tenure system 
matters for public investment, but only if villages are isolated. Isolated villages 
dominated by a large landlord are less likely to be provided with public goods 
when compared to those with a relatively egalitarian distribution of land. In 
peasant based villages, on the other hand, dispersed land ownership has led to the 
existence of a large number of patrons, each too small to exert significant control 
over the peasants. Therefore, in order to maintain their cliental following patrons 
need to offer their clients goods and services (Michie 1981). One outcome of this 
is for the patron to include provision to his clients in his contract with the 
politician. Patrons in landlord dominated villages do not feel the same constraints, 
as their large land holdings give them monopoly/monopsony power over the 
landless peasants (Bhaduri 1977, Michie 1981). The clients whose needs patrons 
cater for in these villages are those who are economically and socially better off in 
society and thus have some leverage over the patron.  
 
Secondly, being connected by a motorway significantly increases the average 
household’s chances of having public goods provided to it. This effect is felt more 
strongly by peasants residing in villages dominated by large landlords than those 
living in peasant based villages. The presence of alternative options, at least in the 
employment market, has created competition for the large patrons, as it restricts 
the patron’s ability to impose economic sanctions, thus leading to a shift in 
relative bargaining powers in favour of the rural poor. As a result, the landlord is 
forced to broker public goods for his clients, as otherwise he runs the risk of 
losing his clientelist following (Scott and Kerkvliet 1977). Thus connectivity is 
                                                 
28 The lack of substantial variation in the results could be explained by the fact that paved streets 
are not a widely provided public good, as is evident from Figure 1. The same was found when the 
data were disaggregated and so it is not presented here. 
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enabling outcomes in landlord dominated villages to converge to those found in 
their peasant based counter-parts.  
 
Lastly, connectivity, and the increase in outside options that come with it, is found 
to benefit the socially and economically lower classes of village society. These are 
those members of society who are most dependent on the patron’s resources and, 
ordinarily, are least likely to withdraw their support from him due to under-
provision. However, as the construction of the motorway has provided these 
households with a viable alternative means of employment, the patron can no 
longer expect their unwavering support in the face of under-provision. Therefore 
the patron has had to channel some of the resources contracted with the politician 
towards them, leading to an increase in their overall welfare. 
 
3. Conclusion 
  
Literature on rural development documents the importance of public goods 
provision in reducing inequality, yet there is wide spread evidence of under-
provision. While efforts have been made by governments to improve provision, 
inefficiency, corruption, elite-capture and patronage politics have meant that they 
have failed to achieve the desired results (see for example Banerjee and Iyer 2005, 
Bardhan and Mookherjee 2002, Gazdar 2000, Charlton, et al. 2003). This chapter 
argued that the presence of patron-client networks has eroded the politicians’ 
incentive to provide for their constituents directly, as they are able to guarantee 
success by contracting with local patrons. Thus any provision that is made is 
brokered through a patron (Mason and Joshi 2008, Keefer 2007, Cheema and 
Mohmand 2004). The outcome of this has been that public goods provision to 
peasants largely depends on their bargaining power vis-à-vis the patron. This 
bargaining power, as argued in Chapter 1, is a function not only of peasants’ 
endowments, but also of the number of alternatives they have to the patron for 
satisfying their needs. Hence, while peasants in isolated landlord dominated 
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villages tend to have low bargaining power, those residing in either egalitarian 
villages or villages which are unequal, but connected to the external economy are 
relatively better off.  
 
This chapter has therefore explored the possibility of increasing peasants’ 
bargaining power, and hence their levels of public goods provision, by connecting 
isolated villages to the wider national economy through road networks. 
Connectivity, through the multitude of alternative options it brings for the 
peasants reduces their dependence on the patron, even when there are high levels 
of inequality. While in the last chapter this led to a reduction in the landlords’ 
influence over peasants independent relationships and thus altered the nature of 
the interlinked relationships they engaged in, in this chapter we find that peasants 
access to alternative options has meant that, in order to maintain the peasants 
support, particularly in the political domain, patrons have had to divert greater 
levels of public spending towards their peasant client. While the difference 
between provision levels in isolated and connected landlord dominated villages is 
not extremely large, it is statistically significant. More importantly, the data 
reveals that while in isolation the level of inequality had a significant impact on 
the amount of public goods poor households will receive, in connected villages 
this becomes insignificant as outcomes between egalitarian and unequal villages 
are found to converge. Furthermore, as in the previous chapter, we find that the 
benefits of connectivity flow most strongly towards the socially lower classes who 
are most vulnerable in village society and therefore most likely to be excluded by 
a monopolistic patron. 
  
 However, this is not to say that building roads is the sole solution to the age old 
development problem. Looking at the levels of provision in villages close to the 
motorway, it is obvious that even the ‘fortunate’ ones have very low levels of 
provision. What the road does do is provide the stimuli needed to change the 
power dynamics in rural villages which, in turn, enables villagers to start 
demanding their rights. Hence it is a first step on the long road to development.  
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5. The Impact of Connectivity on Clients’ 
Level of Collective Action 
 
 
 
In recent years, considerable emphasis has been placed on community based 
development as a way of improving the wellbeing of the poor. The World Bank 
alone has more than doubled its spending on such projects over the last ten years 
(Mansuri and Rao 2004). In the presence of state failure, community based 
projects can be an alternative avenue for citizens to provide the goods and services 
needed to improve their well-being (Hirshman 1984, Abers 1998, Dongier et al. 
2002, Tripp 1992, Di Gregorio et al. 2008). The emphasis on community based 
projects is not only due to the direct benefit that such projects have of providing 
citizens with public goods, but also due to the perceived indirect benefit of 
building trust and cooperation so as to facilitate future community based activities 
(Hadenius and Uggla 1996, Fox 1994). And while Mancur Olson (1971) would 
have argued that the collective action problem would restrict the success of 
community based activities, empirical and experimental research has shown us 
otherwise (see for example Wade 1988, Ostrom 2000, Camerer 2003, Frey 1994 
Krishna 2002, Baker 2005, Hadenius and Uggla 1996, Bratton 1994, Shue 1994, 
Meinzen-Dick et al. 2002). Collective action theories, over the last few decades, 
have come to acknowledge that individuals’ preferences are not homogenous, 
rather they vary depending on the society the individual resides in as preferences 
are shaped by societal interactions (see for example Ostrom 2005, 2000, Ostrom 
and Ahn 2009, Camerer 2003, Blomquist 1992, Granovetter1992).  
 
Thus, a major contribution of the literature, post-Olson, is to highlight that the 
type of society individuals reside in has an impact, not only on their ability to 
engage in collective action, but also on the type of projects they can undertake. 
While societies with strong horizontal ties should be able to tackle fairly complex 
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and varied projects, those undertaken by fragmented societies would be relatively 
limited in their scope. However, an implicit assumption in most collective action 
studies is that social interaction is between individuals of relatively equal status 
and power, but this is, of course, not always the case, and particularly so in rural 
societies. As surveyed in Chapter 1, the literature on rural development has 
extensively documented the existence of patron-client networks, characterised as 
relationships of dependence and inequality, with the resource rich having 
considerable control over the activities of their peasant clients (Scott 1972, Powell 
1970, Bardhan 1984, Pitt-Rivers 1954, Auyero et al. 2009, Eisenstadt and Roniger 
1984, Basu 1986). Putnam (1993) in his study of Italy argued that collective 
action within such hierarchical networks would be fairly limited due to the 
asymmetric distribution of power. Furthermore, and more importantly for this 
chapter, the presence of this hierarchical network is also argued to have a 
detrimental impact on peasants’ ability to engage in collective action within their 
horizontal networks, both indirectly, by making peasants compete against one 
another for the patrons’ resources (Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984, Putnam 1993) 
and directly, by the patron investing in ways to minimize horizontal linkages, out 
of fear that peasant based collaboration may lower their dependence on him and 
enable them to collectively bargain for better terms of exchange (Popkin 1979).  
 
However, contrary to this pessimistic view of clientelist networks, this Chapter 
argues that patrons’ ability to influence their clients’ horizontal relationships is 
highly dependent on the environment in which the hierarchical network exists. In 
areas which are relatively isolated, and where there is high inequality, peasants 
would have few options aside from the patron to satisfy their needs. Such an 
environment leads to the establishment of ‘authoritarian clientelism’ (Fox 1994), 
where the patron is in essence a monopolist/monopsonist in the rural economy 
(Bhaduri 1977), which enables him to influence his clients’ behaviour and their 
third party interactions (Basu 1986, see also Chapter 3). However, if one relaxes 
either of these two conditions, i.e. lowering inequality to create multiple patrons 
or increasing connectivity in order to provide peasants with exit options, the 
patron’s ability to impose sanctions – and thus control third party interactions – 
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are weakened considerably. The focus of this book is on the latter of the two 
conditions, as it has been argued that connectivity lowers peasants’ dependence on 
the patron by breaking his monopoly/monopsony in the village economy, and 
thereby his influence their independent decisions, such as whether to engage in 
collective action or not.  
 
Making use of the empirical data this chapter explores the impact connectivity has 
on peasants’ ability to engage in collective action. The empirical section finds that 
peasants residing in connected villages are more likely to take part collective 
action, even when dominated by a large patron. In fact, qualitative interviews 
reveal that when faced with the possibility of losing clients to the external market, 
patrons not only restrained from blocking peasants’ collective action, but actually 
went as far as to assist, and at times mobilise them, in such activities. Thus by 
actively participating in peasants’ collective activities, the patron essentially 
directed and channelled these endeavours in a manner that increased their 
likelihood of being successful. According to Krishna (2002) the presence of such 
an agent is essential for converting “collective action into collective achievement” 
(pg 165), which is what I find to be the case in connected villages. Ironically, the 
patrons’ motivation for assisting his clients in an activity that could possibly have 
weakened his level of control was his desire to maintain the integrity of the 
hierarchical network and thus his level of control. 
 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 1 briefly looks at 
the literature on collective action, highlighting how the environment in which 
citizens try to mobilize has a significant impact not only on their ability to 
successfully engage in collective action, but also on the scope of the projects that 
they can undertake. The section then explores the role that clientelist networks 
play in the peasants’ decision to engage in collective action, focusing particularly 
on the effect of a strong patron within an isolated village economy. Finally, it 
analyses the change in this relationship when peasants get access to outside 
markets. Section 2 looks at data from the four different types of villages to 
illustrate the effect connectivity has had on peasants’ ability to successfully 
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undertake collective action projects, even when they reside in villages dominated 
by a large patron. Section 3 concludes.  
 
1. Collective Action in Context 
 
Collective action is the ability of citizens to come together for activities believed 
to be in their common interest. Prior to Olson’s (1971) work it was generally 
believed that in the presence of common interests, groups would form to take 
advantage of these benefits. Olson (1971) challenged this idea by arguing that 
rational individuals had an incentive to free-ride on other peoples’ efforts so as to 
minimise the costs to themselves while still enjoying the benefits. This implied 
that collective action would almost always fail.1 Although this argument was 
widely accepted, as mentioned before, countless laboratory findings have since 
documented that collective action succeeds far more often than Olson’s theory 
predicts (see for example Camerer 2003, Ostrom and Walker 2005, Ostrom 2000, 
Cardenas and Ostrom 2004). For instance, Olson’s assumption that individuals 
make their decisions relatively insulated from social relations is contradicted by 
laboratory experiments finding increased chances of successful collective action 
when people engage in face-to-face interaction (Ostrom and Walker 2005) and 
that an individual’s decision to free-ride is significantly affected by his perception 
of the other participants’ trustworthiness (Ostrom and Ahn 2009). These are but a 
few of the experimental results which indicate that in order to investigate the 
dynamics of collective action more carefully we need to move beyond the 
restrictive assumptions of Olson and understand how individuals’ preferences and 
motives are shaped by their social context (Ostrom 2000).  
 
                                                 
1 The only exceptions were when the group size was small enough to make free riding observable 
or when individuals received some selective benefits from participation, which were not extended 
to non-participants. 
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1.1 Collective Action Based on Horizontal Networks 
When investigating the chances and types of collective action among peasants in 
developing countries, it may therefore be useful taking into account that village 
communities are often characterised by strong ties between individuals of 
relatively similar backgrounds - such as kinship groups or families (see for 
example Ahmed 1972, Epstein 1962, Cheema and Mohmand 2004). These 
networks build on what the social capital literature has referred to as bonding 
social capital (Gittell and Vidal 1998; see generally Putnam 2000). Due to their 
ability to transmit information effectively, they are able to curtail the collective 
action problem by making free-riding visible. This provides a strong incentive to 
participate in collective action, as not doing so could lead to sanctions – some as 
strong as social ostracization (Svendsen and Svendsen 2004). However, the 
potential of relying on such networks for collective action may be fairly limited 
for two reasons. Firstly, ties between people of relatively similar backgrounds 
leads to little diversity, particularly amongst the poor who have few resources to 
bring to the network. So, while the poor in developing countries may have 
extensive social ties amongst members of their kinship groups or families, this 
rarely enables them to improve their well-being, as members of such networks 
often lack sufficient skills and resources (Szreter 2002, Putnam 2000). As argued 
by Granovetter (1983), strong social ties can have the disadvantage of being 
closed to outside information regarding new opportunities, thus hampering 
innovation and effectiveness when engaging in collective action. Secondly, the 
ability of such networks to engage in successful collective action would be 
confined to projects whose benefits are restricted to group members only. For 
projects with benefits spilling over to other communities, the free riding problem 
arises once again.  
 
Hence, for activities which require higher levels of resources and skills, and 
whose benefits spill over to other groups, collaboration needs to span across 
communities. It needs to build on bridging social capital, i.e. relationships and 
cooperation between, rather than just within, communities (Gittell and Vidal 
1998; see generally Putnam 2000). For instance, rather than relying on a specific 
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kinship group or family, collaboration would have to involve several groups. 
While relying on relatively weak ties – such as belonging to the same village - this 
form of cooperation enables individuals to enjoy access to varied skills, resources, 
connections and information (Granovetter 1983). It typically takes place in 
societies where individuals of different background are able to signal their 
trustworthiness so as to sustain cooperation (Grief et al. 1994, Janssen 2006). 
Once established, such cross-collaboration can allow members to draw on a wide 
range of resources to successfully engage in relatively challenging forms of 
collective action (see for example Wade 1988, Krishna 2002, Baker 2005, Grief et 
al. 1994).2  
 
But despite spanning communities, bridging social capital is still a horizontal 
network established between members with relatively equal levels of power 
(Halpern 2005). In societies with strong hierarchical networks, collective action 
would have to take into account asymmetric power relations and the impact they 
have on the effectiveness of horizontal networks. The insights on how bonding 
and bridging social capital can facilitate and sustain collective action, therefore 
need to be complemented with an understanding of relationships between 
members of unequal status - such as patron-client networks – and how they 
interact and/or influence horizontal networks. Unfortunately, few have 
investigated the dynamics of collective action under hierarchical networks in 
much detail, and, as I will argue below, those that have, tend to treat patron-client 
networks as homogenous relationships independent of time and place, leading to 
somewhat simplified conclusions.  
 
1.2 Collective Action Under Hierarchical Networks 
 
The literature on patron-client relationships, as surveyed in Chapter 1, firmly 
establishes how the patron tries his best to maintain control over the clients and 
                                                 
2 Naturally, the existence of bridging social capital does not preclude individuals from also relying 
on their bonding networks, and Krishna (2002) finds that societies often rely on both types of 
social capital to engage in various types of collective action projects. 
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thus ensure their dependence on him. Hence it is not surprising that those 
contributions that have dealt with peasant collective action under patron-client 
networks have been rather pessimistic. First of all, Putnam (1993) makes the 
somewhat intuitive point that collective action between actors in an asymmetrical 
power relationship – i.e. between the landlord and the peasant - is severely 
hampered by the fact that sanctioning the powerful is difficult.3 Secondly, and 
more important for my purposes, several contributions have noted that 
hierarchical networks may also preclude collective action amongst the horizontal 
networks that co-exist alongside it, i.e. collective action among peasants 
themselves (Putnam 1993, Popkin 1979). In order to sustain his bargaining power, 
the patron is here argued to minimize his clients’ horizontal networks (Popkin 
1979), whether through the use of violence, privileged access to state resources, or 
his ability to manipulate ties and monopolistic control over village resources 
(Putnam 1993, Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984, Roniger 1990, Scott 1972, Holzner 
2004). Following from this argument, it is conjectured that participation in 
clientelist networks would significantly decrease the amount of collective action 
peasants engage in, irrespective of the purpose.  
 
Furthermore, besides explicitly blocking collective action, the patron-client 
network also has an adverse effect on peasants’ ability to engage in collective 
action due to the strain the network places on peasants’ horizontal relationships. 
This happens due to two reasons. Firstly, the fact that peasants can potentially 
ostracize a fellow peasant on the demands of the patron, as was seen in Chapter 3, 
should limit the scope of horizontal networks as peasants can no longer rely on 
each other for support when sanctioned by the patron. Such threats are also likely 
to minimise the level of trust and cooperation within a rural community, both of 
which are seen as integral for collective action (Putnam 1993, Svendsen and 
Svendsen 2004, Ostrom and Ahn 2009). Secondly, clientelist networks require 
peasants to compete against one another for the patron’s limited resources in order 
                                                 
3 While not central to the literature on social capital, cooperation of this kind has occasionally been 
referred to as linking social capital, i.e. relationships and cooperation between individuals of 
unequal power (Woolcock 2001).  
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to fulfil their basic needs, once again possibly lowering their level of trust and 
cooperation (Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984). Combined, the effect is then to reduce 
both the scope and the cohesion of the network, which should significantly limit 
its ability to overcome the collective action problem. For this reason as well, the 
literature predicts low levels of collective action in a patron-client network.4  
 
However, this conclusion is based on the key assumption that clients have limited, 
if any, exit options resulting in them being firmly tied to the local patron. For 
instance, Southern Italy, which was one of Putnam’s (1993) case studies, was 
found to be isolated from the centre of the country due to the absence of road 
networks and any market centre located near the hinterlands (Eisenstadt and 
Roniger 1984). As a result peasants had no option but to approach the landed 
nobility to satisfy their needs. The question is, however, what happens when you 
change the environmental setting by exposing villages to the external market? 
 
1.3 Connectivity, Patron-Client Networks and Collective Action 
The ability of the patron to exert high levels of control over his clients is 
dependent largely on peasants having few alternative options to the patron to 
satisfy their needs. As has been argued in the last four chapters, both theoretically 
and with the help of empirical results, neither inequality nor isolation is sufficient 
in and of themselves to create an environment that allows patrons to control their 
clients’ activities. Rather it is the combined effect of the two that creates a 
monopolist/monopsonist patron (Bhaduri 1977) with the ability, among other 
things, to interfere with peasants’ independent relationships (Basu 1986, see also 
Chapter 3). This was particularly evident from the results in Chapter 3 where we 
saw that when exposed to the external economy patrons were no longer found to 
interfere with peasants’ independent relationships. Moreover, as stipulated in 
Chapter 2 the presence of external options should also take away some of the 
                                                 
4 Studies that do find collective action to emerge under clientelist networks document them as 
being conflictual (see Auyero et al. 2009 for an overview of this literature on social movements). 
However, Auyero himself argues that patron-client networks and contentious collective action 
need not always be in conflict. 
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pressure peasants face when competing for the patrons resources in isolated 
economies. Therefore, provided peasants have access to alternative options, 
clientelist networks – even those where the patron owns most village resources – 
should not necessarily weaken peasants’ horizontal networks nor should they 
necessarily be able to interfere with clients’ independent decision to engage in 
collective action. Hence, we need to look at the context in which patron-client 
networks exist in order to understand whether they are detrimental to collective 
action amongst peasants’ horizontal networks. By focusing on the connectivity of 
the network, this adds yet another level to our anticipation of the chances and 
types of collective action in the patron-client context, as illustrated in the last cell 
of Table 1. 
Table 1: Collective action under horizontal and hierarchical networks 
 Collective action among peasants 
Horizontal 
networks 
Based on bonding 
social capital 
Limited to projects whose benefits can be 
restricted to the community. 
Based on bridging 
social capital 
Extensive and varied. 
Hierarchical 
networks 
Isolated 
Fairly limited as the patron should block 
it. 
Not isolated 
Has the potential for being extensive and 
varied. 
 
However, before continuing to the empirical analysis, it is worth highlighting an 
important finding of Krishna (2002) from his study of collective action in 69 
villages in India. He argues that collective action, if conducted without direction, 
need not always result in increased benefits for the peasants. In the wide array of 
villages that he visited he found that, while collective action was widespread, the 
benefits it extended were relatively limited. He found that villages which were 
successful in their collective endeavours were those that had a number of educated 
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but unemployed young individuals who assisted villagers with various activities, 
and thus gave competition to old patrons for their clientelist following. Due to 
their education and the increased awareness that came with it, these new 
agents/leaders were able to channel peasants’ collective action in a direction that 
increased its chances of success. Villages that lacked such agents, he found, did 
not see very high returns from their collective activities. Hence, he highlights how 
having the ability to engage in collective action is not the same as having the 
ability to successfully provide collective goods and services. In order to convert 
the former into something successful villagers need a leader who can steer their 
efforts towards beneficial directions. Thus the empirical section also explores 
whether villages, where peasants have the freedom to engage in collective action, 
are able to nurture individuals who could act as leaders/agents in peasants’ 
collective endeavours. Interestingly the village studies reveal that, as was 
mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, in connected villages patrons were 
playing such a role. Instead of being passive bystanders, these patrons were found 
to actively assist their clients by offering moral support, advice and financial 
assistance, thus increasing the chances of these projects being successful.  
2. Empirical Analysis5 
 
2.2. Levels of Collective Action 
Walking around the isolated landlord dominated villages it was hard to miss the 
low levels of public goods provision. Most neighbourhoods had muddy streets, 
soiled with household waste due to the absence of functioning drains.6 As Chapter 
4 documents, peasants there had the lowest levels of public investment out of all 
the villages visited. But while they thereby had the highest need to engage in 
collective action for the purpose of self provision, few households had ever done 
so. This was perplexing, at first, as equally poor and equally isolated households 
in peasant based villages were much more active in working together to self-
                                                 
5 All interviews were in Urdu and have been translated by the author. 
6 This waste, besides making it important to pay close attention to where one placed one’s next 
step, resulted in a significant increase in insects in the area. 
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provide (see also below), despite the fact that they actually had high levels of state 
provision to begin with (see again Chapter 4, Figure 1). 
 
The reason for low levels of community based projects in isolated landlord 
dominated villages, as explained by my key respondents, was that the landlords 
greatly ‘frowned’ upon such activities, and asked peasants to approach them 
instead if they had a problem.7The villagers were extremely cautious when talking 
about the landlord. They always started off by saying that he is our elder and the 
head of the village and that they are extremely grateful for the mercy he shows 
them. Thus disobeying him was not an exercisable option. As demonstrated in 
Chapter 3, inequality combined with isolation, deeply entrenched the peasants’ 
dependence on the patron, as he was not only the main provider of employment 
but also the main source of credit, housing, dispute resolution and access to the 
local politician. This empowered him to make high demands of his clients, one 
being to restrict their collective action. As one household noted, “The landlord is 
our village head, our elder,8 and the protector of our children. If he tells us not to 
try and fix things ourselves, how can we possibly defy him?”9 Households were 
perfectly aware that given the isolated nature of their village, they would be 
excluded from the village economy and community if they went against the 
wishes of their landlord. “Where would we go if we defied him?” 10 one household 
responded when I questioned why they so willingly obeyed the landlord’s wishes, 
while another asked, “How would we feed our children if he cuts us off?”11  
 
The threat from the landlords however, was not always implicit. In response to 
peasants trying to provide irrigation channels with the help of an NGO in one of 
the two landlord dominated villages, the landlord had gone as far as to threaten 
                                                 
7 Key Respondent 3, interview, isolated landlord dominated village 1, 13 May, 2008. 
Household ID 45, interview, isolated landlord dominated village 1, 16 May, 2008.  
Key Respondent 9, interview, isolated landlord dominated village 2, 21 May, 2008. 
8 Being an elder in Pakistani culture commands a high level of respect and authority. 
9Household ID 42, interview, isolated landlord dominated village 1, 16 May, 2008.  
10 Household ID 45, interview, isolated landlord dominated village 1, 16 May, 2008. 
11 Household ID 286, interview, isolated landlord dominated village 2, 24 May, 2008. 
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with violence any household that assisted in these activities.12 Not surprisingly, he 
himself denied ever doing such a thing: 
 
“I have never stopped the villagers from engaging in collective 
action. But you must understand that these are poor people who 
are unable to fulfil their own needs. Also they are not educated 
people like you and me. They don’t know how to provide 
themselves with the things they need. That is why I tell them that 
they should come to me and not try to self-provide.”13 
 
His ‘belief’ that uneducated people cannot engage in collective action was clearly 
misguided, as poor uneducated households in all other types of villages were 
found to have no difficulties engaging in community based projects. Moreover, as 
was acknowledged by the patron in one of the landlord dominated villages close 
to the road “Being uneducated does not mean that the villagers are unaware of 
their needs and how to go about fulfilling them.” 14 Nonetheless, for the sake of 
argument, I asked him whether he was available to village peasants, given that he 
had told them to come to him instead: “They are like my children15, I’ve told 
them, my door is always open and they can come to me whenever they need 
anything.”16 The peasants, however, saw things differently. During my field trips 
to this village, I myself observed how they tried to reach the landlord by loitering 
outside his main gate in the hope of talking to him. When his car pulled out of the 
driveway they swarmed around it, trying to catch his attention, but not once did he 
roll down his window to talk to them. The only time peasants in the isolated 
landlord dominated villages could reach their respective patrons was when they 
held ‘court’ a few times a month.17 But despite their inability to communicate 
                                                 
12 Key Respondent 10, interview, isolated landlord dominated village 2, 21 May, 2008. 
13 Landlord 2, interview, isolated landlord dominated village 2, 24 May, 2008. I have kept the 
landlord anonymous to protect my key respondent’s identity. 
14 Landlord 1, interview, connected landlord dominated village 1, 3 May 2008. 
15 This was said in a very patronizing tone. 
16 Landlord 2, interview, isolated landlord dominated village 2, 24 May, 2008. 
17 Key Respondent 2, interview, isolated landlord dominated village 1, 13 May, 2008. 
Household interviews, isolated landlord dominated village 1, 16 May 2008. 
Key Respondent 10, interview, isolated landlord dominated village 2, 21 May, 2008. 
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their needs, the patrons’ monopoly over village resources meant that peasants 
found it ‘cheaper’ to simply refrain from engaging in collective action: fixing or 
providing a public good might be important for a household, but not important 
enough to risk being punished or ostracised by the all powerful landlord. The end 
result was a gross under-provision of public goods – not just drains and paved 
streets but also tapped water, health facilities, schooling, street lighting, etc.  
 
The situation in landlord dominated villages close to the road was starkly 
different. Despite having higher levels of public investment, a large number of 
household reported engaging in collective action for the purpose of self provision 
(the details of these projects are given in Section 2.3 below). And unlike the 
isolated landlord dominated villages, peasants faced no constraints from their 
patrons when trying to undertake such activities. Given that peasants had access to 
alternative employment opportunities, both within the village and outside of it 
(see again Table 1), even though these patrons controlled most of the resources in 
their respective villages, they were by no means monopolists/monopsonists. 
Therefore, they had limited ability to interfere with their clients’ independent 
activities. Hence in contrast to peasants in isolated landlord dominated villages, 
who spoke of an alliance driven out of necessity and desperation to fulfil their 
basic needs,18 peasants in connected villages engaged in the clientelist relationship 
because they found it beneficial. This was evident from peasants’ responses when 
asked why they considered the landlord their patron: “He provides for our needs,” 
19 was a typical response close to the road, or “he listens to us and does good work 
around the village,” 20 or simply “he is a good person”.21  
 
                                                                                                                                     
Household interviews, isolated landlord dominated village 2, 24 May 2008. 
18 Household ID 37 and 45, interview, isolated landlord dominated village 1, 16 May, 2008. 
Household ID 286, interview, isolated landlord dominated village 2, 24 May, 2008. 
19 Household ID 249, interview, connected landlord dominated village 1, 3 May, 2008. 
20 Household ID 396, 393 and 407, interview, connected landlord dominated village 2, 23 May, 
2008. 
21 Household ID 281 and 284, interview, connected landlord dominated village 1, 3 May, 2008. 
Household ID 386 and 411, interview, connected landlord dominated village 2, 23 May, 2008. 
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The patrons’ responsiveness to their clients was evident from their general 
availability. In one of the villages, this was easily observable as the landlord was 
often seen walking around the village socialising with the peasants - something 
interviews confirmed was not unusual22 – and in the other peasants said that if the 
need arose they could always reach the landlord through his manager (he did not 
himself reside in the village). Furthermore, in contrast to patrons in isolated 
landlord dominated villages, patrons, instead of blocking their clients’ collective 
activities, were actually reported to have assisted in them. I was informed that the 
landlords often came to see how the projects were progressing, and occasionally 
assisted financially or by giving management advice. 23 In fact, in an interview 
with one of the local school teachers I was told that the patron in his village had 
given peasants the idea for various projects they could undertake, and encouraged 
peasants from all biraderies to come and assist in these activities.24 During field-
work my surveyors and I heard many similar stories. Some households reported 
their patron “gave us money to buy the materials we needed”,25 and others talked 
about how “he visited the site to see how the project was going.”26 Thus in 
contrast with Popkin’s (1979) expectation, large patrons in villages closer to the 
road were therefore not blocking their clients’ collective activities. On the 
contrary, in these villages, the hierarchical bonds between peasants and landlords 
actually appeared to be working in the peasants’ favour, as it gave them access to 
additional resources and expertise.  
 
The landlords’ incentives to assist the peasants were arguably two-fold. Firstly, 
since connectivity altered the relative value of the goods and services exchanged, 
patrons had to offer more in the relationship in order to still have access to most of 
the services provided by the peasants (labour, political backing, etc.). As the local 
                                                 
22 Key Respondent 6, interview, connected landlord dominated village 1, 3 May, 2008.  
23 Key Respondent 1, interview, connected landlord dominated village 1, 30 April, 2008.  
Key Respondent 5, interview, connected landlord dominated village 2, 20 April, 2008.  
See also household interviews later. 
24 Key Respondent 1, interview, connected landlord dominated village 1, 30 April, 2008.  
Household ID 369, interview, connected landlord dominated village 2, 23 May, 2008. 
25 Household ID 393, interview, connected landlord dominated village 2, 23 May, 2008.  
26 Household ID 264, interview, connected landlord dominated village 1, 3 May, 2008.  
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school teacher in one of the villages told me, “he helps us in our collective 
activities because he wants our votes. If he does not help the community get 
collective goods he would not be able to attain our political support.”27 The 
feeling that they had something to give in the relationship was also expressed by 
the households in their survey interviews, as households asserted that now they 
had options other than the patron and unless the exchange with him was beneficial 
they would not hesitate to pursue those other options.28 Therefore, in order to 
sustain the desired balance of exchange, the patrons facilitated collective action 
for the public goods that they were unable to broker through the local politician.29 
As stated by one of the patrons in an interview: 
 
“If I treat them well and help them in their collective 
activities, they will be more inclined to help me if I ever need 
anything. And while I do not really need their help, they do 
assist me in my fields during harvesting and sowing season. 
Also during elections the peasants are more likely to align 
with me politically if I help provide them with the goods and 
services they need.”30 
 
Secondly, since the landlords were no longer able to stop collective action – an 
activity that Popkin (1979) argues may be used by peasants against them – joining 
it instead could subdue any collective resentment that might arise against them.31 
Thus the change in the patrons’ incentive structure, as brought about by 
connectivity, meant that peasants actually relied on the hierarchical patron-client 
network to assist them in their collective activities. This will become even clearer 
as we look at the character of the collective projects below.  
                                                 
27 Key Respondent 1, interview, connected landlord dominated village 1, 30 April, 2008.  
28 This was particularly true when talking to the younger generation in the household. 
Household ID 258 and 266, interview, connected landlord dominated village 1, 3 May, 2008. 
Household ID 381, interview, connected landlord dominated village 2, 23 May, 2008. 
29 While public provision in landlord dominated villages close to the road was relatively high, it 
was still not universal (Chapter 4, Figure 1). 
30 Landlord 1, interview, connected landlord dominated village 1, 3 May 2008. 
31 It can be agreed that people are less likely to resent someone trying to assist them in providing 
for their needs. 
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But first let us end this section by turning to peasant based villages. As alluded to 
earlier, collective action levels were here fairly high, both close to and far from 
the road. In peasant based villages dispersed land ownership had led to the 
establishment of multiple patrons, each having to compete against one another for 
the peasants’ services and cliental support. Such competition worked in the 
peasants’ favour by providing them with alternative options to their patron for 
satisfying their needs – the alternative being to join another patron’s network. 
These options significantly curtailed any single patron’s ability to interfere with 
his clients’ independent relationships. Moreover, competition meant that, similar 
to connected villages, peasants only chose to stay with their respective patron 
because they received certain benefits. This came out quite clearly in their 
responses as to why they considered someone their patron. These ranged from 
him catering to their needs32 to having certain personality traits they found 
attractive – such as being a good leader and/or being a good person.33 Given the 
competition amongst patrons in connected as well as isolated villages, it is not 
surprising then that patrons in both types of peasant based villages were found to 
assist their clients in their collective activities by giving either financial support or 
offering advice and/or their expertise.34 It appears, therefore, that the effect of 
connectivity has been to change patrons’ behaviour in landlord dominated villages 
so as to resemble patrons in the relatively egalitarian peasant based villages. This 
is shown clearly in Figure 1 below.  
 
While only 25% of households engaged in collective action in isolated landlord 
dominated villages, 40% did so in similar tenured villages when situated close to 
the road. This difference is significant at the 5% level. Moreover, once connected 
to the external market, the levels of collective action in landlord dominated and 
peasant based villages tend to converge as the difference between the two is 
                                                 
32Household ID 162 and 164, interview, isolated peasant based village 2, 10 May, 2008. 
33 Household ID 211, interview, isolated peasant based village 1, 9 May, 2008. 
Household ID 144 and 193, interview, isolated peasant based village 2, 10 May, 2008. 
34 Household ID 135, interview, isolated peasant based village 2, 10 May, 2008. 
Household ID 216, interview, isolated peasant based village 1, 9 May, 2008. 
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insignificant. Lastly, the quantitative data support the findings of field interviews 
that even when isolated, households in peasant based villages faced few hurdles 
towards their collective activities, as the difference in levels of collective action in 
isolated and connected peasant based villages is insignificant. 
 
Figure 1: Has the household ever engaged in collective action? 
 
 
However, Figure 1 does raise the question that, given the level of control enjoyed 
by patrons in isolated landlord dominated villages, how did 25% of households 
still manage to engage in collective action? The explanation, perhaps, could lie in 
the types of projects these households engaged in, particularly if they differed in 
nature and substance from those undertaken in other villages. 
 
2.3. Types of Collective Action 
The household projects undertaken in the villages can be broadly divided into two 
types; neighbourhood and village level projects. Neighbourhood level projects 
were small-scale activities, such as paving streets and building or repairing drains. 
These projects typically involved people from the same biradery coming together, 
as biraderies tended to cluster around the same area in the villages, thus making 
use of bonding social capital. Village level projects, on the other hand, involved 
activities such as repairing the wall around the mosque or the school building, 
cleaning the village water well, repairing the village transformer station, and so 
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forth. These were projects whose benefits extended to most households in the 
village and thus required peasants from different biraderies coming together, 
making use of bridging social capital. 
 
Of the 25% of households who engaged in collective action in landlord dominated 
villages, around half were involved in projects meant to provide themselves with 
functioning drains and paved streets.35 The scale of these projects was so small 
that they were unlikely to provide peasants with the critical mass needed to 
collectively bargain with the landlord. Moreover, while the projects may have 
resulted in stronger bonding social capital amongst the poorest communities, this 
did not necessarily threaten the landlords’ control as it is questionable how much 
these communities can achieve, even in a group.36 Therefore the landlords had 
little incentive to invest time and energy in blocking such activities on the part of 
their clients. But despite households having engaged in these community driven 
projects my surveyors and I observed that most lacked the goods they had set out 
to provide, indicating that their attempts to self-provide had failed. Nonetheless, 
these households did not feel they could communicate their needs to the landlord, 
as they felt that their poverty made them irrelevant in their patrons’ eyes;37 “He 
(the patron) would never listen to us as we are too poor. No one cares about the 
poor.”38 As a result they continued to live with muddy and soiled streets.  
 
The other main projects undertaken in isolated landlord based villages were 
village level projects, which required peasants from different biraderies to come 
together. Such type of collective action should be threatening to the landlords’ 
control and thus we would have expected the patrons to have blocked them. 
However, the ability of households to engage in such projects probably stemmed 
from the specific nature of the projects themselves. Only two village level projects 
were undertaken by these peasants: repairing the mosque wall and the wall around 
                                                 
35 These were made using materials readily available in the villages so as to keep costs very low. 
36 In isolated landlord dominated villages households are unlikely to withhold their labour from the 
landlord as they have few alternatives available in the economy. Thus there are no real sanctions 
the group can impose on the landlord. 
37 Household ID 39 and 46, interview, isolated landlord dominated village 1, 16 May, 2008. 
38 Household ID 46, interview, isolated landlord dominated village 1, 16 May, 2008. 
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the school premises. In Muslim societies repairing a mosque is considered a holy 
activity, which was evident from the pride households expressed in having 
provided their assistance. Refusing the maulvis’ request for their help, the 
households reported, would have been a sin as it was part of their religious duty.39 
So if the landlords tried to bar peasants from engaging in such projects, they 
would be branded as un-Islamic and thus stand to lose their legitimacy very 
quickly. Although working on the school wall was not considered a holy activity, 
it did involve providing the children of the village with a safer environment to 
study in, which again would be difficult for patrons to try and stop. 
 
In landlord dominated villages close to the road, the households who engaged in 
collective action were also equally split between undertaking small scale 
neighbourhood level projects and more elaborate village level ones. But not only 
was the scope of the projects much wider in these villages, their success rate was 
also much higher. Starting with neighbourhood level projects, most households 
engaging in these activities reported having done so with the assistance of the 
local patron. They mentioned how the patron would visit the site while they were 
working40 and would at times offer advice on how to do things better41 or would 
offer his financial or moral support (see also above).42 Also, unlike their isolated 
counter-parts, these peasants were much more successful in their collective 
endeavours – possibly due to their access to greater resources and expertise.43 
Furthermore, village level projects here were much more extensive than those in 
isolated landlord dominated villages. Households reported not only assisting with 
the maintenance of the school and the mosque, but also repairing the village 
transformer station, assisting in dispute resolutions, working on the provision of 
irrigation channels and mending the graveyard wall. And again all these activities 
                                                 
39 Household ID 63, interview, isolated landlord dominated village 1, 16 May, 2008. 
Household ID 323, interview, isolated landlord dominated village 2, 24 May, 2008. 
40 Household ID 247 and 284, interview, connected landlord dominated village 1, 3 May, 2008. 
41 Household ID 249, interview, connected landlord dominated village 1, 3 May, 2008. 
42 Household ID 266, interview, connected landlord dominated village 1, 3 May, 2008. 
 Household ID 419, interview, connected landlord dominated village 2, 23 May, 2008. 
43 The success was easily observable from them having better functioning drains and well paved 
streets. 
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were undertaken with the support and assistance of their respective landlords. In 
fact, the patron was actually reported to have given the idea for some of the 
projects the households undertook. “Given that the graveyard wall was about to 
break our landlord suggested that we all come together and rebuild it. He said he 
would help us, which he did by giving us the materials and advice.”44 Moreover, 
the patron was also reported to have given the idea to households to repair the 
transformer station, and again provided a substantial portion of the funding.45  
 
Turning to isolated peasant based villages, most households here were found to be 
engaged in village level projects rather than neighbourhood ones. The explanation 
for this lies in the high levels of state provision in these villages, as illustrated in 
Chapter 4, resulting in most peasants having no need to engage in neighbourhood 
level projects. Still the few households that did undertake such activities were 
found to be more successful than those in equally isolated landlord dominated 
village, as patrons in peasant based villages assisted in the projects. In fact as 
reported by one household “in order to ensure that we (the neighbourhood) were 
able to get functioning drains quickly he (the patron) sent some of his own 
workers to help us.”46 Village level projects included fixing the transformer, 
cleaning the village water wells47, maintaining the school and mosque, setting up 
a welfare committee and so forth. As with landlord dominated villages close to the 
road, patrons not only threw their full support behind their clients’ collective 
activities, but also initiated some of the projects by giving households the idea. 
For instance, in one of the two isolated peasant based villages the patrons had 
suggested that households with medical training set up a first aid centre, as the 
government basic health unit was located in another village. The peasants, of 
course, were very grateful for this initiative Thanks to his (the patron’s) idea we 
now have some place close we can go if our kids get hurt or fall ill.”48  
 
                                                 
44 Household ID 401, interview, connected landlord dominated village 2, 23 May, 2008. 
45 Key Respondent 5, interview, connected landlord dominated village 2, 20 May, 2008. 
46 Household ID 135, interview, isolated peasant based village 2, 10 May, 2008. 
47 These are communal wells that everyone uses to extract drinking water from.  
48 Household ID 216, interview, isolated peasant based village, 9 May, 2008. 
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Once connected to the motorway little changed in peasant based villages in terms 
of the variety of village level projects undertaken by households. However, as 
these peasants did not have as high a level of state provision, when compared to 
their isolated counter-parts, considerable focus was placed on neighbourhood 
level projects. Peasants talked about how their respective patrons encouraged 
them to build and maintain their own streets and drains and assisted them in these 
activities by providing funds and expertise.49 With the added help from their 
patrons, it is no surprise that a large number of these projects were successful at 
providing peasants with functioning neighbourhood level public goods.  
 
All in all, it is therefore clear that while a quarter of households in isolated 
landlord dominated villages did engage in collective action, the scope and relative 
success rates of these projects were limited when compared to the activities of 
peasants in all other types of villages visited. Isolation combined with inequality 
meant that patrons were assured of their peasants’ clientelist support. They 
therefore did not have to assist their clients’ collective projects, and could even 
block them at will.  
 
The analysis so far has compared peasants’ experiences with collective action 
across the different types of villages. Before concluding the chapter it is worth 
investigating who within isolated landlord dominated villages was engaging in 
collective action and who within the villages benefitted from connectivity? 
Following our discussion in Section 1.2, we would expect some variation in the 
peasants’ relationship with their patron depending on their economic status. 
Landless households, due to their extreme dependence on the patron, should find 
the impact of ‘authoritarian clientelism’ much more constraining when compared 
to land owning households. Hence, despite both types of households being in a 
hierarchical relationship in landlord based villages, we would expect systematic 
differences in their levels, types, and success in collective action activities.  
 
                                                 
49 Household ID 81 and 120, interview, connected peasant based village 1, 2 May, 2008. 
Household ID 344 and 374, interview, isolated peasant based village 2, 10 May, 2008.  
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2.4. Collective Action, Connectivity, and the Landless 
In isolated landlord dominated villages, there was a clear distinction between the 
types of projects undertaken by land owning and landless households. While the 
land owning households were more inclined towards village level projects, the 
landless were much more likely to engage in small scale neighbourhood level 
projects. However, the limited resources of the landless meant that they failed 
entirely to provide themselves with functioning public goods (Table 3 below). 
This could give some weight to one of the patrons’ argument that poverty made 
peasants unable to provide themselves with public goods (see above). This is 
further strengthened by the fact that the land owning households undertaking 
neighbourhood level projects had significantly higher success rates. However, the 
experience of landless households, just a few kilometres away, in landlord 
dominated villages close to the road, causes us to question whether it was poverty 
that limited peasants from gaining access to public goods through community 
driven projects. As can be seen from Table 2, equally landless households in 
connected villages were much more successful in such activities. The difference 
between the experiences of isolated and connected landless households could lie 
in the role their patron played in their collective activities. While in isolated 
landlord dominated villages the patron blocked such activities, as mentioned 
above, in connected villages the patron assisted the landless,50 with two of five 
projects being successful. Thus while poverty may have been a limiting factor for 
collective action as it restricted peasants’ access to the needed resources, the 
experience of households close to the road illustrates that it can be overcome. 
Besides giving money, the patron also gave these peasants direction and 
leadership, thus steering peasants’ collective activities in a direction that would 
make them more mutually beneficial for the village society. 
 
 
 
                                                 
50 Most landless households spoke of their patron offering them advice and support, and some also 
reported him helping them with buying the materials needed (Interviews household ID 238, 284, 
247, 417). 
171 
 
Table 2: Success rate of neighbourhood level projects in landlord dominated 
villages 
  Land owning households  Landless households 
Close to the 
road 
43% 40% 
Far from the 
road 
75% 0% 
 
Lastly, we turn to village level projects, which in isolated villages were mostly 
undertaken by land owning households. This further explains why the patrons did 
not block these projects, as they had less control over these households’ activities. 
In landlord dominated villages close to the road, these projects were also mostly 
undertaken by land owning households, but with a strong presence of landless 
households as well (see Figure 2 below). Interestingly, some of the village level 
projects undertaken by landless households were those which were initiated by 
their patron – for example, that of the village transformer station51 – and thus they 
were encouraged by him to come and participate.  
 
                                                 
51 Household ID 398, interview, connected landlord dominated village 2, 23 May, 2008.  
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Figure 2: Collective action amongst landless and land owning households 
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The differences in the experiences of landless and land owning households is also 
supported by the quantitative survey data. In isolated villages land owning 
households were much more inclined towards village level projects while the 
landless tended to focus on neighbourhood level projects. The difference is 
statistically significant at the 5% level. However, once connected to the 
motorway, households’ economic status no longer had a significant impact on the 
type of project they engaged in. Not only were landless households more actively 
involved in community driven projects in villages close to the road, the scope of 
their activities was also much wider. Thus it appears that the beneficial impact of 
connectivity is felt most strongly by the landless – and thus poorest - households 
in the village economy. Hence, while field interviews highlighted the patrons’ role 
in collective action in villages close to and far from the road, and the impact that 
had on projects’ chances of success, the quantitative data illustrates the 
convergence taking place between households of different economic status in 
terms of the nature and scope of collective projects they can take part in. The 
implication is encouraging: the poorest has most to gain from reducing the 
isolation of rural villages.  
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3. Conclusion 
 
According to standard social science theory, collective action should be severely 
restricted in the presence of strong hierarchical networks. In rural developing 
economies in particular, patron-client networks should prevent peasants from 
engaging in community based projects. This chapter has argued, however, that 
such predictions may be overly simplistic by failing to consider the social and 
economic contexts in which patron-client networks exist. Rather than being 
homogenous, such networks are largely dependent on the environment in which 
they are nurtured. Thus, as highlighted in the empirical section, hierarchical bonds 
need not always be detrimental to peasants’ ability to engage in collective action. 
In fact, under certain circumstances these bonds were shown to be an added 
source from which peasants could draw expertise and financial assistance so as to 
ensure the successful completion of community driven projects.  
 
In particular, peasants in strong patron-client networks were much more likely to 
engage in successful and varied types of collective projects when they were 
connected to the outside economy. Unlike the ‘authoritarian clientelism’ in 
isolated rural villages, their exposure to new opportunities significantly improved 
peasants’ bargaining power vis-à-vis their landlords. This, in turn, made them just 
as likely to engage in community driven projects as peasants in peasant based 
villages with less strong hierarchical bonds. In fact, in environments where 
peasants had higher bargaining power, landlords were reported to have initiated 
and assisted their clients in many community driven projects, as a way of 
maintaining the integrity of the patron-client network. In such environments, 
patrons were found to play the role of a leader in peasants’ collective activities 
which, according to Krishna (2002), is a main determinant of how successful 
these projects will be.  
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It therefore appears that, while inequality naturally defines the nature of 
clientelism, it may only be truly detrimental to peasants’ welfare when interacted 
with isolation, making the landlord a monopolist/monopsonist. Moreover, while 
evidence from field interviews and quantitative data highlighted an overall 
increase in the level of collective action in landlord dominated villages, it also 
indicated that the beneficial impact of connectivity was felt most strongly by 
landless households. Once connected to the external economy, households’ 
economic status became irrelevant for the types of projects that they engaged in 
and their relative levels of success.  
 
While isolation enabled large landlords to make demands on their clients, which 
were found to be detrimental to peasants’ welfare, connectivity has helped curtail 
such behaviour. Even though patrons in connected villages continue to control 
most of the village resources, they are no longer able to force peasants into 
submission, as the availability of exit options enables peasants to satisfy their 
needs in the market if the patron cuts them off. In fact, not only were patrons in 
connected villages unable to exploit their clients, they actually had to cater for 
their needs to ensure that the benefits that the peasants derived from interacting in 
the clientelist network exceeded, or were at least at par with, the benefits of 
engaging with the external market. This change was evident both from patrons 
trying to increase their clients’ access to public goods – either by brokering them 
from the local politician (as in Chapter 4), or by providing monetary and advisory 
assistance to community driven projects. Moreover, it was evident from one of the 
patron’s response to why he was assisting his clients, “If I treat them well and 
help them ... they will be more inclined to help me.” 52 Thus connectivity has 
helped change the clientelist relationship from one, which was focused on 
exploitation and maintaining control, to one which is actually beneficial towards 
peasants’ needs.  
                                                 
52 Landlord 1, interview, Connected landlord dominated village 1, 3 May 2008. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
Inequality in developing countries’ rural societies has meant that the vast majority 
of the poor lack control over their livelihood and have limited ability to satisfy 
many of their basic needs with their own resources. Moreover, the inability of the 
state to provide its citizens with basic public services and safety nets, due to 
corruption and elite capture, has meant that public resources are not a viable 
alternative for the poor to rely on (see for example Banerjee and Somanathan 
2007, Bardhan and Mookherjee 2002, Gazdar 2000, Charlton, et al. 2003). As a 
result rural peasants have been found to approach the resource rich to gain access 
to goods and services such as employment, credit, housing, social insurance, 
public goods provision, and so forth. In return, peasant households reciprocate by 
providing the resource holder with a cheap supply of guaranteed labour, social 
following and political support (Scott 1972, Powell 1970, Basu 1983). The 
exchange, however, is far from equal, for while the demands of the peasants are 
urgent (fairly inelastic), those of the landlord are not (elastic). Therefore, 
depending on the needs that peasant households aim to fulfil from the 
relationship, and the extent to which they can rely on alternatives, the exchange 
can range from one which is highly exploitative to one which is fairly functional 
in nature.  
 
The unequal exchange relationships that emerge from the presence of inequality in 
rural society have been studied quite extensively in the literature, and that too by 
researchers coming from a wide variety of disciplines. This diversity in the 
researchers’ backgrounds has meant that each has applied his/her own analytical 
tools to the problems of inequality in search for a better understanding of the 
interaction between the resource poor and rich. However, as was highlighted in 
the introduction, academics analysing this subject have established two major 
frameworks for the analysis of unequal exchange relationships: interlinked 
markets, which is used mostly by economists, and patron-client structure, used by 
political scientists, anthropologists and sociologists. The fact that there exist two 
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major frameworks for studying the complexity of human relationships is by no 
means surprising. However, what is surprising is that the two literatures have 
never come into dialogue and thus have evolved parallel to one another rather than 
in consultation. In this context, the introduction to this thesis highlighted the 
similarity between the two frameworks, by arguing that they both dealt with 
interaction between two parties over the exchange of a bundle of goods and 
services. The difference, of course, lies in how the two disciplines frame the 
problem. While the literature on interlinked markets focuses on the impact that 
linked deals have on equilibria in unrelated markets, patron-client theory 
emphasises the personalised nature of the exchange between members of unequal 
economic and social status. Hence, by putting the two together, it can be 
stipulated that, while all patron-client relationships are conducted in an interlinked 
market setting, exchanges in interlinked markets can also be classified as a patron-
client relationship provided the exchange fulfils certain criteria. Using a variety of 
tools, both sets of frameworks have established the advantage that the resource 
rich have in this relationship, as they have more to offer in the exchange. The 
resource poor, on the other hand, are disadvantaged due to their high dependency 
on the relationship for satisfying their needs. Thus it has been argued that this 
advantage enables the resource holder to extract high surpluses off the poor, much 
to the detriment of their welfare.  
 
 
However, in spite of this advantage, both frameworks acknowledge that the 
exploitative tendency of the network is not inherent in the relationship, rather it is 
the environment in which it is cultivated that determines the vulnerability of the 
poor. As has been argued throughout this thesis, such an environment only exists 
when inequality is interacted with isolation thus creating high “transfer costs or 
exogenous barriers to entry” (Basu 1983, pg 272) that restrict peasants’ alternative 
options, and therefore lower their opportunity cost of interacting with the landlord 
– possibly as low as starvation. In the absence of either of these two conditions, 
the monopoly/monopsony of the landlord breaks down, and the relationship is 
forced to change so as to take into account the reduction in the landlord’s 
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bargaining power. In fact, provided the alternative options are feasible, patron-
client relationships can possibly evolve to perform a functional role in peasants’ 
lives, thus becoming second best solutions in response to poverty and state and 
market failures (Waterbury’s 1977).  
 
Policy recommendations regarding exploitative exchange relationships have 
historically focused on altering the unequal aspect of the relationship, and not so 
much on the role played by isolation. Hence the emphasis has been on 
redistribution, either directly through land reforms, or indirectly through welfare 
schemes that help improve and stabilize the incomes of the poor. However, as 
discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, these policies have not always been successful in 
achieving their goals. In the case of land reforms, Chapter 1 highlighted how 
countries that have successfully redistributed land have done so while taking 
advantage of some extraordinary circumstances – such as revolutions, external 
interventions or strong political mobilization (Herring 1983, Dorner and 
Thiesenhusen 1990). Other countries have not been as successful, as their landed 
elite have made use of their political clout to preserve their landholding, thus 
ensuring a minimal change in inequality. In the case of Pakistan, large landlords 
enjoy considerable influence over the government and its bureaucracy. Thus, 
whenever land reforms have been instituted in the past, the state has tended to turn 
a blind eye towards the circumvention of land ceilings by these landlords (Zaidi 
1999, Hussain 1989). As argued by Rashid (1985) this was mostly because the 
enforcers were themselves the circumventers. And to make matters worse, the last 
attempt made in parliament to enact land reforms was declared un-Islamic by the 
head of a major religious political party (JUI), thus making land reforms in the 
near future even more politically difficult in Pakistan. 
 
Other policy initiatives, made by governments of various developing countries to 
alter the level of inequality, have also had mixed results, with the balance tipped 
more towards failure than success. As surveyed in Chapter 1, policies such as cash 
transfers, micro-credit schemes and rural works programs have often tended to 
suffer from poor targeting, resulting in the benefits flowing towards the non-poor 
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rather than the poor. Moreover, the political clout enjoyed by the landowning 
patrons has, at times, enabled them to successfully lobby for government welfare 
schemes to be channelled through them, rather than directly to the poor (Kabeer et 
al 2010, Arif 2006). Such action on the part of politicians and the landowning 
patrons, have converted programs that were essentially meant as tools for poverty 
alleviation, into instruments of patronage where benefits to the poor are directly 
dependent on their relationship with their patron. 
  
This is not to say that all government initiatives have failed to improve peasant 
welfare. Mexico, for instance, has been fairly successful in reaching the poor with 
its conditional cash transfers program (Handa and Davis 2006). Similarly, in 
Maharashtra, India, the state was able to establish a rural works program which 
guaranteed the poor employment for a certain number of days a year (Herring and 
Edwards 1983). Lastly, although microcredit programs have not been successful 
in targeting the poorest of the poor, they have been documented to benefit 
households that were not affluent enough to access formal credit markets and to 
pay market interest rates (Sebstad and Cohen 2000). However, despite the success 
of some policy initiatives, most governments of developing countries have not 
been able to significantly alter their respective levels of inequality. As a result, 
clientelism is still a predominant structure in rural societies. This has been found 
to be particularly the case in Pakistan, where persistent inequality has meant that 
large landowning patrons continue to enjoy considerable control over their rural 
clients (Hussain et al 2004, Cheema and Mohmand 2004, Cheema et al 2005, Arif 
2006, Gazdar 2004). In light of this failure, this thesis has argued for a shift in 
policy focus, at least in the short to medium term, towards the role isolation plays 
in creating a monopolist and an authoritarian patron. While the role of isolation in 
enhancing the vulnerability of the poor has been acknowledged in the literature 
(Basu 1983, Bhaduri 1972), increasing connectivity has seldom ever been 
recommended as a policy tool for reducing the authority of a patron in rural 
society.  
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This thesis has tried to illustrate this point explicitly by arguing that, under 
isolation, the urgency of peasants’ needs, combined with the absence of 
alternative options, leaves peasants no choice but to comply with the extractive 
demands of the patron. Any attempt to reject his demands, in a closed economy, 
carries the risk of being punished and/or ostracized by the all powerful landlord. 
However, once connected to the external market, the level of its peasants’ 
dependency on their patron falls considerably, as they now have a credible exit 
option to walk away from the relationship. In order to sustain his clientelist 
following, the patron then has to provide peasants with goods and services whose 
benefits outweigh, or at least match those received from the external market. Put 
another way, he has to lower his extractive practices to the extent that the costs to 
the peasants of staying in the patron-client relationship are lower than the costs of 
pursuing alternative options (Scott & Kerkvliet 1977).  
 
Whether viewed as an increase in benefits or a reduction in costs, connectivity 
should thus change the nature of clientelism to the benefit of the rural poor. This 
expectation was clearly reflected in the empirical analyses of the thesis, where 
connectivity, through road networks, was found to significantly weaken the hold 
of the large patron. Compared to their isolated counterparts, peasants in strong 
patron-client networks close to the roads were far better off. So much so, that 
convergence had taken place towards the socio-economic situation in villages 
with relatively egalitarian distribution of land.  
 
The thesis made use of a natural experiment found in the construction of a 
motorway in Pakistan to analyse the impact connectivity has on socio-economic 
and political outcomes in villages dominated by large landlords. The data 
collected was both quantitative and qualitative so as to clearly identify the 
direction, nature and mechanism of change taking place in the villages. The 
quantitative data allowed me to establish not only an increase in welfare outcomes 
in landlord dominated villages close to the road, but also the convergence that was 
taking place between villages with differing land tenure systems. By also using 
qualitative data I could more credibly conclude that the econometric results 
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reflected actual changes ‘on the ground’: observing peasants in their dealings with 
the landlord as well as interviewing them about their perceptions on the clientelist 
relationship, made it clear that the change in outcomes was indeed a reflection of 
an underlying change in clientelist relationships.  
 
This analysis focused on three distinct, yet related, implications of clientelism. 
Chapter 3 started off the analysis by investigating market interlinkages in rural 
economies. It was found that in isolated villages dominated by a powerful 
landlord, interlinkages were established in a manner that facilitated surplus 
extraction by the landlord, whereas in peasant based villages such links were 
largely meant to reduce transaction costs in the presence of incomplete and 
missing markets. Exposure to the external market did not break interlinkages 
completely in either of the two different tenured villages. Instead, it resulted in a 
change in the nature of the relationship within unequal villages. In particular, 
connectivity was found to break triadic relationships, thus limiting the influence 
that patrons had on peasants’ independent activities. This was especially evident 
from the freedom that peasants had to engage in their horizontal networks, in spite 
of the presence of a large patron. Thus market interlinkages in connected landlord 
dominated villages were found to function similar to those in egalitarian villages, 
i.e. as dyadic exchange relationships which helped reduce uncertainty and 
transaction costs in the presence of missing and/or incomplete markets. 
  
Convergence was also found in terms of public goods provision in Chapter 4. 
When villages were isolated, the dominant landlords were able to use their 
peasants’ votes as bargaining chips with the local politician in order to appropriate 
public resources for their own private benefit. As a result, public investment was 
under-provided for the peasants in unequal isolated villages. Once connected to 
the external economy, however, patrons with similarly large landholdings were 
found to be unable to appropriate public resources to the same extent. Instead, 
they had to use their peasants’ votes to broker public goods for the village 
economy. While the difference in provision levels between connected and isolated 
landlord dominated villages was not very large, it was found to be statistically 
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significant. Moreover, aside from the change in connected landlord based villages 
being in the right direction, the levels of provision were also found to converge 
with those found in relatively egalitarian villages, thus making land tenure 
systems irrelevant. The responsiveness of the patrons towards the needs of their 
clients was driven by a desire to maintain peasants’ political support, in an 
environment where it could no longer be enforced with the threat of sanctions. As 
a result, public provision in landlord dominated villages connected to the outside 
economy was at par with those in egalitarian villages. 
  
Despite having access to greater public investment through local politicians, 
public goods provision was still not universal in any of the villages researched. 
The last empirical chapter, therefore, analysed peasants’ ability to engage in 
collective action for the purpose of self provision. Here it was found that large 
landlords in isolated villages used the threat of restricting access to their 
resources, or even violence, to curtail their clients’ collective action. By contrast, 
landlords in villages connected to the external economy not only refrained from 
blocking their clients’ collective activities, but actually went so far as to facilitate 
them with financial and technical assistance. In some cases they even initiated the 
projects themselves. Thus patrons in connected villages acted as leaders of 
collective action projects and helped steer peasants’ activities in a direction that 
increased their chances of success. Krishna (2002), in his study of 68 villages in 
India, found that villages that had individuals who could perform such a role were 
much more likely to convert peasants “collective action into collective 
achievement” (pg. 195). The benefit of such leaders in my sample was evident 
from the fact that projects initiated under the supervision of the patron in 
connected villages had a much higher success rate when compared to projects in 
isolated unequal villages. This was also found in peasant based villages, 
indicating – yet again – that breaking isolation led to a considerable increase in 
peasants’ welfare in rural economies, even in the presence of large-scale 
inequality.  
 
182 
 
Moreover, the empirical analysis in all three chapters also focused on who, within 
the villages, was benefiting from connectivity. In this respect each chapter probed 
into how connectivity changed outcomes for the four main social groups in the 
villages. Interestingly, for all the indicators, it was revealed that the benefits of 
connectivity were felt most strongly by the lower class biradery – the Muslim 
Sheikhs. Households belonging to this biradery, apart from belonging to the 
bottom of the social ladder were also found to be landless, which made them 
highly dependent on others for securing a livelihood. Thus these households had 
very low bargaining power within the patronage network, and were therefore most 
vulnerable to exploitation under isolation. However, once connected to the 
external economy, belonging to this biradery had no significant effect on the 
various outcomes analysed. This result is not entirely surprising when we take 
into account that these households had high occupational mobility due to them 
being hired as casual labourers, rather than as tenant farmers (see Table 3 in 
Chapter 2). This meant that when the economy was exposed to external 
opportunities, these households had the ability to walk away from exchanges 
which they deemed detrimental to their welfare. As a result, in order to maintain 
these households’ clientelist following, patrons had to offer them more in return 
than what they did when the village was secluded. Tenancy farmers, on the other 
hand, while more tied to the village economy due to their contractual 
arrangements, nonetheless had the advantage of belonging to the socially upper 
class biradery (see Table 3 in Chapter 2) and having additional ties to the 
landlord. Hence, as we saw in the empirical chapters, these households enjoyed 
favourable outcomes even when isolated. Therefore, while they continued to 
enjoy the advantages of belonging to the upper class in connected villages, the 
difference in these villages was that the lower classes were no longer found to 
suffer a disadvantage. 
  
 However, this is not to say that biradery was no longer important in connected 
villages. Key respondent interviews and household surveys both revealed it to be 
an important indicator of the households’ social status in all 8 village societies. 
This is similar to what Bailey (1957) observed in his mountainous village in India, 
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which was exposed to the external economy a little under a hundred years before 
his visit. In spite of the fact that the lower caste households were able to improve 
their economic wellbeing by taking advantage of the changing economy, they 
were not able improve their social status so as to bring it at par with their new 
found wealth. This led to considerable frustration amongst these households. As a 
result they were found to retaliate by invoking their rights as citizens of India, and 
approaching formal institutions in times of conflict instead of adhering to village 
customs and institutions. I did not see such behaviour in my villages, but this is 
not to say that it may not come about in the future. The outcomes that Bailey 
observed occurred close to a hundred years after the village was opened up, 
whereas my results are based on a mere ten years of exposure. Therefore, the 
socio-political structures of these villages are still very much in transition and thus 
are likely to evolve significantly before resting on a stable equilibrium. However, 
I must add that while there is much more that is likely to change, I do not believe 
that connectivity will make biradery redundant in the rural society of Pakistan, 
despite Marx’s (1853) prediction that railroad access to Indian villages would 
make caste identity irrelevant. Even Bailey (1957), who documented a change in 
the caste relationships in the villages, found that caste continued to be an 
important form of identity in rural India. 
 
Another interesting change brought about by connectivity was the way in which 
resources – both public and private – were used by the patron. As the chapters 
highlighted, the patrons’ access to resources often extended to public funds and 
institutions. As a result, as mentioned in Chapters 2 and 4, all public resources 
were diverted to the patron who then decided on how they were to be spent. 
Moreover, Chapter 2 also highlighted the influence that patrons had on formal 
institutions – particularly those dealing with dispute resolution. This meant that if 
peasants wanted to gain fruitful access to these institutions, they would have to 
approach them through their patron. In isolated villages monopolistic patrons 
were found to use this privileged access to the state and their monopoly over 
private resources to maximise their own private benefit. In connected villages, as 
patrons now faced the threat of losing their clientelist following, similar funds 
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were used by them to compete with the peasants’ outside options. Put another 
way, the presence of alternative options meant that the landlord now had to use 
his resources, combined with state funds, to reinforce his importance in his 
clients’ lives so as to maintain the integrity of the network. This was only possible 
by providing for his clients’ needs so as to make their staying in the network more 
attractive than pursuing their outside options. Hence connectivity caused a shift in 
the patrons’ incentive structure, resulting in his benefits being aligned with those 
of the poor. As argued by Scott (1972), the fact that the patron close to the road 
had promise of rewards to maintain support is a clear sign that connectivity is 
weakening the hold of the landlord. By his own admission, the large patron in a 
connected village realised that, in order to continue enjoying access to peasants’ 
labour in the fields and their political support during elections, he had to offer 
them more from the exchange.  
 
Lastly, connectivity appears to have changed the way peasants interact in their 
horizontal networks. In isolation large landlords use their high levels of control to 
minimise peasants from engaging in mutually beneficial activities with fellow 
villagers. As such control is not possible by patrons in connected villages, 
peasants claim to interact extensively with their fellow villagers to improve their 
joint welfare. In time, this could prove to be another avenue through which 
government resources can be combined with patronage networks for the benefit of 
the peasants. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the Local Government Ordinance makes 
provision for citizens’ participation by providing funds for collective action 
projects. However, these funds are only released after an application is made and 
approved by the funding body. Given the level of corruption in Pakistan, and the 
process through which all other government resources are spent, it is not 
unreasonable to assume that these too would require some amount of lobbying by 
persons of influence. Thus the patron could use his privileged access to the local 
politicians to help secure such funds for peasants’ participatory projects.  
 
Overall, the results present an interesting story of both continuity and change that 
resonates with the broader literature on institutions and development of the past 
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decade. At a very general level, it is clear that patron-client networks persist in 
rural Pakistan. Relationships, cultivated over generations in closely-knit village 
societies, are bound to display a great deal of path dependency. Also, the lack of 
state provision means that if peasants choose to break their links with the landlord 
completely, they would have to seek new alliances to gain access to all their 
necessary services (Scott 1972). This would entail considerable uncertainties and 
transaction costs (see generally, North 1990). So, even in the presence of outside 
options, landlords are likely to play a key role in the economic and social fabric of 
rural Pakistan for decades to come. However, despite their persistence, their 
character changes considerably when opportunities are made available and 
constraints lessened. Whereas in isolated villages peasants align with the large 
patrons out of necessity, as they have no alternative for satisfying their needs, in 
connected villages the relationship persists because landlords have strong 
incentives to cater for the needs of the peasants. Therefore, even though the 
institutional setup of clientelism is based on levels of inequality which have 
stayed largely constant since the creation of Pakistan, this thesis documents that 
an external shock, brought about by the building of the motorway, provided the 
necessary critical juncture to change the relationship from one focused on 
exploitation to one based on cooperation (see generally, Pierson 2000). The 
chapters highlighted how, while in isolation, large landlords used their resources 
along with public funds, to maximise their own surplus, in connected villages 
similar resources were used by patrons to compete against clients’ alternative 
options. At least for the three variables analysed in this thesis it therefore appears 
that breaking isolation has had the same effect as redistributive policies.  
 
One possible caveat to this conclusion is, of course, that the results could simply 
reflect that landlords close to the road just happened to be benevolent. Since the 
study was conducted at the household rather than village level, it is difficult - 
albeit not impossible - to comment on the character of the landlords. But I can, 
and have, commented on their incentive structure. The effect of connectivity, as 
documented throughout this thesis, has been to alter the relative costs and benefits 
of exploitation. As a result the outcomes seen in the three empirical chapters are 
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consistent with an incentive structure that is independent of patrons’ personality 
traits. That said; the effect of connectivity on landlords’ behaviour and perception 
is an important question which future research should address in more detail. This 
could be done as a quantitative study of a large number of villages, or explored 
through in-depth qualitative interviews in carefully selected cases, such as the 
sample of this thesis. Another possible area of future research is to analyse in 
greater detail the impact of connectivity on the control group – the peasant based 
villages. While connectivity is undoubtedly having an impact on these villages as 
well, the effect is much more subtle and was not tested out here as these villages 
were not the focus of this study. Thirdly, the absence of time-series data meant 
that my methodological setup had to take advantage of a natural experiment, but 
studies over time would be able to reveal important insights. It would therefore be 
relevant to study changes in clientelist relationships over the next decades. My 
own expectation is that increased interaction with the outside market over the 
years is unlikely to break clientelist relations completely for the reasons cited 
above, but this remains to be seen. Finally, a question not addressed here, is 
whether the new opportunities that arise from connectivity lead to an increase in 
the marginal productivity of agricultural workers: under isolation it can be 
assumed that peasants were under-employed, as a vast number worked on the 
fields due to the absence of viable alternatives. This may well change when 
peasants get access to alternative labour markets. These are but a few examples 
which indicate that, as always with studies in underexplored fields, the thesis has 
raised more questions than answers. 
 
Nevertheless, the results do quite clearly indicate that decreasing isolation of rural 
economies can lead to some of the same outcomes aspired to by redistributive 
policies. While inequality does, of course, have detrimental effects on peasants’ 
economic welfare, as it makes it harder for them to pull themselves out of poverty 
(World Bank 2000), in the absence of isolation it has limited implications for their 
social and political welfare. This study centred on a motorway that provided a 
useful natural experiment to overcome a number of methodological challenges. 
Although the impact on clientelism of this particular road was clearly an 
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unintended consequence, it provides a useful illustration that policy makers 
seeking to increase peasants’ welfare should take into consideration. The 
advantage of this policy option is that it should be politically easy to implement. 
Already, we have seen that peasants have benefited not only by obtaining 
additional employment opportunities, but also from their stronger bargaining 
position vis-à-vis the patron. The landlords also benefit, despite their weakened 
bargaining position, due to increase in the value of their land and transport cost 
reductions in accessing their agrarian fields and getting their produce to the 
market. Therefore, as in the case of Maharashtra’s employment guarantee scheme, 
rural elites are unlikely to block such policy initiatives. And, of course, the 
politicians benefit, as they can claim credit for a tangible result: providing roads to 
the masses.  
 
Lastly, apart from its political ease and the spill-over effects in the village 
economy, building infrastructure should also have some village and economy 
wide benefits not analysed in the empirical chapters. These can range from the 
free flow of ideas, to greater access to education, to a reduction in transportation 
costs to the possible increase in food security in the country. As was mentioned 
earlier, with connectivity comes an increase in contact with outsiders who not 
only bring information into the rural economy, but also introduce new ideas and 
worldviews that can help facilitate change. While economists have looked at how 
the flow of such ideas encourages the adoption of new technology and new 
techniques in the production process (see for example Platteau 1996), sociologists 
have focused on how this impacts societal organisation (see for example Skinner 
1985, Liu 2007). While this may manifest itself in multiple ways, one example 
may be the positive effect that a flow of ideas can have on gender relations and 
gender mobility within the village economy. While gender issues were not the 
focus of this thesis, I did at times interview households where the women would 
tell me enviously that I had seen more of their village than they had, since their 
household did not consider it appropriate for women to venture outside their 
homes. The constraints faced by women in isolated villages are not peculiar to 
Pakistan (see for example Saul 1993, Bruce 1993, Mackenzie 1993). In most 
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cases, studies have found that women are given restricted access to land and 
labour markets so that their households can control their incomes and thus their 
level of mobility. Exposure to the external economy, it is hoped, will alter social 
setups by changing their ‘worldviews’, thus reducing the restrictions placed on 
their women. This change would not only allow women to enjoy more freedom, 
but may also lead to their greater participation in the labour market, thus assisting 
the household in pulling itself out of poverty.  
 
Another positive impact of connectivity is to increase households’ access to 
educational institutions – both for basic and higher education. Aside from the 
obvious advantages of increased education, this should also help the flow of ideas 
and thus facilitate cultural change in the rural economy. The importance of 
education in changing the social structure of rural societies has also been 
discussed extensively by Krishna (2002) through his findings in 69 Indian 
villages. He documents how the availability of an educated group of young 
individuals resulted in a reduction in the authority of old patrons, as villagers now 
had the option to approach this new group for help with activities such as filling 
out forms, applying for national identity cards, registering for elections etc. Also, 
with education there should be an increase in the general level of awareness 
amongst the villagers. As was argued in Chapter 4, this should result in an 
increase in the responsiveness of government officials (see for example Prat and 
Strömberg 2006, Besley et. al. 2002, Besley and Burgess 2000, Olsen 1982).  
 
In purely economic terms, connectivity benefits small farmers by lowering costs 
associated with transporting their produce to the market. Improved infrastructure 
should increase the number of transport options available to small farms, thus 
creating competition which should lower the price that the transporters charge. 
These cheaper options should make it possible for farmers to profitably take 
advantage of price changes in the urban centres, and maybe even in the 
international market (de Janvry et al 1991, Delgadi 1992), which in the presence 
of isolation was monopolised by middlemen (Fafchamps and Hill 2008). 
Furthermore, having a well functioning road that connects the village to the 
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external market, should significantly lower the time it takes to transport produce 
from farm to market. Apart from freeing up farmers’ time for other productive 
activities, this time saving should also help to reduce post-harvest losses caused 
due to the produce lying idle too long in inadequate storage facilities (Platteau 
1996). At the national level, stock mobility should enable governments to increase 
food security within their countries by providing regions with bad harvests with 
food from areas of abundance (Dreze and Sen 1991). These are but a few 
examples of the benefits that connectivity can provide for not only the rural 
villages, but also for the wider national economy.  
 
 
However, before concluding, it must be stated that this policy prescription is 
extended with the caveat that road networks are by no means the silver bullet of 
development, despite their win-win character. In order to have a much stronger 
and more effective impact, connectivity must be followed by wider governmental 
and economic reforms so as to enable institutions to work better for the poor. 
Nonetheless, even in the absence of these reforms, connectivity does appear to 
provide a small step on the very long road to development.  
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Appendix 1 
Payoffs for Chapter 3 
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Payoffs 
 
No exploitation: 
[ ] [ ]PPPP PxxlwlYU −+−+= )()( τψ  
LPMM PxPxYU ++=  
[ ] [ ] )()( MLLLL dPxxwlYU φλπ −−+−+=  
Exploitation: 
[ ] [ ]PPPP PxxlwlYU −+−+= )()( τψ  
LPMM PxPxYU ++=  
[ ] [ ] )()( MLLLL dPxxwlYU φλπ −−+−+=  
(A,t,T) 
 
(A,t,T) 
 
PU  = -20 + 30 + 30 = 40 PU  = -20 + -5 + 30       =  5 
mU  = -10 + 10 + 15       = 15 mU  = -10 + 10 + 15       = 15 
LU  =     0 + 10 + 10 + 0 = 20 LU  =     0 + 30 + 10 + 0 = 40 
(A,t,N) 
 
(A,t,N) 
 
PU  = -20 + 30 + 30      = 40 PU  = -20 + -5 + 30        = 5 
mU  = -10 + 10 +  0       =  0 mU  = -10 + 10 +  0        = 0 
LU  =     0 + 10 +  0 + 0 = 10 LU  =     0 + 30 +  0 + 0 = 30 
(A,n,T) 
 
(A,n,T) 
 
PU  = -20 + 30 +  0       = 10 PU  = -20 + -5 +  0       = -25 
mU  = -10 +  0 + 15       =  5 mU  = -10 +  0 + 15       =  5 
LU  =    0 + 10 + 10 + 0 = 20  LU  =    0 + 30 + 10 + 0 = 40  
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(A,n,N) 
 
(A,n,N) 
PU  = -20 + 30 +  0       = 10 PU  = -20 + -5 +   0       = -25 
mU  = -10 +  0 +   0      = -10 mU  = -10 +  0 +   0      = -10 
LU  =    0 + 10 +  0 + 0 = 10  LU  =    0 + 30 +  0 + 0 = 30  
(R,t,T) 
 
(R,t,T) 
 
PU  = -20 +  0 +  30     = 10 PU  = -20 +  0 +  30      = 10 
mU  = -10 + 10 + 15      = 15 mU  = -10 + 10 +  15     = 15 
LU  =    0 +    0 + 10 – 5= 5  LU  =    0 +    0 + 10 – 5=  5  
(R,t,N) 
 
(R,t,N) 
 
PU  = -20 +  0 +  30      = 10 PU  = -20 +  0 +  30      = 10 
mU  = -10 + 10 +   0      =  0 mU  = -10 + 10 +   0      =  0 
LU  =    0 +    0 +  0 – 5  = -5 LU  =    0 +    0 +  0 – 5  = -5 
(R,n,T) 
 
(R,n,T) 
 
PU  = -20 +  0 +    0      = -20 PU  = -20 +  0 +    0      = -20 
mU  = -10 +  0 +  15      =  5 mU  = -10 +  0 +  15      =   5 
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LU  =    0 +   0 + 10 + 0 = 10 LU  =    0 +   0 + 10 + 0 = 10 
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(R,n,N) 
 
(R,n,N) 
 
PU  = -20 +  0 +  0       = -20 PU  = -20 +  0 +  0       = -20 
mU  = -10 +  0 +  0       =  -10 mU  = -10 +  0 +  0       =  -10 
LU  =    0 +   0 +  0 + 0 =  0 LU  =    0 +   0 +  0 + 0 =  0 
 
 
 Merchant has outside options: 
[ ] [ ]PPPP PxxlwlYU −+−+= )()( τψ  
[ ]wlPxPxPxYU OLPMM −−++++= πα )1(  
[ ] [ ]
)()(
)(
oM
LLLL
dd
PxxwlYU
φφ
λπα
−
−−+−+=  
 
Merchant and peasant have outside 
options : 
[ ] [ ]+−+−+= PPPP PxxlwlYU )()( τψ  
  [ ])('' llw ψ−  
OLPMM PxPxPxYU +++=  
[ ] [ ]
)()(
)(
oM
LLLL
dd
PxxwlYU
φφ
λπ
−
−−+−+=  
 
(A,t,T) 
 
(A,t,T) 
 
PU  = -20 + -5 + 30               =  5 PU  = -20 + 30 + 30 + 0= 40 
mU  = -10 + 10 + 15 + 0 + 0  = 15 mU  = -10 + 10 + 15 + 0   = 15 
LU  =     0 + 30 + 10 + 0 + 0 = 40 LU  =     0 + 10 + 10 + 0 + 0= 20 
(A,t,F) (A,t,N) 
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PU  = -20 + -5 + 30                =  5 PU  = -20 + 30 + 30 + 0= 40 
mU  = -10 + 10 + 15 + 0 + 9 = 24 mU  = -10 + 10 + 0 + 10   = 10 
LU  =     0 + 21 + 10 + 0 + 0   = 31 LU  =     0 + 10 + 0 + 0  - 5 = 5 
(A,t,N) 
 
(A,n,T) 
 
PU  = -20 + -5 + 30                 = 5 PU  = -20 + 30 + 0 + 0= 10 
mU  = -10 + 10 +  0 + 10 + 0  = 10 mU  = -10 + 0 + 15 + 0   = 5 
LU  =     0 + 30 +  0 + 0 + -5  = 25 LU  =     0 + 10 + 10 + 0  + 0 = 20 
(A,n,T) 
 
(A,n,N) 
 
PU  = -20 + -5 +  0                = -25 PU  = -20 + 30 + 0 + 0= 10 
mU  = -10 +  0 + 15 + 0 + 0   =  5 mU  = -10 + 0 + 0 + 10  = 0 
LU  =    0 + 30 + 10 + 0 + 0   = 40  LU  =     0 + 10 + 0 + 0  - 5 = 5 
(A,n,F) 
 
(R,t,T) 
 
PU  = -20 + -5 +  0                = -25  PU  = -20 + 0 + 30 + 30= 40 
mU  = -10 +  0 + 15 + 0 + 9  = 14 mU  = -10 + 10 + 15 + 0   = 15 
LU  =    0 + 21 + 10 + 0 + 0   = 31 LU  =     0 + 0 + 10 -5  - 5 = 0 
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(A,n,N) 
 
(R,t,N) 
 
PU  = -20 + -5 +   0    = -25 PU  = -20 + 0 + 30 + 30= 40 
mU  = -10 +  0 +   0  + 10 + 0  = 0 mU  = -10 + 10 + 0 + 10  = 10 
LU  =    0 + 30 +  0 + 0 -5        = 25 LU  =     0 + 0 + 0 -5  - 5 = -10 
(R,t,T) 
 
(R,n,T) 
 
PU  = -20 +  0 +  30               = 10 PU  = -20 + 0 + 0 + 30= 10 
mU  = -10 + 10 +  15 + 0 + 0 = 15 mU  = -10 + 0 + 15 + 0   = 5 
LU  =    0 +   0 + 10 – 5 + 0   =  5  LU  =     0 + 0 + 10 +0 - 5 = 5 
(R,t,F) 
 
(R,n,N) 
 
PU  = -20 +  0 +  30              = 10 PU  = -20 + 0 + 0 + 30= 10 
mU  = -10 + 10 + 15 + 0 + 0  = 15 mU  = -10 + 0 + 0 + 10  = 0 
LU  =    0 +    0 + 10 + 0 – 5  = 5 LU  =     0 + 0 + 0 - 5 - 5 = -10 
(R,t,N) 
 
 
PU  = -20 +  0 +  30                 = 10  
mU  = -10 + 10 +  0 + 10 + 0   = 10  
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LU  =    0 +   0  +  0 + -5 + -5  = -10  
(R,n,T) 
 
 
PU  = -20 +  0 +    0  = -20  
mU  = -10 +  0 +  15  + 0 + 0 =  5  
LU  =    0 +   0 + 10 + 0 + 0   = 10  
(R,n,F) 
 
 
PU  = -20 +  0 +    0   = -20  
mU  = -10 +  0 +  15  + 0 + 0 =  5  
LU  =    0 +   0 + 10 + 0 + 0   = 10  
(R,n,N) 
 
 
PU  = -20 +  0 +  0     = -20  
mU  = -10 +  0 +  0 + 10 + 0  =  0  
LU  =    0 +   0 +  0 + 0 + -5  = -5  
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Appendix 2 
Village 
Maps162 
 
                                                 
162 These maps are not drawn to scale. Also they have been compressed to A4 size. The actually 
maps used in the field were double in size. 
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Isolated Landlord Dominated Village 1 
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Isolated Landlord Dominated Village 2 
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Isolated Peasant Based Village 1 
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Isolated Peasant Based Village 2  
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Connected Landlord Dominated Village 1 
 
 
Connected Landlord Dominated Village 2 
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Connected Landlord Dominated Village 2 
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Connected Peasant Based Village 1 
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Connected Peasant Based Village 2 
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Appendix 3 
Household Survey 
 
 
Within each village 20% of the households were selected to be included in the 
sample. This led to the collection of a total of 383 household interviews. These 
surveys were collected by a team of 14 surveyors, supervised by me. Of the total 
sample I conducted 10% of the interviews myself. The survey used is given 
below. 
Household Survey
Education
Do you send your children to
EI School? 0 No
1.(. ,ot· /' I {.Jl!LJ I No kids
~ 7 - 7. 2 Kids too young
cr .... ~r\~ 3 Kids graduated
'~ • "'Of ~ 4 Yes
5 Only the boys
6 Some of the kids go
7 They go to a madressa
50 Other (specifY)
100 Unwilling to respond
If answer to QEl is between 0-3 go to QE3, otherwise go to QE2.
Ifyes to qEI,What level of
schooling are they enrolled
E2 in? I primary school
r~p, , ~1.!7 ,./c£ L....,I 2 middle school
~ ~ .~
- ~ ~ 3 high school<: ...... ;;...d_?..J
, "-"..~ .J~
Ifno to qEI, Why do you
E3 not send your kids to school? I can't afford it
,~/\~ /I~ 2 unlslamic
~- ~ '-'" ~ need the girls to work at home3
c :::',rJlS 4 the school is co-education
,
. ~ 5 the school is too far
50 Other (specifY)
99 Don't know
100 Unwilling to respond
When was the school made? ~~0~ ~E4 (write code) <:
a Boys primary
b Girls Primary I before 1998
2 after 1998
c Boys middle 99 Don't know
100 Unwilling to respond
d Girls Middle
e Boys high
f Girls high
Who was the intermediary
:T::' ~j (~ ,L cJJ~ GJ/who played a role in
1.:>\;\,://«I d U~~providing the school? (write
E5 code) 5' t;., ~
a Boys primary
a Noone
b Girls Primary I MNA
2 MPA
c Boys middle 3 Village influential (get name)
4 Other influential (get name)
d Girls middle 5 CBOs
6 NGO
e Boys high 50 Other (SpecifY)
99 Don't know
f Girls high lOa Unwilling to respond
Does someone monitor the
E6 performance of the teachers? a No
);.r 16 ,,/ I.:;; G..v I L(~.){ 1 Yes
~.J v ( /'" (, /~I j, /{ 99 Don't know
.
c ../ I..J../ ~ 100 Unwilling to respond
E7 Ifyes to qE6 then who? 1 MNA
(/" l" ,/ /1t.tr.\ ,(' 2 MPA
. c
.J 'V.J 3 Village influential (get name)
4 Other influential (get name)
5 CBOs
6 NGO
50 Other (SpecifY)
99 Don't know
100 Unwilling to respond
GI Are you happy with the
E8 school? LJL.:Nc.:.O=--- _
/ r-' .'<
\ <-I \ VJ 1 Yes
eb/-' 100 Unwilling to res ond
-
E9 If no to qE8 then why? 1 Teachers don't teach
.Y l/f <"'I ~ / -0 ,.X 2 Teachers don't come
~ v ~
'-",'f./.. 3 There are no proper facilities
" 4 The school has no toilet
School has no water
50 Other (specify)
100 Unwilling to respond
Health
If a member of the
household is ill where do
RIa you 1 BHU
normally go? / /) / 2 Pvt doctor
~I v or .1 If' ..},s,! ;> j 16 ,.cJ ,-"1 3 Pvt dispenser
c- <:t y -~ ,Ur--T..J J~ ('-~ J 4 Hakem
-1'-''': bo you use any other\
b medical facility 5 Homeopath
-. V r<'" n\ .5 J uY l,( 50 Other (specify)
.
c' .-- "5 j 7 II ;;..;; I 99 don't know
• ~< J 100 Unwilling to respond
If the household opts to
use a pvt health facility
H2 then what 1 Get better care
is the reason for this? 2 They give medicines
~/ .11"":-, -J y>'"- Y. 9'" LJ 3 They are more responsive
j (/A~9t.f--:{ 4 The govt doctor never comes
. ,
-- 5 BHU too far
50 Other (specify)
100 Unwilling to respond
Who was the intermediary
H3 that played a role in 0 Noone
providing the closest
health facility? 1 MNA
,</1;_/" (.; -I.,....... rc" 2 MPA
c,.~- ~I /1 . ),.,-,vI :a.. • ~j 3 Village influential (get name)
'- J \' '-'.. "-' 4 Other influential (get name)
5 CBOs
6 NGO
50 Other (Specify)
99 Don't know
100 Unwilling to respond
Only ask the remaining
questions if they use a
BHU.
If they don't then go to
next section
Are there ample medicines
H4 available to you? 0 No
'~'4 .P -.1 ....... ~I 1 .( 1 Yes~ ,.
'--"-
, .".-~~..,/ 99 Don't know<
'f 100 Unwilling to respond
Are you happy with the
H5 medical facility? 0 No
-. '~ ;u.lo
_I ,"( 1./ I Yes
, ~ '-'~ ;r ~::./' Unwilling to respond100
,''--''
H6 If no to QH5 then why? 1 The hospital has no equipment
£(\./':1 . // 2 They don't give medicines.....-' ../\
~ ~ '---'~':.J They are not responsive3
4 The govt doctor never comes
5 The BHU is very far
50 Other (specify)
100 Unwilling to respond
Does someone monitor the
performance ofthe
H7 doctors? 0 No
./ r> ;,1\" .t: ,~\~L..( 1 Yes
uv J c -'"u1::---;U ~Lt' -{ f 99 Don't know
,
< J \J) U 100 Unwilling to respond
H8 If yes to qH7 then who? 1 MNA
< ~ l- .(r·J\ff~, t 2 MPA
, , J'J 3 Village influential (get name)
4 Other influential (get name)
5 CBOs
6 NGO
50 Other (Specify)
99 Don't know
100 Unwilling to respond
Roads
./
What kind of roads does ( oj)"'d'r ~ ly'Y YJ
the household have: (write ;- 0;?J!/Jy{"RI code)
I Mettle
leading to the closest _
a town? ( f; j:v .,if i 2 Bricks
../. 'J,y 3 Mud
leading to the closest /
b trading market?, (';;;"r <;1 50 Other (specify)
./;5- 99 Don't know
c leading to the motorway? 100 Unwilling to respond
~ "d-J J/
Where is the closest
market? (name of town or
R2 city) /'
'4 vid}c..f/
How far is the closest
trading market? (distance
R3 km) ,/ -:~VfU~U/
When were these roads/
R4 made?u;S-r ~ JJY;v I Pre 1998
to the closeStt~wn? ./ ~ Post 1998a 2
99 Don't know
b to the closest market? 100 Unwilling to respond
c to the motorway?
Who took the initiative to
R5 provide these roads? 0 Noone
d",,1oi".lb,J~\ ;. /:,p 2.1./ j u)!-' "I I MNA
, -
a Vtd the clOsesttow~? J 2 MPA
3 Village influential (get name)
b to the closest market? 4 Other influential (get name)
5 CBOs
c to the motorway? 6 NGO
50 Other (Specify)
99 Don't know
100 Unwilling to respond
What is the condition of l.;: /t 0 i.7 (:)1~ Z ():?.J~the road after rains? (write ~~ J X c.:,.J{YR6 code)
1 Significantly worse
a to the closest town? 2 Worse
3 Average
b to the closest market? 4 No effect
99 Don't know
c to the motorway? 100 Unwilling to respond
How much traffic passes
R7 through the village? a None
~ ,I •• /.J I ./ .~a 1 A little
......c- ~'''-(."V: L,Yli ;JJ~ 2 Moderate
~'-=7 - -= 3 A substantial amount
99 Don't know
100 Unwilling to respond
Has the level of traffic
increased since the
R8 motorway was a No
built in 1998? 1 Yes - a little
~"J~7d.- ,_1.. ,,/ 2 Yes - substantially
..:5 "~/~I '.1 _ ",,-./. ~, r. li 99 Don't know,
, <
- - 100 Unwilling to respond
Has there been an increase
R9 in the transport facilities a No
available to the village
since 1998 1 Yes (specify)
I_ 0 IL- .. /~ . > ., , 50 Other (specify)(
'-. (",,' ~(,.,' _-:.1., .. ;,.4 99 Don't know
, C7 =--= - 100 Unwilling to respond
What is the cost to go: (in
"!.)l?~ J'cJ) 1.P c..J:d r-!~RIO Rs,) "". <r" v.(
to the nearest town?
<
a
b to the nearest market?
c to your place of work?
d to the motorway?
How often does a member
RII from the household travel 0 Never
outside the village? I Every day
rv I,ti J ( ;<.1/ >1,../ £' ,JP' 2 At least once a week
f >':-- .:f~ -' l 3 Once a week
, ~, JJ A 4 Once in 2 weeks
5 Once a month
50 Other (specifY)
99 Don't know
100 Unwilling to respond
Soling
What type of streets are
SI outside your house? 0 Kaccha (mud)
(observe) 1 Kaccha soling (bricks)
Pucca soling (bricks with
2 cement)
3 Pucca (mettle)
What is the condition ofthe
S2 street? 1 Extremely poor
(observe) 2 Poor
3 Average
4 Good
5 Excellent
When was the soling
S3 provided? 1 Pre 1998
, v-li~II,~LL j//;(,I'" 2 Post 1998
,
'-' '-' /< • /, ~ "7;" 99 Don't know
. '-' '-'. 100 Unwilling to respond
Who was the intermediary
S4 that helped provide 0 Noone
the solingv:' I' [13 r~1 1 MNA
<( ;;'< vll.1 .1 7 r' \ ." '-> t.": ,( 2 MPA
•
- J , ......
3 Village influential (get name)
4 Other influential (get name)
5 CBOs
6 NGO
99 Don't know
100 Unwilling to respond
What is the impact of rain
S5 on the street? I Significantly damaging
I'.v ... , I.J·~ r Ji 1./ r .); G 2 Damaging
1/ .. ./~ ,~ 3 No effect
< 99 Don't know
100 Unwilling to respond
Are you happy with the
S6 street? 0 No
r ....lJ-. r' ,JI r ·...,1 r IIJ/ I Yes
"'-' '-' ,---""
,
r .~ 100 Unwilling to respond
Sanitation -'
What kind of sanitation
SAl system does the household 0 None
have? I Open-drain kaccha (mud)
..;; /,I.\\' --'I-.i',f p,\ 2 Open-drain pucca (cemented)
\ v ~- j,' ,).-'~,{ 3 Underground drain
• -j 100 Unwilling to respond
Where is the waste
SA2 disposed? I Pond inside the village
c: ..-v ( ... ~,I/ '1.ILr oJv 2 Pond outside the village
< ./ , v~ 3 Agricultural channel
4 Main drain
50 Other (specify)
99 Don't know
100 Unwilling to respond
When was the drainage
SA3 provided? I Pre 1998
< ~ '", ,( ,I • II' .. 2 Post 1998
1--'- '-'. - ~ 99 Don't know
100 Unwilling to respond
SA41 How was the system [JJ Public health engineering dept
provided?
\ .P; ./.,-J/r'l':J C6 r 1.J (', 2 Zila council
-! '-../ \ :r~o<, .j 3 Town municipal adm
I
- 4 Community self help
5 Self provided
6 NGO
7 Local Government
50 Other (specify)
99 Don't know
100 Unwilling to respond
Who was the intermediary
SA5 that helped provide the 0 Noone
drainage? I MNA
r • 1~ r ..fr .... LJ· r'\'H', 2 MPA
~ ";',. \;"',/ \~i'" ,I~:?:::, " 3 Village influential (get name)
,
- J I' 4 Other influential (get name)
5 CBOs
6 NGO
50 Other (Specify)
99 Don't know
100 Unwilling to respond
What is the impact of rain
SA6 on the drain? I Significantly damaging(:S \ ,.Jl'J u:>,.;S / \~.tl 2 Damaging
'" ,....... ~-__ /•.;, r.:-:n" I '.1" 3 No effect
, < •
- 99 Don't know
100 Unwilling to respond
What is the level of
SA7 blockage ofthe <!rain? 0 None
r """"
I, ....JI:, 5' .J S- .1" I Minimal
'-'-
,",..,'-J,}),!i, ",f.( 2 Average
, '-"! '-I- v 3 High
4 Very high
99 Don't know
100 Unwilling to respond
Who maintains the
SA8 drainage system? 0 Noone
! .(tl ..f- ~ /), \ .,.J I' I Public health engineering dept
\.J'-.) "', ~ '-/ '-" r
<eo ,.I-~; 2 Zila council
'< '-' 3 Town municipal adm
4 Community selfhelp
5 Selfprovided
6 NGO
7 Local government
50 Other (specifY)
99 Don't know
100 Unwilling to respond
f bl ksE ectora vo In!! oc
Was the household part of a ~li'l (?10!»li ItV
voting block in: (write ~~ rvJY t!O..~' ><,(-'VI code) •
a 1997
b 2001 0 No
I Yes
c 2002 99 Don't know
100 Unwilling to respond
d 2005
What is the size of the (' ~/EeL"'~?Cf \voting block? .
V2 (approximate)
a 1997
b 2001
c 2002
d 2005
What was the basis of
V3 joining the vote block? 0 None
~ 1<><- 5 r ,\ :,1 'b 5" N 1 Political party\
~.~ • J I.r:"<' .:.:v ~ ,"'bC 2 Biradery
.'0 -0 3 Religion
4 Family
5 Agriculture
6 Industry
7 Other occupation
8 Biradery alliance
9 Neighborhood
10 Social influence of the village
influential
50 Other (specifY)
99 Don't know
100 Unwilling to respond
/'
Was there a rival voting Jie I.c"~l.oP z:-y":> 2- '-.../' I iJiV4 block? (Write code) - , <:l'c.I,,';",~i~I~7P\
. J ./a 1997
b 2001 0 No
1 Yes
c 2002 99 Don't know
100 Unwilling to respond
d 2005
What was the basis of the
V5 rival blocks' formation? 0 None
,;~ L' "'.., A. I ':.,a ( '" I 1 Political partv
J
e -;.. .~. , f 2 Biradery
. '" - 3 Religion
4 Family
5 Agriculture
6 Industry
7 Other occupation
8 Biradery alliance
9 Neighborhood
10 Social influence of the village
influential
50 Other (specifY)
99 Don't know
100 Unwilling to respond
Who was the head of your / ~,,~ /u'l
vote block? (name and ( ~ oJ..J _ .?. 7.?- 0
.
V6 status)
a 1997
b 2001
__c 12002
__d=- 2005
What was the basis of the tI.£~~J~J(JJ!' u l
power of the head of the ~ cJ!' ~-"V7 vote
block? (write code)
I Biradery
2 religion
a 1997 3 Family
4 Agriculture
b 2001 5 Industry
6 Local moneylender
c 2002 7 Trader
8 Landlord
d 2005 9 Village head
10 Aarti (middleman)
II Political activist
12 Personality/leadership
13 Educated
14 Elder
50 Other (specify)
99 Don't know
100 Unwilling to respond
V'II I fl . II al!e n uentm
Is there more than one
11 Village Influential? 0 No
~ Lf ,..,. ,. . -'.116 £: '1'",( 1 Yes(';.. '::-"i ~ j, L"',.,1 ; 99 Don't know
• ~t ./ - 100 Unwilling to respond
Ifyes to QIl then ask QI2
Have there always been
12 multiple Influentials? 0 No
, f I :-,~ ./ r !,/d' ...... \ \ ,f 1 Yes
-
.... ~'J ,'-'.;;/> "'7:1 "')'. -/" 99 Don't know~,.
~
,
-
}
- 100 Unwilling to respond
If no to QI2 then ask the next questions, otherwise go to QI7.
Where did the new
13 influential come from? I Migrated from another village
r IJ".f ~ I ~ .:if .Til ;; 2 Migrated from a town
~ ~r~ ~ \-:r. : 11'';' A 3 Migrated from the city
. '---' ,
- 4 Rose from within the village
50 Other (specifY)
99 Don't know
100 Unwilling to respond
. .
When did the new Village U: IP O;IfUI~/I~CS/
14 Influential arise? ' <C .c:.. ~
(approximate time) •
What is the basis of the new
15 influencials power? I Biradery
-' .- L"I ,.-- r'o .~ Jfr r':"; 2 Religion
\ ( ,~ "v. J. q' 17/j' 3 Agriculture (Landlord)
, ~ ~
4 Economic power
5 Local moneylender
6 Aarti (middleman)
7 Educated
8 Opposition to the old Village
Influentials
50 Other (specifY)
99 Don't know
100 Unwilling to respond
Does the new Village
16 Influential own land? 0 No
,\ ,', ~'I >rl /' ? Jil jr'IJ' I Yes
/, ......- J .' 99 Don't know~
I '-!... ( 100 Unwilling to respond
What is the relationship
17 between the two Village I They work together
Influencials? 2 They are rivals
~ r :2 til •.,,- .~ Ii' 3 They have their own following
'.-.if"'r-,C: J;" 0 ,- ~ .......:1' ~ but are not rivals
~ '--" 7
.-- 50 Other (specifY)r
. '-<- 99 Don't know
LJ'---- ~lJQQJ Unwilling to respond
Needs ,.
What are the household's 3 -/./f'Vr: \~ ~c;-:~ .-:. <:..:( ~most important needs? ~ c.;( _ cr:}.-:/NI (write code)
I Agriculture
a Need I 2 Irrigation
3 Transport
b Need 2 4 Roads
5 Soling
c Need 3 6 Education
7 Sewerage
8 Health
9 Water (piped)
10 Water (quality)
11 Gas
12 Crime reduction
13 Welfare/poverty reduction
14 Land (for cultivation)
15 Land (for home)
16 Loans
17 Employment
18 Post office
19 Telephone
20 Mosque
21 Market
22 Vet hospital
23 Sanitation
24 Housing
50 Other (specifY)
100 Unwilling to respond
Whom does the household
N2 approach to articulate these 0 Noone
needs? 1 MNA
;' ...J/~.£', \.JJ'~r \\ 'I 2 MPA
h<Jeed r r- '<""~-l r1 r ;"1 3 Village influential (get name)
.: . '--' ':'" 4 Other influential (get name)
Need 2 5 Biradery members
6 Neighbourhood
Need 3 7 CBOs
8 NGO
50 Other (specify)
99 Don't know
100 Unwilling to respond
Has your household always
N3 approached this person for a No
their needs? 1 Yes
.-.15 ~ JO...P :.-- I A ~ ;\ 1,( 99 Don't know
;:. ~ d-!~. __';'" L r -/' ;, 100 Unwilling to respond
.~.
'-' ~
IfYes to QI3 then skip Q
N4-N6
Who did they go to before?
N4 (name and status)
When did they switch?
N5 (approximate date) /
~ cs.' 1.-4- <5'k '£lS c:!:f.:
Has the household ever
approached a government
N7 official a No
Unable to contact the
for their major needs? 1 government
.£. .,.,...1 .£',!;;"nJ:~;P/e.-:I (;J official directly
~ .- 'fx?ft fr>J/.~;',7r;' 2 Yes
.--< - ./ , , 100 Unwilling to respond
Ifyou feel unable to contact
N8 the govt official directly a No restrictions
then what are the
restrictions? I The Village Influential doesn't
~ ...-' ;J~J .J'r "i'r .:-.,/, ; (, f allow it
~ \...)...~ ~ , ~- ~ - 2 Unable to get an appointment
3 Don't know where he sits
We come from a lower
4 biradery
5 We are economically inferior
50 Other (specifY)
99 Don't know
100 Unwilling to respond
Ifyes to QN7 then whom ~ 30.hySej"~\ ~t-!.J
did they approach and were $cY'"
N9 they 0 No
responsive? I Yes
100 Unwilling to respond
EI Ifno to QN7 then why not? I
Has the community ever f0-' J'D~,.i- U.:f~ ...(u5,[$. ~
collectivized to self-provide /
ra
~c2.,d.J (, .z:oj;;?c..s; I
Nil for o ~,~ Xr~ .f ,f, :..-1
their needs?
<
I Yes
100 Unwilling to respond
If no to QNIl then what is My community doesn't belong
NI2 the reason? I to
r.r' /A'I 'J /.;.; /( a dominant biradery
'-' '-J.'.J My community doesn't belong
</'" .. ~ 2 to
•
"
. the dominant political party
3 My community belongs to a
minority religious group
4 Lack of a sense of community
because of biradery divisions
5 Lack of a sense of community
because of political divide
6 Lack of resources
Don't have contacts with
7 government
officials
8 Lack oftechnical know-how
9 Not our responsibility
10 Lack of leadership
II Lack of a sense of community
50 Other (specifY)
99 Don't know
100 Unwilling to respond
Ifyes to QNll then ask QN13-16
otherwise go to the next section.
/ ./
Ifyes to QNII then give 6 (ol.y I.!'(VY:;~J;~
details of the project and ~U?~~:.J
N13 how the
community came together.
Ifyes to QNII then did the
Village Influential
NI4 encourage it? 0 No
Ir" ./ '" f',<,,\ .i. "uA:(f ""', 1.( I Yes
-,
- <: ~\, .",1 ~ I , 99 Don't know
·u 100 Unwilling to respond
Where did the community
NI5 get the resources from? I Household's gave money
d,--J /,>-,f.'7',J
Borrowed form the
.:;,\J( , J .1 2 government
~.• '? .... .... • ..1 '7 Borrowed form the
t ...;, 5- I/"'" li' 3 moneylender
~
4 Borrowed from the Village
Influential
5 Money given by the Village
Influential
6 Borrowed from a bank
50 Other (specify)
99 Don't know
100 Unwilling to respond
Did the Village Influential
NI6 hey in any wat}CJ!If Lf
> .... .P.> ~ -:;t .:"1
- '-" - I'
P f' t b d"ar lCIPa orv 0 les
Have you heard of the musalihat
PI anjuman committee? 0 No
~ ;: \ - ..c I ,M , • ..f'
'" I ,1/ I Yes
1'-'- ~ /" f:" r "'" ~, " ~~ 100 Unwilling to respond
< ~-
I Very activeIf yes to PI then how active is it
in the village?
2 Active
3 Average
4 Not very active
5 Not active at all
99 Don't know
100 Unwilling to respond
Have you heard of Village g
P3 Neighbourhood ~ Gu/:,;:If' a No
committees? u::L~ .;£ _ 1 Yes
y<f <.;.v 100 Unwilling to respond
Ifyes to P3 then how active are
P4 they in the village? 1 Very active
-;1/ ,...li 1.-/ ... / ~a J 2 Active
'-'~ ) \......1- '-' - 3 Average< /"
C 4 Not very active
5 Not active at all
99 Don't know
100 Unwilling to respond
Have you heard of Citizen
P5 Community Boards? a No
<- Irc.......... ..". -' II f rc fl, 1 Yes
, <. '--"- lOa Unwilling to respond
Ifyes to P5 then how active are
P6 they in the village? 1 Very active
<:/-' r / ('/L \,-.( ......, / JU 2 Active
, <. I~J ' '-/- ~ - 3 Average
4 Not very active
5 Not active at all
99 Don't know
100 Unwilling to respond
Have you heard of School
P7 Management Committees? / a No
--'
L. £. /~ ,1- •~ (" Ir 1 Yes
~ . 100 Unwilling to respond,
-- (. .-0
,
'-'-
Ifyes to P7 then how active are
P8 they in the village? 1 Very active
,/" -; { r'l6'k, ( ~ -'" , ;11 ,;.J- rJ 2 Active
'. v, \ '-'., V v
~
3 Average
4 Not very active
5 Not active at all
99 Don't know
100 Unwilling to respond
Have you participated in the
P9 activities of an NGO? 0 No
~/~ )\ J .,fd~ (' J)3 1 Yes
,>::\~\ ~ ~ \ Y-,y 2 Not aware ofNGOs
• -
'-L
-J/ 100 Unwilling to respond
If no to P9 then what was the
PIO most dominant restriction? 0 No restriction
U o 9 >' J"';l', (-.-oJ'); \ S 1 No NGO has worked here
.... ' ,1./ J .-/ - The NGO didn't involve us
~ ;;, "'H 163..J 2 in
'\..) their activities
Not interested in working
3 with
NGOs
4 Don't trust NGOs
Not concerned with the
5 project
the NGO was working on
Bared by the Village
6 Influential
to work with NGOs
50 Other (specify)
99 Don't know
100 Unwilling to respond
Conflict resolution
Who does the household
Cl approach for conflict resolution? 0 Noone
-'
"'} ;:: .> I.,;L-v f~ ,~ 1 Policer I
-,
__ ';'1 t7
.-1 ,.u.,..u' 2 Panchayat(
( "'--"'-'"
~ 7 '--' 3 Village Influential
4 Local Government official
5 Biradery head
6 Neighbourhood head
7 Moneylender
50 Other (specify)
99 Don't know
100 Unwilling to respond
Has the household always
C2 approached the same person 0 No
for conflict resolution? I Yes
./ .~ , <:,,1 h ~ ~ 1'(0 99 Don't know
'-
...;
-----
r - .: 17 u 100 Unwilling to respond
, ......... ~ 7
..
Has your household ever
C3 approached the police? 0 No
",/, l..A "',,'" /' ....J J ,~ I Yes
'-.J y. ~"r~'-~<f 100 Unwilling to respond
, <: U '-" ~
Ifyes to C3 then how Extremely responsive;
C4 responsive were the police? I problem
;Xf~,.;I-, .; r ~ J resolved
'- 7 .. '-::-7; 2 Responsive, but problem not
. '--"
solved
3 Indifferent
4 Not very responsive
5 Not responsive at all
100 Unwilling to respond
There was no problem which
C5 If no to C3 then why not? 0 would
/.,LY I' /<1
require us to approach the
:> ,...Jy police
'-- '--" ...
-;,<----- -c?J I They don't do anything
1'-' .. - They are puppets of the
2 landlord
3 They are part of the problem
(the dispute)
They are corrupt and abuse
4 their
power
5 They make matters worse
6 We come from a minority
biradery thus we get no
attention
7 They refuse to meet us
We come from a minority
8 class
due to which they give us no
attention.
They have no authority to do
9 anything
50 Other (specify)
99 Don't know
100 Unwilling to respond
Is there a panchayat in the
C6 village? a No
/" .. -Ai ....,. f ,51«~I \,( 1 Yes
, < - ,., '-..-<- ~ ;- ~ 99 Don't know
100 Unwilling to respond
If yes to C6 then what is the
C7 basis of choosing members? 1 Biradery basis
.. I..~ r·...r"'r dJ .L,- ,I ;- 2 Level of education
"
-
-~ .
-,.." ':... 3 Age
~ --......._<.
4 Social power
Link to the Village
5 Influential
6 Issue wise
7 Economic power
Link to the Local
8 Government
50 Other (specify)
99 Don't know
100 Unwilling to respond
Ifyes to C6 then has any
C8 member of the household a No
participated in the panchayat? 1 Yes
r .:.". _....t-C' ~ .JJilJ 99 Don't know
'--- - 7 7
-' ".T •.>- 100 Unwilling to respond
'- ./ ~
Ifyes to C8 then did the
C9 household find it helpful? a No
(specify) 1 Yes
, /~'fi.1. '\ '> -N ( -2 (.( 99 Don't know
. ,
"
. 7 1 - 100 Unwilling to respond
Ifno to C8 then was there a
cIa restriction on the household's a No
participation? I Yes
~ ;;...; ;', .Ii., {{Ii 99 Don't know
,~ V"
- lOa Unwilling to respond
If yes to C Ia then what was that .
Cll restriction? a No restrictions
• .;;; , ,(/>J ,/,1. ,
.1 I Biradery specific
''-'' - - 2 Religious
We are rivals of the Village
3 Influential
4 Lack of economic power
5 Lack of social power
6 Gender
50 Other (specifY)
99 Don't know
lOa Unwilling to respond
Household rofile I-
What are the total number 0tu;. )j \2-0' J,V4- )iff~
people in the household? . J: 7
What is the biradery ofthe
H2 household? J. I Ansari
rJ I <I ,,1,)/ "I,' <'~ ..-£ 'I 2 Arain
I /. UJ < __~ I J 3 Baloch
"
- 4 Bhatti
5 Chauhan
6 Darzi
7 Dhoodhi
8 Faqir
9 Gappa
10 Guijar
11 Haral
12 Jats
13 Jolahay
14 Juj
15 Kami
16 Kashmiri
17 Kbarral
18 Kbokar
19 Kichi
20 Kumar
21 Lohar
22 Machay
23 Malik
24 Maral
25 Masiah
26 Maulvi
27 Mir
28 Mistry
29 Mochi
30 Mughal
31 Muslim Sheikh
32 Nayee
33 OtherKami
34 Pathan
35 Pir
36 Qureshi
37 Raja
38 Rajput
39 Sayal
40 Shah
41 Sheikh
42 Sunhar
43 Tarkhan
44 Utwal
45 Vains Jat
46 Wattoo
50 Other (specify)
99 Don't know
100 Unwilling to respond
H3 Does the village have pattis? a No
, , Jo" ... / J Vi ..;L'II,( 1 Yes
'-J •. 1 '--" _ '--'
7,..r ,.v 99 Don't know
I '"-:.' 100 Unwilling to respond
Ifyes to H3 askH4 and H5,
otherwise go to H6
/.
Ifyes to H3 then what patti does f. j. ~~\( ~ jJ.J>.J7 Ib~H4 your household ~ "1
belong to?
H5 Who heads your patti? (name)
: c::. c:.U .J~~ ~ <..<;';; I
What is the religion of the
H6 household? a None
, ....... L/ "' ;'" rJ r. II:, I:. .--(1' 1 Ahl-e-sunna
, <:
-
• £ 7 2 Ahl-e-hadise
3 Deowandi
4 Shia
5 Ahmedi
6 Hindu
7 Christian
8 Wahabi
9 Sikh
10 Parsi
II Ismaili
50 Other (specifY)
99 Don't know
100 Unwilling to respond
What is the ethnicity of the
H7 household? 0 None
<; __ 1.,/ r - ",,.9,J,,\ I Punjabi
. "
- -
v-' 2 Sindhi
3 Balochi
4 Pathan
5 Muhajir
6 Seraiki
50 Other (specifY)
99 Don't know
100 Unwilling to respond
What languages are spoken by
H8 the household? I Urdu
1..-.\\ '..-~ f r ,.if of ~'1 2 Punjabi
,
'-' ~ ;:-'",,-..J -; I '" '7r. IJ 3 English
. "-':" ~ . '-" 4 Persian
5 Seraiki
6 Pushto
7 Sindhi
8 Balochi
9 Hindi
50 Other (specifY)
100 Unwilling to respond
H9 Are you a Native or a Settler? I Native
.,.;. .'~,t {IT 5..-.1 ,h :(, ,( 2 Settler (canal colony)
'..1.< .' • ~ " $"~ - .. 3;~ ,S' • ' r, -." G I 3 Settler at partition (Muhajir)
....., /"J 4 Migrant after 1947 (get date)~ ~
._..,;~
50 don't know
100 Unwilling to respond
How long has the household
HlO been a resident in I Less than I year
the village? 2 1-5 years
<",. ..!'" .". r , ~ ,# ..... 1 >\ 3 5-10 years
• '->". ~- ~ '-' 1
4 10·25 years
5 More than 25 years
50 Other
99 Don't know
100 Unwilling to respond
Ifyou have moved in the last 10 ~ c..:r. c:!.:'\ .e::::-r.JIf ':( I
Hll years then where •
did the household migrate
from?
What were the reasons for
H12 migrating? 1 Better job opportunities
---
,.. • 11 ~ ~ .or \~IP _\ 2 Better living standard
. '--' ........-
~ ~ Did not like the people in our
~ .:as 2. ~ 3 old place
50 Other
99 Don't know
100 Unwilling to respond
Individual member profile
head ofthe household
117.a Age? j
J
b gender? ,.... ",....;J;I'
'--' .
c Does he/she have an NIC?
<; /"' I"... t· 1; ,//r::.Y /.~, IE, \ \.wI
d WRat is hislher leveIOf education?
(ifunder 18 is he/she still in/ 0 o~
school?) <, __ ;;:J~
, ,
'-' ,-
e Did he/she vote in 1997 ~I'; b ~
2001 dd5
2002 •
2005
Members above 18
--:+-118.aAge? _I 1_
b. Gender?
d What is his/her level of education?
e Did he/she vote in 1997
2001
2002
2005
l22.a Age?
b Gender?
c Does he/she have an NIC?
d What is his/her level of education?
e Did he/she vote in 1997
2001
2002
2005
123.a Age?
b Gender?
c Does he/she have an NrC?
d What is his/her level of education?
e Did he/she vote in 1997
2001
2002
2005
Children under 18
124.a Gender?
b Age?
c What is her/his educational status?
c Does he/she have an NIC?
d What is hislher level of education?
e Did he/she vote in 1997
2001
2002
2005
119.a Age?
b Gender?
c Does he/she have an NIC?
d What is his/her level of education?
e Did he/she vote in 1997
2001
2002
2005
120.a Age?
b Gender?
c Does he/she have an NIC?
d What is hislher level of education?
e Did he/she vote in 1997
2001
2002
2005
121.a Age?
b Gender?
c Does he/she have an NIC?
l25.a Gender?
b Age?
c What is her/his educational status?
l26.a Gender?
b Age?
c What is herlhis educational status?
l27.a Gender?
b Age?
c What is herlhis educational status?
l28.a Gender?
b Age?
c What is herlhis educational status?
EmDIO ment
EMI What was the household's
a main s~urce of income? -
b secondary source of income?
c tertiary source of income?
I
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
II
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
50
99
lOa
Agriculture
Government servant
Milkman
Blacksmith
Washer man
Barber
Business owner
Shopkeeper
Hawker
Trader
Doctor
Lawyer
Financial service provider
Moneylender
Agricultural labour
Day labourer
Monthly labour (permanent)
Monthly labour (contractual)
Domestic help
Migrant worker (domestic)
Migrant worker (abroad)
Army
Goldsmith
Herdsman
Transporters
Other (SpecifY)
Don't know
Unwilling to respond
Is the household involved in a
EM2 siep relationship? a No
~ , :,u- 5"r,rlk/.~~I t.f I Yes
1
'-.J J, /'-' ~ 100 Unwilling to respond
If the household is in~olved in
EM3 agricultural labour then Paid a fixed wage
what are the terms of the
contract with the landlord? Low wage + interest free loan
J ~.-> .:£/ t'>"'.J''''- .:{ <-.->-( )\ Wage + payment in kind
,,...,'-(- /'.1.:~~ ;::J l..:u 'J 1" J 1 50 Other (SpecifY)
< "
-
,
99 Don't know
______________1100 1Unwilling to respond
If the household is involved in
EM4 agricultural labour then 0 No
has there been an increase in
wages over the last 10 yrs? 1 Yes - marginally
r I""~I ¢",£l .-( I.le....... .,...~d£. 2 Yes -significantly
- -
~- ~- ~~('
,,,,-\"-jl .., 99 Don't know
~ ~ 100 Unwilling to respond
Has there been an increase in
EM5 non-farm employment 0 No
over the last 10 years? 1 Yes - marginally
.J {'.' ft ,I' .",u;:\/ /.' j,J' 2 Yes -significantly
U v~ ~J --;~1 ::- 99 Don't know
,
100 Unwilling to respond
Has there been an increase in
EM6 employment opportunities 0 No
outside the village over the
last 10 years? 1 Yes - marginally
~ ... 11 .,. r ;1 .~ Ad (,( 2 Yes -significantlv
<...... d
'"
,f:I:., I . .. r ,,., f'J' ~, 99 Don't know
<- '--J~ ~ ''::J . -/. ' 100 Unwilling to respond
Do you feel you have multiple
EM? job opportunities or do 0 No options
you feel confined to one form
of employment? 1 Options have gone down
Industries have been wiped
(Get details) 2 out (shutting
/ /,' ~ L!j'w I down of traditional activitiesIrl r c;,J j r.¢ like pottery)
J '-'. v , Have options but they are
- ,r....:'I~ r ~;,C<: 3 limited
• '-J_ - s- Have options but they re
4 within the
same industry
5 Have many options
50 Other (specify)
99 Don't know
100 Unwilling to respond
I EM8 I Has there been an increase in [:::.Q]LNc.c:.o _
employment opportunities
created by passing-by traffic
over the last 10 years? 1 Yes - marginally
(e.g. the ability to set up tea-
shops or repair shops) 2 Yes -significantly
(. J;ltf
"". .J/ .-? A"f, ,I· 99 Don't know
. '"'"' ,-;, Iii ,J\ '";' ~'::::I (:'I ;::., -. ,,~~.:' 100 Unwilling to respond
, <
--:I
Has there been closure of
traditional
EM9 jobs/roles/activities? a No
Yes - some have been
e.g. Pottery 1 eliminated
~ 1\ ri Yes - a lot have been- ' J'r 2 eliminated,.,
'- f.I ~-
-
'-'
,,,",,'I" 99 Don't know
, <
- 100 Unwilling to respond
Ifyes to EM9 then since when
EMI0 has the erosion ofjobs 1 About 1 year ago
taken place? 2 <3 years ago
~ .,., /q)' I' -I"' "" /"'"' \ 3 <5 years ago
u ~J . ]
r' ..- 4 <7 years ago
" --:.... 5 <10 years ago
6 About 10 years ago
7 More than 10 years ago
99 Don't know
100 Unwilling to respond
<
Do any of the women in the
EMIl household have a job? a No
SJIr,h, ',cI' ;; {, [ ~rr,/ 1 Yes
v.J -J V '/.P 100 Unwilling to respond
.
Ifyes to EMIl How long
have they had this job? 0JJ
Is the household significantly
EM13 dependent on remittances? a No
(domestic or from abrpad) 1 Yes
d. :I ..r~ /,,1 i6£.L'I'( 50 Other (Specify)
'-'
-." ~~·~.-fJr" ':1' 99 Don't know
, < /' ~ 100 Unwilling to respond
Ifyes to EMl3 then where did
the worker migrate to?
Ifyes to EMl3 then when did
the worker migrate?
./
Debt
What is the amount of loan taken
D1 by the household in the 0 None
last 12 months? 1 <3000
..... II. ~ '.r. 1:,\:" .--('1' 2 <5000
- ~ .:~ v" 1.1 ,p:;' [.-j 3 <8000
. <
- .I 4 <10000
5 <12000
6 <15000
7 >15000
50 Other (specifY)
99 Don't know
100 Unwilling to respond
If no loan was taken then skip
to the next section.
If a loan was taken then who
D2 gave the loan? 1 Bank
,lJS I.J .;;;.. ~ .-f 2 Government establishment
- ./ U 3 Village Influential
4 Landlord
5 Landlord's manager
6 Neighbour
7 Village moneylender
50 other (specifY)
100 Unwilling to respond
D3 What are the terms of the loan? I repay with no interest
~ _1 .• /1.",1;;" ( ;;~. 2 repay with <10% interest
~< - ./ ./ 3 repay with <15% interest
-
4 repay with <20% interest
5 repay with >20% interest
repay with no interest but
6 work in the
moneylenders house
Ifyes to A4 then ask A5-A7,
otherwise go to A8.
repay with no interest but
7 give a portion
of the household's produce
50 other (specifY)
99 don't know
100 Unwilling to respond
Do you have any other
J2! relationship with the person you 0 No
borrowed from apart from
financial? I We work on his lands
~ 'I ~.J _b'~ eLl 9/::> ;.,;; 2 We work in his house
~
..: / ~ ,: 3 We trade for him
, c ~
- He owns our house4
He is the head of our
5 community
50 Other (specifY)
99 Don't know
100 Unwilling to respond
A ricultural households
How much land does the,c~
• 4
household own?
When did you obtain this land
(approximate date)?
Who was the land bought
from? (name)
Has the household sold any (
land? When? c' J.
. .
/
A5 IHow much land was sold? D_.L__~_<::s_:6_u---,-;-f_·_c:._·_t::_)__c?_·-----;-"1
I D ~C:;c5.idlA6 Who was the land sold to? L- . _
A7 Why was the land sold? 1 Needed the money
:' It was idle land not being
i! /l!: ( f! UyJ 2 cultivated
~
3 It was not very fertile land
4 We decided to move out of
agriculture
We were forced to sell the
5 land
50 Other (specify)
99 Don't know
100 Unwilling to respond
.L:s .-<fl' ::;f r,l\ '.I :. l~ \
How much land does the .. - '-' ~.c; ~A
A8 household rent in?
If the household rents in land
A9 what is the nature of the I Sharecropping
contact? 2 Fixed rent
rJ f ...( -'.:.J/-,~~ ~J ..?A 3 Tenancy
~ )' ~- ~ . ",~ ~ 50 Other (specify)eft'
, , . 99 Don't know
100 Unwilling to respond
How much land does the 'd
household rent out? ' l
If the household rents out
All land what is the nature of the 1 Sharecropping
contact? 2 Fixed rent
..;;i ..v'j~,v (>,.)~ 3 Tenancy
~- J' "':(/'-0 .. 0 50 Other (specify),-", - ,t, /"J~'"
< - v 'J 99 Don't know
100 Unwilling to respond
How many acres controlled ~ l". IIjV.I7 '(;J Kif;' ci:: I y)
AI2 by the household are ,~..2-
. -
cultivated?
How many acres ofthe land cJl:..'6()J~\d .£~;~'/A13 controlled by the household
"CO w J \". ~
is irrigated by canals? ' < ,
What is the main Rabi
A14 (summer) crop grown by the a None
household? 1 Wheat
, IJ,L..LP (' ~JIJ-J 50 Other (specify)
"
_ 'V
V'-"" '-.I' 99 Don't know
100 Unwilling to respond
What is the average yield per
acre?
What is the main Kharif
A16 (winter) crop grown by the a None
household? 1 Sugarcane
lA..• / / r 2 Cotton,c:. '.1 '7 ,~
, .
-V v ':/ " 3 Rice
50 Other (specify)
99 Don't know
100 Unwilling to respond
Does the household make use
A18 of any machinery? What a No
is it? 1 Yes (specify)
.....r vP ' J,., :. ./// w.Y < ,1',.( 99 Don't know
'-"
'---'; ./1.. /r II~ I /h'~. ,.;;.., 100 Unwilling to respond
• '---'~ J 'V ~-
Ifyes to Al8 then ask Al9 and
A20, otherwise go to A21
Is the machinery owned or
A19 rented? 1 Owned
/,.1/ ,v ~ I J:-'I" ..z,. t . (' 2 Rented
-J .., , v ~ \.) 1 \..:.)-
-;, ",- .J 99 Don't know
cJ? 100 Unwilling to respond
When did the household get
A20 this machinery?
/.l.~' r .;fr ....;..,
Did the use of machinery
L-~:.:..J increase the level of output
1 Within last year
2 1-4 years ago
3 5 vears ago
4 5-9 years ago
5 More than 10 years ago
99 Don't know
100 Unwilling to respond
a No
cultivated? 1 yes - marginally
,~ /'" ;, ,J A I ,,;;.- \ ~d 2 yes - average
<-'" '.J -.3;",/?, (' ~.... J:I ~> ,£t 3 yes - substantially
, .
., / ~
-
"~J . 99 Don't know
100 Unwilling to respond
Has there been an increase in
A22 the size of the market 0 No
available to the household for
selling its produce in over 1 Yes - marginally
the last 10 years? 2 Yes - significantly
c:::11 Iwr:'Ir\ ... ,\J~; ... ,... J1 99 Don't know
",;,,,,,, ~-~ ~(: I' "';;;- \ t.? ...~ 100 Unwilling to respond
• (0 L '-"- ~ ,-"
Have you ever been
approached by a factory to
A23 sell 0 No
your produce to them? 1 Yes (name)
':"'11. ) I~ILJ. ,£'\ ~_ ,,.w ,c-f \.(
~ t":-V.~... ,..I ;,.,'t'.b - ;; 100 Unwilling to respond
,
~ . I. ~ v
Ifyes to A23 then as A24-
A26, otherwise go to A27.
If yes to A23 are the terms of
A24 the factory better than 0 No
what you received earlier? 1 yes - marginally
_.-l !.; /' .£1(<;;;::' ,f'~ 1./ 2 yes - substantially
, 7
-
, '--/
-.J'rv'3J 100 Unwilling to respond
'7./
Is your trading with the Through an aarti
A25 factory through an aarti 1 (middleman)
(middleman) or is it direct? 2 Directly
I ~.:.¢' / i r ,1.1 d :-, ,Id 50 Other (specify)
. '-'}
", v~ :;y .( .7 J::'e;' : ,.- 100 Unwilling to respond,
. '-'5 7-' -...I '
Has trading with a factory
A26 caused you to change your 0 No
production set-up? Ifyes then
how? I Yes - Had to mechanize
/ :k Yes - Had to produce a
"r
. " /" ?
';',//J,.I.-- b .. <; ( _ 2 different variety
,,,,, '( J.r-:i -':._<' .,....P ift-,j j, than before
,
<: v, .'-J '-'- 'J
50 Other (specify)
lOa Unwilling to respond
Has there been a general
A27 increase in productivity over a No
the last 10 years? I yes - marginallv
,.t\
-.-0/ •JI ......,p ,.( 2 yes - average
,,,,,,y:.; ~;/':"', ~ ,;/-" ~ -/~)::(n P 3 yes - substantially
, ,
- ... ? ." ~ 99 Don't know
lOa Unwilling to respond
Households involved in
business
Does the household own or rent
~ the business premises I Owned - Within the house
and where are the premises
located? 2 Owned - Inside the Village
,{ ,L.illl- ;.- I ,."",t';' 110:1', ,( 3 Owned - Other Village
'-' ''; .i1~
-t_...- i/ 4 Owned - Cityc k-' ..JJ>,I' \ r7'-" /> ->
,- ,
- , .;"'-'_\ _.Ift 5 Owned-Town
C /,. -J .. 6 Rented - Within the house
7 Rented - Inside the Village
8 Rented - Other Village
9 Rented - City
10 Rented - Town
50 Other (specify)
99 Don't know
lOa Unwilling to respond
Does the household own or lease
B2 the machinery used? a No machinery used
~ '" {.\l~\ AA> .\ "It I Own
1. .,'""' c:::. J .1_7:~'~19 2 Lease
U - '- /, -.1 ---: - ~ ;.., I 3 Own and lease
. --.c '-_J7 50 Other (specify)
99 Don't know
lOa Unwilling to respond
Does the household own or lease
B3 the tools used? a No tools used
l.r ot'r lJi _ ~ I hI r- \\'T I Own
:''-'':-7 'I ~.J ~ .f '-' 1 ., 2 Lease
3 Own and lease
50 Other (specify)
99 Don't know
lOa Unwilling to respond
Has the scope of the business
~ changed since the building I Significantly decreased
of the motorway (10 years ago)? 2 Moderately decreased
.f-"(~ ~ L~ L d-.,} Y"IJ 3 No change
7
< ,.-'V' I 'i' {:.; "" .J. L. .. :it, 4 Moderately increased
<
-
./ ......-
,
5 Significantly increased
99 Don't know
lOa Unwilling to respond
Has there been an increase in the
$ size of the market (no, a No
of clients) in which the
f--- household can sell its good/ I Yes - Marginally
services over the last 10 years? 2 Yes - Significantly
L .l ",i .fir ,elL.<. .,.-.., M f .( 99 Don't know
~- -, .~',';;, ~ 100 Unwilling to respond,-" I', .1 :.1
< - '-'.
.-I
Has there been an increase in
~ competition faced by the a No
business over the last 10 years? I Yes - Marginally
:.,( ~ ~ loll '> A.o? 1,( 2 Yes - Significantly
~ l-! -7 "'..>~:.r ,1.,YJ It _..,~u-;... 99 Don't know
- ../ - .
co .... lOa Unwilling to respond
<
,
Ifyes to B6 then where is the New businesses emerging
B7 competition coming from? I within the
..l ,/ .(.~ti s.l.-I;:'" g .J village
~
- 1mports from nearby towns,
~ ~ ~. j-' /"'"'. 2 villages and
cities
New businesses migrating to
3 the village
50 Other (specify)
99 Don't know
100 Unwilling to respond
fild'tExpen I ure pro I e
./ '"
What was the household's • ~W"-":/. \::L,. 1Ibf. 6< \, Fz:' ,/" .. -B)EPI average monthly expenditure
I- C~ '\..Oc../- , '
over the last three months? (in
LJ'---R---'-S) LJ'---- _
EP2
Has the)r:duction,
0 Noaverage foo flces over
the last 10 years. ~ Yes
how do I get themt~t for ~owinflation? 99
"- 100 Unwilling0- respond
During the last one week, d- ~!.>JlY .J:.'Iu:e M.~
EP3 roughly, how many times did '? j '7
the family consume the <;~ j4f~ c,:,1 r-J~
following?
• (",_. ~~,--'Z_
'-._-',
a Meet r~ ::-,f
b Eggs ./ >;, I
c Sweet .11.( ~ I r~
-
d Rice r ,_ ( 'Y
'-.../ .,
e Roghani bread c .1' r' j~J
'--'
f Plain roti SC( " \
'-'
g Milk products < I CI ;'~, ....
-
'-'"
h Vegetables r C/
~/'
1 Pulses r \ I ::;
'--"
During the last month, on how
EP4 many days did all the 0 0
members ofthe household have
all meals? I <5
.> ,.. d:,f;' AI' r ,J'".(,e d 2 <10
1'-'
"I ......,~ 7 C 3 <15
1(' [.i ,/ .0 /"" r _ .:.,;J 4 <20
J J' ..... ~ ~ 5 <25
" {,;;, l.~ 6 <30
. - Everyday7
99 Don't know
LJL ----'I-.!QQJ Unwilling to respond
What quantity of the following 0;::" .>y.c.fI .so C;:,) /;!
EP5 is consumed? </rl~1
Wheat flour (annually) l~ "1 . - -a
b Maize flour (annually)l;'Y Ii ~
c Cooking oil (monthly) elf ~_l)J
v~
"
If the income of the household
EP6 was increased by Rs. 100 0 0
per month how much would be
spent on food? r 1 <10
'"
f.J ~. (, 100 > ,X r /,,/, 2 <20
,. ,.!?' I- -; (' ,,,( .'"'..... , 'j../3l.b' 3 <30
c r v / ;; ::r ~ ,...., '., (--J 4 <40
'-'v ....... / .I~ 5 <50
6 <60
7 <70
8 <80
9 <90
10 More than 90
99 Don't know
100 Unwilling to respond
/ .b ./
What percentage of yearly food .J.JL;~ ~~cJL,..v.~\
EP7 consumption comes
.I r /j" .rJ.~
from the following sources? ~ "
(write code)
a Purchases from the market 0 0
I
.;. ~ > .J~V 1 10%
b Self grown "J - 2 20%
, ",. >~ l" ,!J 3 30%
c From share-croppihg 4 40%
/' ,",y,~"';:' JoY' :: ~I ~/ ,7 5 50%l.rJ rl
, ..... d" In-kind wage v'-' 6 60%
n/ .... - ar-' ,('~ 7 70%
-- 8 80%e Other (specify)
9 90%
Siep (unequal reciprocal patron-
f client relatioQ)..~ - 0</.,( - ...... 10 100%
.~- -
-------------1l22J Don't knowD.QQJ Unwilling to respond
Nature of dwellin
How many rooms are there
in the house?
Is the house owned or
N2 rented? / I Self-owned
c -,J I ,..( \ /" U. tt' ,.;r 2 Rented
')7 -J - , ., J 3 Rent-free
Informal arrangement
4 (specify)
5 Squatters
50 Other (specify)
99 Don't know
100 Unwilling to respond
If house is self-owned, ask
date of obtaining ownership.
If rented, rent-free
arrangement or squatter, ask
N4 about I Government
ownership of land on which
house is built. 2 Landlord (specify name)
It (! Moneylender (specify, ,.... 3 name)
, , 50 Other (specify)
99 Don't know
100 Unwilling to respond
Observed physical structure
N5 ofthe house? I Pucca (brickes)
Semi-pucca (part brick and
2 part mud)
3 Kaccha (mud)
50 Other (specify)
Observed physical condition
N6 of the house I Seriously dilapidated
2 Major repairs needed
3 Minor repairs/ reasonable
structure
4 Sound structure
50 Other (specify)
Where is the household's
N7 toilet facility? a None (in the fields)
c;.# r,(J ~,[ ~ ~ I Outside the house
, .:; ,
'V 2 Inside the house
50 Other (specify)
100 Unwilling to respond
What source of lighting does
N8 the household use? / I Electricity
r<' :'J~ '';'''1 .for 2 Kerosene
, ---:L J ~ .....,
.J 3 LPG cylinder
4 Mustard oil
50 Other (specify)
99 Don't know
100 Unwilling to respond
What source of cooking fuel
N9 does the household use? I Natural gas
.,,/ :(, ~ ~', II., ,·.l,rl' 2 Kerosene
\.-/ ~ 1 3 LPG cylinder
C r .- ;- It, l>,J. 4 Wood
¥ "-:' ·v 5 Charcoal
6 Gas/biogas
7 Electricity
8 Dung cake
50 Other (specify)
99 Don't know
100 Unwilling to respond
Does the household have an
NIO electricity connection? a No
t r' r ~. I Yes
~ '-.J • 100 Unwilling to respond
If yes to N 1athen rate the
Nil regularity of the supply. 1 Lowest
,1\1 /' ,""' ~ JJ=' 2~ \
\J
-
.:; '-J
...... <~\... 'r,(.!J, 3
• <.. v .
-------------IJ==±j Highest
Does the household have a
NI2 natural gas connection? 0 No
,Y ::;J':t~ 1 Yes
< '--' '-..I' 100 Unwilling to resDond
If yes to N13, rate the
N13 regularity of the supply. 1 Lowest
,- ., I - ,':I G ' ~\ \~ 2
. ,-= , -cr
- < --= \J" 3
4
5 Highest
Assets
In what quantity does the household
.2:/U \:: £/-41
own the following?
Cattle and buffaloes/cows •
-<" Lv.
.-=~ -.;:::7•.
Sheep/goats < "(" . !
, !~.
Poultry r> I .< J'
- J
Horses ~ ~:f
Donkeys <1,7
L
Other livestock
"
Does the household own a C. cSFwatch/clock? <
Is it new or second-hand? ;;; _.> ,rI-' 1 New
,~.....~L. 2 Second-hand
How many years ago did Ybu'bu}r'it Or
receive it? .-:::. .\ . r
-=--= ,
Does the household own a car?
-< ~ I~
, '--'
Is it new or second-hand? 1 New
2 Second-hand
How many years ago did you buy it or
receive it?
Does the household own a ~cP)/
motorcycle?
Is it new or second-hand? I New
2 Second-hand
How many years ago did you buy it?
Does the household own a bicycle? (~
Is it new or second-hand? I New
2 Second-hand
How many years ago did you buy it or
receive it?
/
Does the household own a tractor? ~?
Is it new or second-hand? I New
2 Second-hand
How many years ago did you buy it or
receive it?
Does the household own a cart? './}.i )
Is it new or second-hand? I New
2 Second-hand
How many years ago did you buy it or
receive it?
Does the household own any other
.JJ" JJ
mode of transport?
(Specify)
Is it new or second-hand? I New
2 Second-hand
How many years ago did you buy it or
receive it?
I_D_o_e'-'s_t_he_h_ou_s_e_h_o_ld_o_w_n_a_r_a_d_iO_?_----IB -'-)__
Is it new or second-hand? I New
2 Second-hand
How many years ago did you buy it or
receive it?
Does the household get a newspaper? 0 No
I I ;" I I Yes
,
If no to a. then do you have access to a
newspaper? 0 No
I Yes
Does the household own a television?
!
Is it new or second-hand? I New
2 Second-hand
How many years ago did you buy it or
receive it?
Does the household own a VCRlDVD
player?
Is itnew or second-hand? 1 New
2 Second-hand
How many years ago did you buy it or
receive it?
Does the household own a
refrigerator or freezer?
Is it new or second-hand? 1 New
2 Second-hand
How many years ago did you buy it?
Does the household own an electric or
gas cooker?
Is it new or second-hand? 1 New
2 Second-hand
How many years ago did you buy it or
receive it?
IDoes the household own a sewing or D----tu"-'r~:""·+O~[--{(j~».Lk',,-----
knitting machine? ~3L.)
Is it new or second-hand? I New
2 Second-hand
How many years ago did you buy it or
receive it?
Does the household own a water or ~~l,{.oG
treadle numn 7
,
(electric)?
Is it new or second-hand? I New
2 Second-hand
How many years ago did you buy it or
receive it?
Does the household own a fan or lA·cooler?
Is it new or second-hand? I New
2 Second-hand
How many years ago did you buy it or
receive it?
Does the household own a washing
machine?
Is it new or second-hand? I New
2 Second-hand
How many years ago did you buy it or
receive it? .
Does the household own a telephone?
Is it new or second-hand? I New
2 Second-hand
How many years ago did you buy it or
receive it?
Does the household own a mobile
phone?
Is it new or second-hand? I New
2 Second-hand
How many years ago did you buy it or
receive it?
